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1Introduction 
There is mounting evidence that economic differences 
between regions within the same EU Member States are 
growing. Some regions, generally capital city regions 
and larger metropolitan centres, are faring much better 
than other regions. These divergences, if unchecked, 
could undermine social and territorial cohesion. 
Growing interregional inequality is one factor that is 
leading to disenchantment with existing political 
systems, which in turn is weakening the social bonds 
that ground our democratic systems.  
This report analyses shifts in the employment structures 
of the EU regions. Identifying these shifts in 
occupational and sectoral employment, and how these 
vary across regions, can help policymakers to 
understand how structural change contributes to 
unbalanced regional growth patterns.  
The analysis compares patterns of employment growth 
and decline in four types of region: capital city, other 
largely urban, intermediate and largely rural. It covers 
130 regions over the period 2002–2017 in 9 of the larger 
Member States: Belgium, Czechia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
These regions account for nearly four out of five EU 
workers. 
Policy context 
Regions have an important place in EU policymaking, 
notably in cohesion policy. They are the basic territorial 
units for the application of policies that account for 
nearly one-third of the overall EU budget. To date, the 
EU has been successful in its objective of reducing 
economic disparities between Member States. A 
combination of catch-up growth and regional policy  
has contributed to faster growth of GDP per head in 
central and eastern European Member States over the 
last 15 years, just as it enabled earlier accession 
countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain to 
converge economically with the founding Member 
States of the European Community.  
However, in recent years, it has become apparent that 
the gap in the economic fortunes between regions 
within many Member States has been growing. Electoral 
patterns suggest that this is one of the factors fuelling 
the disenchantment of EU citizens with established 
political parties and the rapid emergence of populist 
alternatives adept at drawing electoral advantage from 
such disenchantment. 
Key findings 
Population and employment growth have been much 
stronger in the capital city regions of all nine Member 
States than in the other types of regions of the same 
country. In 2002–2017, employment grew by 19% in 
capital city regions compared to 10–12% elsewhere. 
This was reflected in a growing share of national 
economic output. The metropolitan areas of London, 
Paris and Stockholm accounted for at least 30% of the 
GDP of their respective countries.  
Capital city regions are distinctive in that they have a 
very high share of employment in the service sector. 
These regions deindustrialised earlier and faster than 
other regions, with their early specialisation in services 
proving fortuitous in the context of the modern shift 
towards a service-based economy. Nearly 75% of 
national employment and economic output are now in 
services, but this share rises to 85% and above in many 
capital city regions. 
In the nine Member States, employment shifts as a 
whole have been upgrading (more net new employment 
in well-paid jobs), accompanied by mild polarisation 
(somewhat greater employment growth in low-paid 
jobs than in mid-paid jobs). Nonetheless, capital city 
regions appear to be a significant vector of  
employment polarisation. They have disproportionately 
high shares of well-paid, high-skilled employment in 
knowledge-intensive services, but the shares of                     
low-paid employment have also grown in most of the 
capital city regions over the period analysed.  
Despite growing economic cleavages between capital 
city regions and other regions, there is evidence that 
employment structures at regional level are converging 
towards the average European employment structure. 
For example, the rapid contraction of the agricultural 
sector in Poland over recent decades and the 
corresponding growth of employment in manufacturing 
and especially services has been an important driver of 
upward convergence in that Member State. At the same 
time, regions within the same country are becoming 
more disparate in their employment structures, 
whereas differences between Member States are either 
decreasing or staying the same. 
The countries and regions where employment in 
manufacturing has proven to be the most resilient 
(Czechia, Poland and some German regions) are those 
in which mid-paid employment has held up best.  
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2Policy pointers 
While the EU has been successful in reducing economic 
disparities between Member States, social inequality 
has continued to increase, and more recently, rising 
inequality between regions within countries has 
emerged as a public and policy concern.  
Public investment, for example in the form of public 
services employment, plays an important role in 
supporting more regionally balanced growth, as jobs in 
education, health and public administration tend to 
have above-average pay levels and are more evenly 
spread geographically.  
Regional mobility has been regarded as one antidote to 
unbalanced regional growth, with individuals 
encouraged to transfer from declining regions to   
higher-growth regions. However, this risks leaving 
unfavoured regions even further behind. The need for 
integration is just as great for regions as for individuals 
and is even more acute for those regions beset by 
industrial decline or depopulation. 
Given the increasingly digital – and in many cases, 
location-independent – nature of much work, universal 
high-quality broadband availability is one obvious 
example of a policy that may contribute to the dispersal 
of labour activity. However, good-quality employment – 
often work that could, in principle, be carried out 
remotely or virtually – has, in practice, tended to cluster 
more and not less in large, urban, and often capital city, 
regions. Connectivity, while helpful, may only be one 
small part of the answer to the problem of regionally 
unbalanced growth.  
EU regional policy should continue to assist unfavoured 
regions not to fall further behind regional powerhouses. 
Infrastructural investments provide the connective 
tissue strengthening linkages between different      
regions and region types. Human capital investments 
(for example, through the European Social Fund and 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund) help 
individuals and companies in such regions to adapt to 
changing workplace needs. Such policies can mitigate 
the risks of the overconcentration of economic activity 
in some areas and territorial disconnection in others.  
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shifts in employment structures has been carried out at 
national level and aggregate EU level. In this report, the 
analysis is extended to cover developments at regional 
level in nine of the more populous Member States: 
Belgium, Czechia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These 
countries account for nearly four out of five EU workers.  
Why do a regional analysis? 
There are various motives for wanting to carry out a 
regional-level analysis. Firstly, regions have an 
important place in EU policymaking, notably in 
cohesion policy. They are the basic territorial units for 
the application of policies that account for nearly a third 
of the overall EU budget – policies that have been 
successful in raising living standards in many less 
developed regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 
2013). Identifying what dimensions of the employment 
structure help less developed regions to converge 
towards average output levels can inform cohesion 
policy. 
Secondly, much differentiation in economies, labour 
markets and employment structures is visible only with 
a region-based analysis. On average, the most 
productive region in a developed economy is twice as 
productive as its least productive (OECD, 2018), which is 
reflected in large differences in labour market 
opportunities and, in turn, in employment and 
population growth. National averages conceal these 
large differences. They also fail to convey an important 
message from recent studies of regional inequality in 
the EU: that the trend towards upward convergence 
observed at national level across the EU conceals a 
growing divergence within countries. In other words, 
some regions are faring much better than other regions 
in the same Member State.  
Thirdly, interregional differences in terms of prosperity 
and economic dynamism have social and political 
ramifications, in some cases potentially undermining 
the social bonds that ground our democracies. In 
particular, the interests of large, metropolitan capital 
city areas and the regions outside them appear to be 
diverging in terms of electoral outcomes, reflecting 
cleavages in economic dynamism. The strong regional 
differentiation of the vote in the UK referendum on             
EU membership is one example (over 60% of London- 
and Scotland-based citizens voted to remain in the EU, 
while the overall vote in favour of leaving was 52%). 
Urban–rural divides in voting patterns have also been 
observed in national elections in Hungary and Poland, 
where incumbent conservative nationalist governments 
were returned to power based on large, regional,         
non-metropolitan majorities. More recently, the ‘gilets 
jaunes’ protests in France can also be interpreted as an 
expression of the contrast between perceived 
metropolitan comfort and provincial discontent. In 
summary, the growing economic importance of larger 
cities has been accompanied by the growing electoral 
importance of regions that are being ‘left behind’ in 
what Rodríguez-Pose (2018) has called the ‘revenge of 
the places that don’t matter’. 
Rise of the capital city 
These tensions appear to have roots that are highly 
territorial as well as social. It would be surprising if they 
were not driven in part by, or at least reflected in, shifts 
in the employment structure, crucial as this is to income 
generation and distribution.  
The broadest structural shift in employment has been 
the successive transitions from an agrarian to a 
manufacturing to a services paradigm of productive 
activity. The latest phase, which began in the 1970s, 
coincided with a renewed concentration of resources – 
human and financial capital – in big cities. In the             
post-war period, manufacturing tended to disperse 
production away from capital city regions to mixed 
urban–rural, intermediate regions. In retrospect, this 
may have contributed to more balanced regional 
growth, as the benefits of territorially dispersed 
production compensated for the secular decline in 
agriculture in less densely populated areas. Capital city 
regions deindustrialised fastest and were the first to 
undergo the ‘services transition’. This early 
specialisation in services proved fortuitous, with nearly 
three-quarters of employment and output now 
generated by the service sector. The corollary has been 
the decline in fortunes in many regions with a strong 
manufacturing specialisation, and weak population 
growth or depopulation in many rural, agricultural 
regions. 
What particularities of the growing service sector may 
be contributing to these spatial divergences? Many 
service activities rely on face-to-face or in-person 
provision (notably public services such as health and 
education but also private services such as 
accommodation, restaurants and much retail). This, in 
principle, should be an equalising vector, as services 
employment needs to be as broadly dispersed as the 
overall population to meet demand.  
Introduction
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private service) activities that benefit considerably from 
agglomeration effects and therefore tend to cluster in 
more densely settled urban areas. Most services of this 
kind are skilled and require higher-level qualifications. 
These jobs have been referred to as ‘symbolic-analytic’ 
(Reich, 1991) and involve the manipulation of 
information and specialised knowledge. They include 
most higher-skilled jobs in media and communications, 
information technology, law, accountancy, and so on. 
Earlier predictions that ICT developments would render 
place of work irrelevant for these types of work have 
turned out to be wide of the mark. Even though an 
increasing share of work is performed in front of a 
computer screen with a network connection (and could, 
in principle, be carried out anywhere), the importance 
of proximity to a city when it comes to accessing        
good-quality employment opportunities has grown,     
not declined.  
This may partially relate to the effects of competition,  
as well as what Michael Porter (2000) has called the 
‘location paradox’: the more things are mobile, the 
more decisive location becomes. Outsourcing or 
offshoring tend to underline that 
anything that can be efficiently sourced from a 
distance has essentially been nullified as a 
competitive advantage in advanced economies [...] 
the most enduring competitive advantages in a 
global economy seem to be local. 
(Porter, 2000, p. 32) 
As generic inputs to production become more abundant 
and readily accessible, ‘prosperity depends on the 
productivity with which factors are used and upgraded 
in a particular location’ (Porter, 2000, p. 19). Such 
improvements particularly benefit from the density of 
linkages with buyers, suppliers and other institutions – 
and this is where cities have a clear advantage.                
For these reasons, rather than dispersing power and 
resources, globalisation has tended to reinforce the 
economic salience of some existing ‘global cities’ – 
London, New York, Shanghai and Tokyo – and given 
privileged places to other regional or national capitals 
as transaction nodes in the global economy. 
Knowledge-based service activities tend to cluster in 
these types of cities. 
Commonly cited examples of this are the City of London 
for financial services, Silicon Valley for information 
technology and Hollywood for film production. In these 
knowledge-based sectors, having highly qualified 
professionals located in close proximity and exchanging 
ideas augments productivity and innovation. Demand 
arising from the higher wages of such workers also 
sustains many lower-paid service jobs.  
Moretti (2012) refers to ‘thick labour markets’, where job 
opportunities are generated by a variety and volume of 
firms and employers and a matching variety and volume 
of qualified workers in close proximity. The advantages 
of cities in terms of thick labour markets, as well as the 
cultural amenities they offer as centres of learning and 
entertainment, have tended to outweigh any 
disadvantages in terms of cost of living, cost of labour    
or congestion. And these advantages tend to be             
self-compounding: the things that attract firms and 
people to big cities in the first place are boosted, in turn, 
by further agglomeration (Glaeser, 2008). 
Additionally, service outputs may often be the inputs  
for other service sectors, such as legal services, 
employment agencies, translation and accounting. 
Economies of scope have self-reinforcing effects as 
skilled, specialised individuals tend to gravitate to these 
same regions or areas, where the opportunities are 
located. These compounding advantages tend to 
sharpen regional imbalances. The highest recent 
increases in relative prosperity in the EU (measured by 
GDP per head) were all in capital city regions: Bratislava, 
Bucharest, Dublin, London and Warsaw-Mazowieckie 
(Eurostat, 2018). 
EJM contribution to the evidence 
The EJM applies a methodology that is well suited to 
assess the impact of shifts in the regional employment 
structure. Using the ‘job’ – defined as a given 
occupation within a given sector – as a unit of analysis, 
it captures both the sectoral and occupational 
dimensions of change, the former dominated by the 
shift to services and the latter by a pattern of upgrading. 
Additionally, the use of the job–wage as a yardstick to 
assess employment and employment change provides a 
ready means of measuring the extent to which relatively 
good-quality – and bad-quality – jobs tend to be 
concentrated in specific regions. 
Two main patterns of employment change have 
prevailed in Member States in recent decades: 
upgrading, where new employment is skewed towards 
higher-paid jobs; and polarisation, where employment 
grows relatively more in higher-paid and lower-paid 
jobs compared to mid-paid jobs. 
In previous EJM studies at aggregate EU level, the 
dominant pattern identified has been one of 
employment upgrading with some measure of 
polarisation, which tended to be sharper during      
periods of recession. In this EJM report, the greater 
variation offered by a regional approach is used to see      
if the specificities of regional employment structures 
(for example, shares of knowledge-intensive private 
services, shares of public services employment, and 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per head and 
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5employment growth) are also useful predictors of the 
employment-shift patterns observed. They can also 
indicate the extent to which these shifts are leading to 
the convergence of employment structures across 
regions or further specialisation. In order to make the 
analysis manageable, this study focuses on 
developments in nine Member States, including the five 
largest and most populous ones.  
Report structure 
The report is structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides contextual detail that informs the 
job-based analysis in the remainder of the report. It 
includes a summary of the main findings from recent 
analyses of regional economic convergence in the EU, 
as well as descriptive accounts of regional settlement 
and sectoral specialisation of different regions.  
Chapter 2 begins with a methodological note on the 
jobs-based approach used in this report and then 
develops a basic classification of regions and presents 
some initial top-line findings by region type. It also 
sketches some of the likely sectoral and occupational 
drivers behind the changes observed. The shift from a 
national focus – as applied in earlier EJM analyses and 
in Annex 2 of this report – to a regional focus requires 
some adaptation of the jobs-based approach in order to 
synthesise results in a more digestible format. 
Chapter 3 contains the main descriptive analysis. It 
presents a convergence-based analysis using job–wage 
terciles to compare the regional employment structures 
in 2002 and 2017 to the weighted average employment 
structure in the nine chosen Member States. 
The time period of the analysis is determined mainly by 
data availability for the selected countries, although it 
can be seen as representing one extended business 
cycle. Of course, an important caveat is that the period 
was unique in the severity and extensiveness of the 
recession that occurred mid-path (2008–2010), making 
even more challenging the task of disentangling the 
structural and cyclical components of shifts in 
employment composition. 
Chapter 4 closes the report with concluding remarks 
and policy pointers. 
In order not to distract from the regional focus of the 
main body of this report, the standard EJM presentation 
of recent labour market trends at national and EU levels 
(for 2011–2018) using the jobs-based approach is 
provided in Annex 2. Additional material in the annexes 
includes: 
£ a summary of tabular data from the 130 regions 
covered in the regional analysis 
£ an examination of the impact of worker mobility 
and migration on regional employment structures 
£ a literature review summarising existing relevant 
analyses using the jobs-based approach 
£ a summary of the findings of an econometric 
analysis on the determinants of regional 
employment shifts 
£ an application of the Krugman Dissimilarity Index to 
the regions covered 
The main target audience for this report comprises 
policymakers, as well as researchers and analysts at 
regional and national levels in the EU with an interest in 
labour market developments at a subnational level.  
Introduction

7Trends in regional disparities  
From its origins, the European Union has aimed at 
‘reducing disparities between the levels of development 
of the various regions and the backwardness of the least 
favoured regions’ (Treaty of Rome, 1957). Yet, although 
the idea of an EU regional policy can be traced back to 
the Treaty of Rome, a more genuine ‘European’ 
cohesion policy was given impetus by the Single 
European Act of 1986, which introduced for the first 
time a specific title covering the concept of economic 
and social cohesion. Under this title, Article 130c 
referred to the necessity to ‘redress the principal 
regional imbalances in the Community through 
participating in the development and structural 
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind’. This constituted the legal basis for the creation 
of the European Structural Investment Funds, as well as 
the backbone for EU cohesion policy more generally. 
The same aim is now enshrined in Article 174 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union          
(the Lisbon Treaty). 
Over the last decades, the EU Member States have 
converged upward in socioeconomic outcomes.                 
EU membership has led to an improvement in the 
average standard of living across all Member States and, 
though at a different pace, the poorer economies 
(mostly in central and eastern Europe) have caught up 
with the richer ones (Eurofound, 2017a).1  However, 
while income convergence is taking place within the EU 
as a whole, contrasting trends emerge among regions 
within countries, in particular those that recently joined 
the EU (Monfort, 2008; Cuadrado-Roura et al, 2016).  
While the central and eastern European countries and 
regions continued to converge to the EU average in 
terms of GDP per capita from 2000 until 2015, their 
regions have performed unevenly (Alcidi et al, 2018).            
In particular, great disparity has emerged between 
capital city regions and other regions, with the former 
adding further to their already advantageous situation 
through higher income growth rates and the latter 
recording further deterioration in their relative position. 
This is the case for Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania, with Sofia, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw 
and Bucharest performing above national averages. For 
all these countries, internal disparities were already 
increasing steadily since the mid-1990s, with the 
exception of Romania, where local differences increased 
much more dramatically and more than doubled 
between 1995 and 2000 (Monfort, 2008). 
These contrasting trends at national and regional levels 
are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the overall 
1 Context  
1 The catch-up process in which poorer countries grow faster than richer ones is defined as beta-convergence. Beta-convergence exists if the relationship 
between the growth rate of an indicator (for example, GDP per capita) and its initial level is statistically significant and negative. Another way of 
identifying convergence relies on measures of dispersion (such as the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation) or measures of inequality             
(like the Theil Index) and refers to a reduction of disparities between countries, or regions, over time (this is the concept of sigma-convergence). 
Figure 1: Theil Index decomposition of variation between and within Member States in GDP per capita in NUTS 2 
regions, 2003–2015
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Overall inequality Inequality between Member States Inequality within Member States
Notes: The Theil Index is a statistical measure often used to measure inequality that allows such measures to be separated into ‘within’ and 
‘between’ components of inequality. Population-weighted estimates. GDP per capita measured in purchasing power standard (PPS). Data not 
available for Ireland in 2015.  
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Eurostat regional accounts     
8inequality in GDP per capita in the NUTS 2 regions of 
Europe (green line), and this broken down into variation 
between and within Member States (the blue and 
magenta lines, respectively). It shows that up to 2008, 
EU-wide interregional convergence took place,            
despite slowing down in the second half of the period. 
(This pattern was mostly driven by the regions of the 
pre-2004 Member States, especially the Mediterranean 
regions.) However, the aggregate decline in regional 
inequality in GDP per capita was essentially driven by 
convergence between Member States, while a pattern of 
increasing inequality is evident between regions within 
countries, especially in the post-2009 period. 
While the economic crisis of 2008–2010 slowed 
convergence in terms of GDP per head, in the case of the 
employment rate, 2007 marked a clear inversion in the 
trend, as depicted in Figure 2. Regional differences in 
both employment and unemployment rates had 
narrowed between 2000 and 2007 but widened 
significantly from 2008 onwards (European 
Commission, 2013, 2014). More specifically, as Figure 2 
shows, the post-2008 increase in regional divergence 
was driven essentially by dynamics in the euro zone, 
while regions outside this zone continued to converge 
more or less consistently towards more similar 
employment rates. Furthermore, although in 2013 
regional disparities in employment rates started to 
narrow again, three years later they were still higher 
than pre-crisis levels (notably in the euro zone). 
Explaining regional disparities 
From a theoretical perspective, various hypotheses 
have been proposed to explain why some regions 
attract a disproportionate share of economic activity, 
which can lead to substantial disparities in economic 
and labour market performance compared to other 
regions. Much of the literature has examined the most 
intuitive explanation: the presence of location-specific 
productive attributes such as climate or access to ports 
(natural advantages) (Krugman, 1993; Ellison and 
Glaeser, 1997). A large body of the literature has also 
focused on the economic benefit from spatial proximity 
creating flows of productive knowledge (or knowledge 
spillovers). Theoretical perspectives offered by Romer 
(1986), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Duranton and 
Puga (2004), for instance, explain the process of 
regional economic agglomeration through localised 
accumulation of knowledge, as workers interact with 
each other, leading to better sharing of ideas, faster 
innovation or faster adoption of technology. Another 
strand of the literature, based on trade theories and 
known as the ‘new economic geography’, emphasises 
instead the interaction between trade costs and            
firm-level scale economies as a source of 
agglomeration: consumers and producers locate in the 
same region to exploit plant-level scale economies 
while minimising trade costs (Krugman, 1991; Head and 
Mayer, 2004).  
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Figure 2: Convergence patterns in employment rates among NUTS 2 regions of the EU, euro zone and non-euro 
zone, 2004–2016
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that benefits arising from skills in a specific location are 
related to the number of skilled workers there; therefore 
the processes of economic agglomeration favour 
already high-skilled regional economies (human capital 
externalities). Empirically, the high concentration of 
skilled workers can result in positive social returns in 
terms of increased productivity at regional level, which 
reinforces regional imbalances (Moretti, 2004). The 
presence of high-skilled workers also has spillover 
effects on non-tradeable low-skilled services that 
require physical proximity, making the employment 
opportunities of low-skilled workers increasingly 
dependent on their proximity to highly skilled workers 
(consumption spillovers) (Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2013).  
According to Sassen (2001), this leads to increasing 
disparities between global cities, with growing 
economies driven mainly by the service sector, and                 
less urbanised regions. Recent literature from the 
United States reveals regional trends of increasing 
spatial concentration of economic activities, with 
prosperity unevenly distributed across American 
metropolitan areas – what Moretti (2012) calls ‘the new 
geography of jobs’. The economic decline of regions in 
the Rust Belt, the once prosperous industrial 
heartlands, has been accompanied by the rise of cities 
such as Seattle, San Francisco and New York, where 
highly educated workers are concentrating faster and 
where the knowledge economy is flourishing.  
Increasing importance of capital cities 
The growing importance of capital city regions in the EU 
is an analogue of developments in the United States. 
These regions typically benefit from several economic 
advantages (in terms, for instance, of income, wealth, 
productivity, entrepreneurship, innovation and 
investment), and these advantages appear to have 
increased in recent decades. According to a recent 
study, the median share of capital city regions’ 
contribution to the GDP of their respective countries 
increased by almost 12% (2.8 percentage points) 
between 2000 and 2016, most notably in central and 
eastern European countries (OECD, 2018).  
The ascendancy of large urban areas (especially 
capitals) has led some researchers to state that ‘cities 
and urban agglomerations have come to replace large 
firms and the nation state as the central social and 
economic organising units of our time’ (Florida and 
Mellander, 2018). And within this group, an even more 
select subset of ‘global cities’ has asserted a privileged 
position as nodes in the global economy. London is one 
such node, given its pre-eminent position in global 
finance, while Paris is also often considered to be in the 
top tier (Globalization and World Cities Research 
Network, 2018).  
This growing importance of capital city regions is likely 
to contribute to higher levels of income inequality, as 
city size and inequality are correlated. Research in the 
United States has pointed out that city size ‘accounted 
for roughly 25–35% of the total increase in economic 
inequality over and above the effects of skills, human 
capital, industry composition and other factors’ (Florida 
and Mellander, 2018). Lee et al (2015) demonstrate a 
strong association in the United Kingdom between 
regional prosperity and regional inequality, with the 
geographical ‘sorting’ of high-skilled workers a key 
determinant of this association. 
Slowdown of urbanisation  
According to a recent study by the OECD, metropolitan 
areas (defined as cities with more than 500,000 
inhabitants) have increased their population by 0.75% 
per year since 2000 and now account for about 60% of 
national GDP. They are also distinctive in having higher 
proportions of migrants and higher rates of innovation 
and business creation (OECD, 2018). 
Nonetheless, according to De Beer et al (2014), the rate 
of urbanisation – the average rate of growth of the size 
of the urban population – in Europe was highest in the 
1950s and 1960s and subsequently decreased. It is 
currently at just less than half of the peak growth rates 
seen half a century ago. This is in part due to mature 
demographics in Europe (lower birth rates) but also to 
declining rates of transfer from rural to city areas. 
Dijkstra et al (2013) find that the large European cities 
may not be concentrating growing proportions of 
economic activity and populations to the same extent 
after the turn of the millennium as they did in the 1990s.  
When compared to other areas of the world, Europe is 
characterised by a distinctive polycentric urban 
settlement, with many mid-sized cities (0.5 million to         
2 million inhabitants) and relatively few megacities 
(more than 10 million inhabitants) (Dijkstra et al, 2013). 
This can be explained by various factors: the relative 
maturity of urban settlement and existing high levels of 
urbanisation in Europe; modern communication 
technologies facilitating dispersion; and steady but low 
levels of economic growth and population growth.  
Whatever the reasons, this distinctive European 
urbanisation pattern may be seen from contrasting 
perspectives. From a negative standpoint, there may be 
obstacles preventing Europe from achieving optimal 
city scale, such as planning restrictions or green belts. 
From a positive perspective, Europe offers an 
alternative pathway to growth, based on a more 
distributed urban settlement. This results from a high 
share of public spending, which tends to distribute 
economic resources spatially by directing public 
funding to areas, regions and sectors undergoing major 
restructuring or transformation (such as agricultural or 
Context
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post-industrial areas) rather than exposing them to the 
full rigours of global markets. This mode of 
development manages to avoid some of the negative 
consequences of the emergence of megacities, such as 
congestion, unbalanced regional growth or high costs of 
living.  
With regard to the nine Member States covered in this 
report, urban settlement patterns vary quite broadly.2  
Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain could be considered 
countries with polycentric urban settlement, as their 
capital city regions do not account for a 
disproportionate share of the national economy, and 
the weight of several other regions is also relatively 
important (for example, Lombardia in Italy, Cataluña 
and País Vasco in Spain, and various regions in western 
Germany). However, France and Sweden (as well as 
Czechia, Poland and the United Kingdom to a lesser 
extent) may be seen as more monocentric, because 
around 30% of total national economic activity is 
concentrated in their capital city regions (above 20% in 
the case of Czechia, Poland and the United Kingdom).  
Patterns of regional sectoral 
concentration 
This section describes patterns of regional employment 
concentration by sector in the nine selected countries, 
from 2002 to 2017, based on sectoral data available at 
the NACE two-digit level.3 The data were extracted from 
the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 
provided by Eurostat. 
In order to partially overcome the problem of a break in 
the sectoral classification in 2008 (from NACE Rev. 1 to 
NACE Rev. 2), a matching method proposed by Perani 
and Cirillo (2015) has been adopted in this chapter. This 
approach creates a new classification consisting of the 
following 16 sectoral categories: agriculture; mining; 
manufacturing; utilities; construction; retail; 
accommodation and food; transport, information and 
communication; financial services; professional private 
services (comprising professional services, 
administrative services, business and real estate); 
public administration; education; health; arts and 
entertainment and other services; households as 
employers; and extraterritorial bodies. The 
classification is consistent over time, allowing us to 
describe changes in sectoral composition at the 
regional level in the initial and final year. The only 
structural break that can be seen clearly is from 2007 to 
2008, when the NACE Rev. 2 was introduced, for the 
transport, information and communication sector 
(quite heterogeneous on its own). 
General trends 
Significant differences in the distribution of 
employment by sector (and its change over time) are 
already apparent at country level, as illustrated in      
Table 1. Throughout the entire period analysed, Poland 
is the country with the highest employment share by far 
in agriculture, although this has declined by 9.4 
percentage points (from 19.6% in 2002 to 10.2% in 
2017). This trend is also observed in all the other 
countries, albeit to a lesser extent (the second highest 
decline of -2.1 percentage points was registered in 
Czechia).  
With regard to manufacturing, employment shares have 
dropped in all countries (ranging from -6.5 percentage 
points in Sweden to -4.5 percentage points in Germany 
and Italy), with the only exceptions being Czechia and 
Poland. Indeed, in Poland, manufacturing employment 
increased slightly from 18.9% to 20.9%, surpassing 
shares in Germany (19.0%) and Italy (18.2%), while in 
Czechia, it remained stable at 27.9% (the highest 
proportion among all countries, both in the initial and 
final years). 
Looking at the employment distribution in the 
manufacturing sector in more detail, the four 
subsectors with the highest employment shares across 
all countries in 2017 were manufacturing of food 
products (especially in Belgium, France and Spain), 
fabricated metal products (highest shares in Czechia, 
Italy and Sweden), motor vehicles and trailers (notably 
in Czechia and Germany), and machinery and 
equipment (especially in Germany). The high level of 
specialisation in the manufacturing sector in Czechia is 
therefore driven by manufacturing of motor vehicles 
and trailers and fabricated metal products, which 
together make up almost one-third of total 
manufacturing employment. In contrast to Czechia, in 
Germany, the machinery and equipment manufacturing 
subsector (alongside motor vehicles and trailers) 
employs most of the workforce in the sector. The 
comparatively low employment share of manufacturing 
of motor vehicles and trailers in Italy (only 4.8%) is 
noteworthy. 
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
2 The nine countries covered in this report (Belgium, Czechia, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have been selected 
on the basis of population size in the first instance – larger populations and more regions – but also based on availability of microdata from the EU Labour 
Force Survey for all regionally relevant variables for the period 2002–2017. 
3 NACE is a French acronym (nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne) for the industry standard classification 
used in Europe.  
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Employment in the construction sector is much less 
diverse across countries, with Czechia and Spain having 
somewhat higher initial values but declining over time, 
especially the latter (falling 5.9 percentage points, from 
11.9% in 2002 to 6% in 2017). The construction sector in 
Spain experienced a big expansion in the pre-crisis 
period followed by a strong reversal when the economy 
entered recession.  
Private sector services account for the highest 
employment share in every country (ranging from 
around 38% in Czechia and Poland to above 50% in 
Spain and the United Kingdom). This share has been 
increasing in every country, particularly in Italy and 
Spain, but also in the two central and eastern European 
countries, despite still ranking low. A detailed look at 
the sectoral distribution of employment shows that 
most of the job expansion is driven by the professional 
private services category, comprising professional 
services, administrative services, business and                   
real estate (from +3.4 percentage points in Italy to            
+1.5 percentage points in France and Sweden, Table 1). 
A general increase across all countries was also 
recorded in the transport, information and 
communication sector, and notably within that sector in 
computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities, which increased in all countries over the 
period 2008–2017. 
Aggregate public services employment 4 also increased, 
although mainly in the health sector and, to a lesser 
extent, the education sector. The expansion of 
healthcare employment was particularly evident in 
France (from 10.6% to 14.9%), but also in Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom                   
(with increases ranging from 2 to 2.9 percentage points). 
The notable exception is Sweden, where the 
employment share in the health sector declined from 
18.4% to 15.2%; it remains, however, the country with 
the highest figure for health employment in 2017.           
The employment share in public administration 
decreased for some countries, notably Italy (dropping 
3.2 percentage points, from 8.6% to 5.5%) but also 
Belgium and Germany (-1.1 percentage points). Overall, 
Czechia and Poland are among the countries that 
recorded the least variation over time in employment 
shares in public administration, education and, 
especially, health.   
Comparing employment across sectors 
Differences in the distribution of employment across 
sectors in the selected countries and their dynamics 
over time are displayed in a more synthetic way in 
Figure 3 using box plots. The same analysis of the 
distribution of employment is also performed at 
regional level, allowing a comparison of results.  
In general, what clearly emerges is that differences in 
the sectoral distribution of employment are 
considerably more pronounced at regional level than at 
national level, both at the beginning and at the end of 
the period considered. This is the case for each sector 
and in particular for agriculture, where several outliers 
can be identified at regional level. However, it is worth 
noting that there has been a decline in extreme values 
over time, pointing to convergence in regional 
employment shares.  
Manufacturing employment also shows a considerably 
higher variability at regional level, with maximum and 
minimum values from around 0% to above 30% of total 
employment. Indeed, manufacturing tends to be more 
concentrated territorially because of historical paths of 
development, specific local endowments of natural 
resources, access to specialised human capital and 
benefits from agglomeration effects. For private 
services, the distribution of regional employment is 
particularly dispersed in the professional private 
services sector, as well as for the accommodation and 
food sector, with many high-value outliers.  
Regarding public sector employment, the greatest 
interquartile range at regional level is recorded for the 
health sector. This is somewhat surprising considering 
the nature of the service, which is provided in situ and 
face to face. However, in countries like Italy, the health 
system is managed at regional level (even financially). 
Moreover, these differences could be driven by the age 
distribution across regions.  
Key broad sectoral shifts 
The results presented above point to substantial 
heterogeneity in industrial structure across European 
regions. The next step is to further investigate these 
differences and identify which regions within the 
selected countries specialise in certain sectors, and how 
the economic structure has changed over time.5  In 
order to do so, this section analyses data specifically for 
four sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, professional 
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
4 Public services employment is proxied by employment in three predominantly state-funded, one-digit NACE sectors: public administration, defence and 
compulsory social security; education; and health and social work. 
5 For the purpose of the analysis at regional level, two small regions with very low employment levels (less than 50,000) were dropped. These are 
Ceuta/Melilla in Spain and Valle d’Aosta in Italy. 
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private services and health. For these sectors, 
interesting developments were already found at 
national level, so they warrant a more detailed analysis. 
Agriculture 
Regarding agriculture, as previously mentioned, the 
most noticeable changes occurred in Polish regions – 
which were those with the highest employment share at 
the beginning of the period considered. The dramatic 
change (see Figure 4) is particularly notable for regions 
like Podkarpackie, Lubelskie, Małopolskie, 
Świętokrzyskie and Podlaskie, which all recorded a 
decrease in employment share close to or higher than 
15 percentage points. All of these regions occupy the 
southeast area of the country, bordering Belarus or 
Ukraine (in the east) or Slovakia (in the south). Overall, a 
clear process of convergence towards the European 
average is taking place. 
Context
Figure 3: Box plots of employment shares (%) by sector at national and regional levels, nine Member States, 2002 
and 2017 
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In the majority of all the other regions considered, 
changes in employment shares were either very       
modest or around 0. Among the exceptions are some 
northern Spanish regions: notably Galicia                                
(-5.8 percentage points), La Rioja (-5.3 percentage 
points), Cantabria (-3.9 percentage points), Castilla y 
León (-3.2 percentage points), Principado de Asturias          
(-2.9 percentage points) and Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra (-2.6 percentage points). This declining trend 
did not affect Extremadura and Murcia, however, both 
of which still recorded the two highest shares in 
agriculture in 2017, around 12.4% and 13.8%, 
respectively. The Czech regions of Jihozápad (in the 
southwest) and Jihovýchod (in the southeast) recorded 
a drop of around 4 percentage points from an initial 
employment share of around 8%. Similarly, in the 
French regions of Pays de la Loire, Aquitaine, Limousin 
and Basse-Normandie, the employment share in 
agriculture declined by around 3 percentage points.               
In Italy, the region of Calabria recorded a stable 
employment share at around 11%, the highest in the 
country in both 2002 and 2017; other southern regions 
with high initial shares of around 10%, such as           
Molise and Basilicata, instead recorded a decline                
(-3.7 percentage points and -2.1 percentage points, 
respectively). In Germany, the only region with a        
higher but declining employment share in agriculture        
(-4 percentage points) is Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
(bordering the Baltic Sea to the north and Poland to     
the east).  
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
Figure 4: Regional share of employment in agriculture (%, 2017) and change (ppt, 2002–2017),                                    
nine Member States
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Manufacturing 
In terms of regional employment in the manufacturing 
sector, Figure 5 demonstrates that employment has 
contracted in most of the regions. Among the regions 
ranking highest in terms of manufacturing employment 
in 2017, some experienced a significant drop compared 
to 2002. These are mostly Italian regions, notably: 
Marche, with an initial value of 33.5% and a decline of 
4.2 percentage points (although it remains the most 
industrialised region in the country); Veneto, with an 
initial value of 32% and a decline of 5.3 percentage 
points; Lombardia, with an initial value of 32% and a 
decline of 7.9 percentage points; and Emilia-Romagna, 
with an initial value of 27.6% and a decline of                       
3.6 percentage points. The German region of                
Baden-Württemberg (in the southwest) also recorded        
a notable decline of around 5.3 percentage points     
(from 32.6% in 2002 to 27.3% in 2017). A very similar 
pattern can be seen in the French region of              
Franche-Comté.  
Czech regions are among those with the highest 
employment shares in manufacturing – especially those 
located in the north and northeast of the country – and 
their primacy has been consistent over time, with only 
small variations over the period considered. 
Severozápad and Moravskoslezsko recorded the 
greatest expansions – 3.4 and 2.6 percentage points, 
respectively. The most dynamic regions in terms of 
increasing manufacturing employment are in Poland: 
among the 10 regions with the largest expansion, 8 are 
Polish. It is particularly interesting to note that the 
region of Świętokrzyskie is both the one with the largest 
decline in agriculture and the highest increase in 
manufacturing (from 14.2% to 18.5%, although this is 
still lower than the national average of 20.9% in 2017), 
suggesting a shift in the economic structure towards 
higher industrialisation. 
The picture is much more diverse if one looks at the 10 
regions experiencing the highest drop in manufacturing 
employment. At the top of the ranking is the Spanish 
region of Cataluña, where manufacturing employment 
dropped from 27.8% to 16.8% over a period of 15 years. 
A similar decline of around 10 percentage points was 
recorded in the French regions of Picardie and Centre 
(and to a lesser extent Nord-Pas-de-Calais), as well as 
the West Midlands in the United Kingdom. Some 
Flemish regions of Belgium and southern Swedish 
regions are also characterised by a significant decline in 
manufacturing employment (around 8 percentage 
points). 
Context
Figure 5: Regional share of employment in manufacturing (%, 2017) and change (ppt, 2002–2017),                           
nine Member States
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Professional private services 
This category groups together professional services, 
administration services, business and real estate 
activities. Employment in these types of private services 
is on the rise everywhere, with three notable exceptions: 
Stockholm, Brussels and Île de France. However, even  
in these cases, the decline is very marginal – around                 
1 percentage point – and all three regions still          
occupy the highest places in the national rankings        
(see Figure 6).  
Indeed, it is very much the case that when it comes to 
private services, and even more specifically those 
analysed here, capital city regions are in the lead. By 
looking at the 10 regions with the highest employment 
share in professional private services in 2017, one can 
find almost all the capital city regions of the nine 
selected countries: from Stockholm, with the highest 
rate (20.7%), to Madrid (15%). Among these capitals, 
Prague and Berlin recorded the largest employment 
expansions: +4.9 and +3.9 percentage points, 
respectively. The only two outliers are Lazio and 
Mazowieckie; in both cases, the employment share 
expanded by around 3 percentage points between 2002 
and 2017, but in absolute terms, it is lower than the 
other capitals, especially Mazowieckie (the employment 
share in 2017 was 14.1% and 10.7% respectively). 
The employment expansion in several regions with a 
very low initial share of professional services is also 
noteworthy; for instance, Northern Ireland (where the 
employment share rose from 5.9% in 2002 to 12% in 
2017) and many southern Italian regions like Abruzzo, 
Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia, Campania, Basilicata and 
Sardegna (where the employment share doubled in 
some cases, starting from around 5–6%). Altogether,         
a moderate convergence pattern can be identified, 
suggesting that regions with the lowest initial 
employment rate are growing the most. 
Health  
The health sector expanded in almost every region, by 
almost 2.8 percentage points on average, between 2002 
and 2017, but with great variation across different 
regions (Figure 7). However, there are also some cases 
of employment contraction, particularly evident in 
Polish and Swedish regions. Most of the regions in 
Poland experienced a marginal decline in employment 
shares in the health sector, ranging from a minimum of 
0.5 percentage points to a maximum of 1.8 percentage 
points. Ranking regions by the employment share of the 
health sector in 2017, it becomes evident that the 
bottom 10 are all Polish – with values ranging between 
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Figure 6: Regional share of employment in professional private services (%, 2017) and change (ppt, 2002–2017), 
nine Member States
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4.6% and 6.5%. This was not the case 15 years before, 
when the lowest values were recorded predominantly  
in Spain. 
Employment in the health sector also contracted in 
many Swedish regions, both in the north and south of 
the country. However, in contrast to Poland, these were 
still among the regions with the highest health sector 
employment share in 2017 (especially the northern 
regions, at 18% or more). 
French regions are among those that have experienced 
the biggest employment expansions in the health 
sector. Indeed, among the top 10 regions where the 
employment share increased, 8 are French. These              
are dispersed around the country, from the north              
(for example, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and                 
Champagne-Ardenne) to the south                     
(Languedoc-Roussillon), the east (Alsace) and the  
centre (Auvergne and Centre) but not in the west. This 
significant employment expansion means that 
Limousin, Auvergne and Languedoc-Roussillon 
overtook Swedish regions and, in 2017, were the             
EU regions with the highest employment shares in         
the health sector (around 19%). 
Relevant research 
The well-established literature on shifts in the 
employment structures of advanced economies tends 
to focus on developments at country level and, in many 
cases, is predicated more or less explicitly on the 
prevalence of patterns of employment polarisation or 
(less often) employment upgrading at national level     
(for instance, Autor et al, 2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; 
Goos et al, 2009; Oesch and Rodríguez-Menés, 2011; 
Eurofound, 2013, 2014, 2015; Oesch, 2015). Relatively 
few studies look at recent shifts in employment at 
regional level in detail. Where this has been done, these 
studies primarily focus on specific countries, while there 
is a gap in terms of comparative analysis at EU level. 
Most of the analyses focus on structural changes in local 
labour markets in Germany (for instance, Dauth, 2014; 
Senftleben-Konig and Wielandt, 2014; Blien and Dauth, 
2016) and the United Kingdom (for instance, Kaplanis, 
2007; Jones and Green, 2009; Lee et al, 2015). Less 
evidence is available for other countries, although 
individual studies do cover Spain (Consoli and      
Sánchez-Barrioluengo, 2016), the Netherlands       
(Terzidis et al, 2017) and Italy (Aimone et al, 
Context
Figure 7: Regional share of employment in health (%, 2017) and change (ppt, 2002–2017), nine Member States
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forthcoming). A detailed summary of each study is 
provided in Annex 4, including the methodology used 
and main findings. The studies highlight that there are 
noticeable differences in the quality of employment at 
local level, with polarising patterns of different intensity 
that warrant further investigation and comparison from 
a cross-country perspective. The degree of urbanisation 
can play an important role, with regions that are initially 
more urbanised more likely to have a polarised 
employment structure. In particular, changes in 
employment patterns in capital cities appear to stand 
out vis-à-vis the rest of the country (notably in the 
United Kingdom). The results also highlight the role of 
the public sector in providing good-quality 
employment, reducing inequalities and mitigating 
regional differences. 
In terms of the forces behind these changes at local 
level, several studies conclude that there is an 
association between job polarisation at local level and 
the concentration of routine jobs, emphasising the role 
of technological change in polarising the employment 
structure by displacing routine, mid-paid jobs. At the 
same time, local demand is also a very important factor 
contributing to increased employment in low-skilled 
services, notably generated by the presence of highly 
skilled workers, which leads to consumption spillovers.  
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This chapter presents the jobs-based approach applied 
in the remainder of this report. A classification of 
regions is developed, loosely based on an existing 
Eurostat urban–rural typology, in order to describe the 
main regional developments broadly. This shows how 
employment has evolved from 2002 to 2017 in four 
settlement categories: capital city regions, other largely 
urban regions, intermediate regions and largely rural 
regions. Thereafter, pointers are offered as to what 
specific sectoral and occupational developments 
contribute to the differences observed between region 
types, in particular to the strong and growing skew of 
capital city regions in terms of well-paid employment. 
This is by way of preamble to the more detailed  
regional application of the jobs-based approach in the 
next chapter. 
Methodology: The jobs-based 
approach 
The key concept of the jobs-based approach is that of a 
‘job’. A job is defined as a given occupation in a given 
sector – for example, a salesperson in the retail sector or 
a doctor in the health sector. This is an intuitively 
attractive definition and corresponds to what people 
might consider when describing their job or to how an 
employer advertises a new job opening. 
This definition is useful for both theoretical and 
empirical reasons. The two concepts of occupation and 
sector correspond to two fundamental dimensions of 
the division of labour within and across organisations. 
The sector classification designates the horizontal 
distribution of economic activities within a country 
across organisations generating different products and 
services. The occupation classification provides an 
implicit hierarchy of within-organisation roles – senior 
managers, line managers, professionals, associate 
professionals, production staff, and so on. Established 
international classifications of occupation (the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations, 
ISCO) and sector (NACE) mean that it is relatively easy      
to operationalise the jobs-based approach using                
the standard labour market data sources, such as the 
EU-LFS. This allows for a highly detailed disaggregation 
of the workforce in each country based on commonly 
applied occupational and sectoral classifications to 
ensure international comparability.  
The jobs-based approach requires not only an intuitive, 
conceptually coherent and empirically practical 
definition of a job but also some means of evaluating 
jobs in relation to their quality. The job–wage has been 
the main proxy of job quality in much jobs-based 
analysis, originating in the work of Nobel Laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz in the 1990s (CEA, 1996) and 
subsequently refined by Erik Olin Wright and Rachel 
Dwyer (2003) and others. The analysis that follows relies 
on a wage-based measure to rank jobs. 
For the purposes of this report, the jobs-based 
approach used in earlier EJM analyses has been 
adapted in order to deal with three issues:  
£ limitations in the level of sectoral detail available in 
the EU-LFS microdata (NACE Level 1, identified by a 
one-digit code, rather than NACE Level 2, identified 
by a two-digit code), which necessitate a more 
aggregated approach 6   
£ changes in the core ISCO and NACE classifications 
in 2008 and 2011, which complicate the analysis of 
shifts in the employment structure over the chosen 
period of analysis (2002–2017) 
£ the sheer complexity of trying to cover 130 
territorial units rather than 28 Member States 
These issues have been addressed by using a                    
tercile-based approach rather than the quintile-based 
approach used in previous analyses. Such an approach 
lends itself to a simpler characterisation of employment 
shifts, notably the canonical patterns of upgrading or 
polarisation.  
In terms of presentation, a new graphical approach has 
been used to characterise employment shifts in order to 
compress more regional data into individual 
scatterplots.  
Finally, and more substantively, much of the analysis is 
based on a different set of comparisons to that used in 
the country analysis covered in previous EJM reports 
(and in Annex 2 of this report, covering developments at 
national level). Instead of covering absolute 
2 Applying the jobs-based 
approach at regional level     
6 In EJM reports up to 2017, the level of detail was two-digit for both occupation and sector. Eurostat introduced restrictions in 2018 in the level of detail 
permitted in its ad hoc extraction requests, upon which EJM analysis has been largely reliant. The current analysis is conducted at a less detailed level as 
a consequence (one-digit NACE instead of two-digit). Sensitivity analysis, however, confirms that overall results (employment shifts by quintile) are only 
very modestly affected by this change.  
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employment shifts by job–wage quantile between a 
start and an end year in an individual territory, the main 
comparisons are between the regional shares of 
employment, using the job–wage terciles of the nine 
Member States as a baseline. This means that rather 
than comparing regions with themselves over time 
(showing net employment change between a start and 
end period), all regions are compared to a reference 
European employment structure (based on the nine 
Member States), first in 2002 and then in 2017. This 
allows us to characterise a region’s employment with 
reference to the average job–wage structure of all nine 
countries – accounting for over three-quarters of                   
EU employment – to identify how regions deviate from 
that average (whether more upgraded, more 
downgraded, more polarised, and so on) and how those 
deviations have evolved over time.  
The main, simplified steps of the jobs-based approach 
used in this report are as follows.  
1.  A matrix of jobs – comprising occupation-by-
sector cells – is created for each region, using the 
standard international classifications of occupation 
(ISCO) and sector (NACE). The level of detail is           
two-digit for occupation and one-digit for sector. 
Each job is an occupation in a sector. In total, there 
are 43 two-digit occupations and 21 one-digit 
sectors, generating 903 job cells. In practice, many 
of the theoretical job cells do not contain 
employment; there are unlikely to be many skilled 
agricultural workers in financial services, for 
example. At the country level, the total number of 
job cells with employment varies between around 
300 and just over 700. The number is largely 
determined by country size and labour force survey 
sample size (the bigger the workforce, the greater 
the variety of possible job combinations in which 
employment is observed using EU-LFS data).  
2. A weighted average EU job–wage ranking is 
calculated. This exercise is carried out separately 
for 2002 and 2017 due to changes in the underlying 
sector and occupation classifications in 2008 and 
2011, respectively. For the 2017 data, the job–wage 
rankings for each country are based on combining 
data from the EU-LFS annual data files for                
2011–2014 and aggregated data from the Structure 
of Earnings Survey (SES) for 2010. For the 2002  
data, the job–wage rankings derive from a 
combination of SES and European Community 
Household Panel data.7 For both years, an 
aggregated job ranking is then calculated, based on 
the employment-weighted average job ranking 
across the nine Member States. 
3. Jobs are allocated to terciles based on the                
EU job–wage ranking. The best-paid jobs are 
assigned to the third tercile, the lowest-paid to the 
first tercile. Each tercile of the EU job–wage ranking 
represents as close as possible to one-third of 
employment in the starting period for the nine 
Member States as a whole; in other words, jobs are 
assigned to terciles based on their employment 
weights. The job rankings and resulting assignment 
of jobs to terciles remain fixed in the beginning and 
end periods (see Figure 8 for job to tercile 
allocations for the starting period, 2002).  
4. Regional employment structures are compared to 
that of the nine Member States in both 2002 and 
2017, based on the share of employment by                
EU job–wage tercile. This analysis makes it possible 
to see where low-paid, mid-paid and well-paid jobs 
are more prevalent in individual regions compared 
to the reference employment structure of the nine 
Member States. As the comparison is done at two 
points with a 15-year interval, it is also possible to 
see how regions’ position relative to the average of 
the nine Member States, and to other regions, has 
evolved over time.  
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
7 Further background documentation on the data processing involved includes Eurofound (2008), as well as extensive material in the annexes of previous 
EJM annual reports (see Eurofound, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017) where the same jobs-based approach was used. 
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Applying the jobs-based approach at regional level
Figure 8: Assignment of jobs to terciles based on nine Member States, 2002
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Corporate managers
Senior officials
General managers
Science and engineering professionals
Health professionals
Teaching professionals
Science and engineering associate professionals
Teaching associate professionals
Office clerks
Personal and protective service workers
Skilled agricultural workers
Labourers in mining, construction, etc.
Building trades workers
Customer service clerks
Other associate professionals
Health associate professionals
Other professionals
Sales workers
Metal and machinery trades workers
Handicraft and printing workers
Other craft and trades workers
Stationary plant operators
Agricultural labourers
Machine operators and assemblers
Drivers and mobile plant operators
Sales and services elementary
Occupation
Notes: Allocation of jobs to terciles in the nine Member States in 2002, based on the average ranking positions of the occupation-by-sector 
combinations and the shares of employment in the nine Member States as a whole. Job combinations (occupation by sector) with marginal or no 
employment have been omitted.  
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
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Top-level findings 
This section describes how employment has evolved 
from 2002 to 2017 in four identified settlement 
categories (capital city regions, other largely urban 
regions, intermediate regions and largely rural regions) 
before exploring developments in employment at 
individual regional level in the next chapter. These four 
categories arise from an adaptation of Eurostat’s 
urban–rural typology, which is necessary in order to 
apply the EU-LFS employment data to the 130 regions 
covered in this report – see Box 1 for details.  
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Estimates of the urbanisation levels of countries are highly dependent on how regions are categorised, and as a 
result, they vary significantly. The United Nations estimated the urban share of the population in Europe at 73% 
in 2011. According to the current Eurostat regional typology, 41% of the EU population lived in regions that are 
‘mainly urban’ in the same year. The estimate of the combined urban and capital region shares of the population 
generated from the nine countries covered in this report lies somewhere in the middle, at around 54%.  
The urban–rural typology used by Eurostat is assessed at NUTS 3 level (Eurostat, undated). NUTS 3 regions are 
characterised by the share of the population living in rural or urban areas. The Eurostat typology comprises three 
categories: mainly urban, intermediate and mainly rural. A region is categorised as ‘mainly urban’ if less than 20% 
of the population live in rural areas, ‘intermediate’ if 20–50% of the population live in rural areas, and ‘mainly 
rural’ if more than 50% of the population live in rural areas. Rural areas are all areas outside urban clusters, which 
are defined as contiguous grid cells of 1 km2 with a density of at least 300 inhabitants per km2 and a minimum 
population of 5,000. Adjustments are made based on the presence of urban centres within regions – a rural area 
with an urban centre of more than 200,000 inhabitants becomes intermediate, while an intermediate area with an 
urban centre of more than 500,000 becomes mainly urban.  
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent at NUTS 2 or NUTS 1 level, the level of detail at which EU-LFS data is made 
available to researchers. Moreover, simply taking the Eurostat approach, based on the rural percentage 
population shares, and applying it at the more aggregated regional level tends to mechanically raise the 
percentage of urban and intermediate shares. There are proportionately many fewer NUTS 2 regions than NUTS 3 
regions with a majority of inhabitants living in rural areas.  
Given that regional policies in the EU are often based on data available at NUTS 2 level, there is an obvious 
demand for adapting the Eurostat typology to this level of coverage – and the current regional analysis is an 
example. So, for this report, one useful existing example of such an adaptation (De Beer et al, 2014) has been 
further adapted to take into account the fact that EU-LFS microdata is available in a combination of NUTS 1 level 
(Germany and the United Kingdom) and NUTS 2 level (the other seven Member States). The steps taken are 
described below. 
£ Regions are categorised based on the share of the population living in urban, rural and intermediate NUTS 3 
regions that are part of a larger NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 region. 
£ The NUTS 1 and 2 regions are labelled according to whichever of the three categories has the highest share of 
the population. Thus, if a NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 region comprises NUTS 3 regions where the urban regions 
account for 40% of the population, the intermediate regions account for 35% and the rural regions account 
for 25%, the region is considered a ‘largely urban region’. 
£ One additional adjustment – useful for the analysis, given the central importance of capital cities – is to 
distinguish capital city regions as a separate category.  
The four-category typology proposed is subject to two important caveats: 
£ It is improvised for the purposes of this report and strictly unofficial. 
£ All such typologies are bound by construction to oversimplify and sometimes lead to dubious categorisations 
of regions due to aggregation issues. This is notably an issue as regards the UK and German regions, as the 
unit of regional observation in the EU-LFS (NUTS 1 regions) is generally much larger than in the other Member 
States covered, so these regions are more likely to be misclassified as a result. The German NUTS 1 regions of 
Bayern and Nordrhein-Westfalen are each more populous than individual countries such as Belgium, Czechia 
and Sweden. 
A full list of regions by region type is included in Annex 1. 
Box 1: A classification of regions 
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In 2017, the population of the nine Member States 
studied was distributed in the four settlement 
categories as follows: capital city regions, 12%; other 
largely urban regions, 42%; intermediate regions, 35%; 
and largely rural regions, 11%.  
Capital city regions have increased their shares of 
employment in all but one of the nine Member States. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of employment by region 
type in 2017 and the percentage point change from 2002 
in an accompanying column. Île de France (Paris) is the 
one exception to the pattern of relatively rapid-growing 
capital city regions but nonetheless accounts for over 
one-fifth of national employment, the second highest 
share among the nine capital regions. The largest shift 
of employment towards capital city regions occurred in 
Sweden (+2.2 percentage points), where the Stockholm 
region now accounts for nearly a quarter of national 
employment.  
The nine countries covered are diverse in their 
composition of employment by region type: the United 
Kingdom is overwhelmingly urban; Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, and Sweden are relatively highly urbanised; 
France and Poland have a relatively high share of 
employment in rural areas; and Czechia and Germany 
have high shares of employment in intermediate, mixed 
urban and rural regions.  
The main compositional change has been one of an 
incremental shift towards capital city regions. This has 
occurred at the expense of other largely urban regions 
in Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom. In Sweden, 
intermediate regions have declined fastest. In Czechia, 
largely urban regions rather than the capital city region 
have benefited from rural–urban employment flows – 
although, as detailed regional data in Annex 1 confirm, 
this relates in particular to growth in the Střední Čechy 
region, which forms a ‘doughnut’ around the capital city 
region. Poland is exceptional in the shift of employment 
out of largely rural regions, consistent with a late and 
ongoing decline in agriculture, which accelerated 
following EU accession. The shifts here have been 
mainly to intermediate regions. France is notable for the 
relative stability of employment shares between 
different types of region between 2002 and 2017. 
Not only have capital city regions benefited 
disproportionately from employment growth, but their 
advantage in terms of aggregate employment quality 
has also increased over time. As shown in Figure 9, 
capital city regions have a notable skew towards      
upper-tercile employment, and this increased from  
2002 (41.9%) to 2017 (44.7%). The share of low-paid 
employment also increased in capital city regions 
during the same period, albeit from very low levels, so 
there is some evidence of employment polarisation in 
these regions. In other largely urban regions, 
employment is more evenly spread across well-paid, 
mid-paid and low-paid employment. This is also the 
case in intermediate regions, but there has been a shift 
towards mid-paid employment. The largest relative shift 
in employment has occurred in largely rural regions, 
where a significant upgrading has taken place arising 
from the decline in low-paid, mainly agricultural 
employment and countervailing increases in private 
services employment. In the period after 2011, largely 
rural areas also experienced a growing manufacturing 
share of employment. 
Applying the jobs-based approach at regional level
Table 2: Employment share (2017) and change (2002–2017) by region type and Member State 
Capital city region Other largely urban region Intermediate region Largely rural region
Emp. 
share 
(%) 
Emp. 
change 
(ppt) 
Emp. 
share 
(%) 
Emp. 
change 
(ppt) 
Emp. 
share 
(%) 
Emp. 
change 
(ppt) 
Emp. 
share 
(%) 
Emp. 
change 
(ppt) 
Belgium 9.8 1.4 46.4 -1.3 41.2 -0.3 2.6 0.2
Czechia 13.1 0.3 12.8 1.3 62.5 -1.3 11.6 -0.3
France 20.7 -0.4 18.5 0.4 27.6 -0.5 33.2 0.5
Germany 4.3 0.3 32.5 0.1 61.4 -0.2 1.8 -0.2
Italy 10.3 1.0 48.0 -1.3 40.4 0.4 1.3 -0.1
Poland 15.1 1.1 11.5 0.3 29.5 1.9 43.9 -3.3
Spain 15.4 0.3 61.9 0.6 22.7 -0.9 0.0 0.0
Sweden 24.5 2.2 36.2 -0.3 30.9 -1.4 8.4 -0.5
UK 14.3 1.6 74.4 -1.7 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Weighted average 12.7 0.7 41.3 -0.3 35.6 -0.1 10.5 -0.2
Notes: Emp. = employment; ppt = percentage points. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)    
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In summary, employment growth has been strongest in 
capital city regions. These are also distinctive in their 
high levels of higher-paid, higher-skilled private services 
employment. They have quite different contours to 
those of the other region types, and these differences 
have become more accentuated since 2002. There is 
nonetheless some evidence of modest polarisation in 
capital city and other largely urban regions, compared 
to growth in the middle in intermediate regions and 
upgrading in largely rural regions, albeit one where a 
skew to less well-paid employment persists.  
Sectoral drivers 
In order to see which sectors are contributing to 
changes in the tercile share of employment by region, as 
observed in Figure 9, the most relevant data are:  
£ how employment is distributed by sector across the 
job–wage distribution  
£ which sectors have contributed most to relative 
shifts in overall employment composition, both 
negatively and positively 
£ which are the sectors and occupations where 
employment growth has been unevenly distributed 
by region type  
Member State level 
Figure 10 addresses the first two elements of the list for 
the nine Member States. Sectors are ranked left to right 
by their contribution to the overall percentage point 
change in employment (right-hand axis). This helps to 
readily identify those sectors contributing most to 
compositional shifts, which appear at each end of the 
figure. The vertical bars describe the employment share 
by job–wage tercile in the selected Member States in 
2017. This shows, for example, that over 80% of 
employment in agriculture was low-paid, while around 
65% of employment in education was high-paid. The 
decision to use 2008–2017 as the period of coverage is 
pragmatic; the NACE classification change in 2007–2008 
in the EU-LFS complicates a simple presentation of the 
basic sectoral trend for the entire period 2002–2017. 
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Figure 9: Employment share (%) by job–wage tercile and settlement category, nine Member States, 2002 and 2017
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The main structural changes are in any case highlighted 
adequately in Figure 10 by the declining share of 
manufacturing and the increasing share of health and 
professional, scientific and technical services. These 
shifts were similarly prominent in the earlier 2002–2007 
period.8 
The decline in manufacturing (-1.7 percentage points) 
and construction (-1.4 percentage points) should, all 
things being equal, generate polarisation, as 
employment is concentrated in the mid-paid tercile in 
these sectors. Also, stronger relative growth in 
professional, scientific and technical services                       
(+1.2 percentage points) as well as education                 
(+0.7 percentage points), combined with the relative 
growth in more basic service activities such as 
accommodation and food and administrative support 
services (+0.5 percentage points each) should together 
also contribute to employment polarisation. The former 
boost employment growth in the top tercile, while the 
latter boost employment growth in the bottom tercile. 
On the other hand, declining employment shares in 
agriculture (-0.5 percentage points) and retail                    
(-0.4 percentage points) are each upgrading, as they 
detract from growth in the low-paid tercile. Finally, the 
declining public administration share (-0.5 percentage 
points) should be downgrading, as this sector 
predominantly comprises high-paid employment. The 
sector in which the employment share grew most – 
health (+1.5 percentage points) – has a reasonably even 
distribution of employment across the wage 
distribution, so this growth should, all things being 
equal, be neither upgrading nor polarising.  
The relative contribution to overall employment shifts 
of the remaining sectors bunched in the middle in terms 
of percentage point growth share is somewhat less 
important, either because the sector itself has less 
weight in overall employment or because the level of 
employment has evolved more or less in line with that 
of total employment across all sectors. For example, the 
information and communication sector still only 
Applying the jobs-based approach at regional level
8 The main sectoral difference between the earlier and later period is that the construction sector experienced growth in 2002–2007, increasing its share        
of total employment by 0.4 percentage points, before declining after 2008. This can be interpreted as a reversion to mean after the construction              
bust-to-boom cycle experienced notably by Spain and the United Kingdom, of the countries covered here, during and after the global financial crisis. 
Figure 10: Composition of sectoral employment by job–wage tercile (%, 2017) and shifts in total employment 
share by sector (ppt, 2008–2017) in nine Member States 
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accounts for 3% of overall employment, so despite 
relatively fast growth it contributes only modestly to 
overall employment shifts, while the retail sector, 
though declining only modestly in relative terms (from 
14.1% to 13.7%), contributes more to overall sectoral 
compositional shifts.  
As a first approximation, based on the relative sectoral 
composition shifts identified above, overall 
employment would be expected to have polarised but 
with a positive upgrading skew.  
Regional level 
How these broader shifts in the sectoral composition of 
employment impact at regional level depends in part on 
how evenly or unevenly sectoral employment is 
distributed across different region types. Table 3 
confirms that agricultural employment is, 
unsurprisingly, heavily skewed towards largely rural 
regions, and that it is in these regions that the greatest 
share of agricultural employment decline has been 
recorded.  
For some more important sectors in terms of aggregate 
employment share, such as manufacturing and 
professional, scientific and technical activities, there is 
also a strong skew by region type. Manufacturing is 
underrepresented in the employment share of capital 
city regions, in particular, but also of other largely urban 
regions. The highest share of manufacturing 
employment is in intermediate regions, while even 
largely rural regions have a higher share than largely 
urban regions. The locus of manufacturing activity has 
tended to shift away from urban concentrations. In 
largely rural areas, the manufacturing employment 
share has eroded much more slowly than in more 
densely populated regions over the last decade. As 
industrial activity has increasingly dispersed away from 
the most densely populated areas, these have been the 
first to undergo deindustrialisation and, subsequently, 
the shift to service activity. Likely factors influencing 
this development are the greater costs, including 
opportunity cost, of manufacturing in cities due to 
higher land costs (and in some cases labour costs) as 
well as reduced transport costs, making location 
decisions less sensitive to considerations of market 
proximity.  
Two growing service sectors with a preponderance of 
urban, and especially capital city region, employment 
are professional, scientific and technical services and 
information and communication. Both have a 
concentration of well-paid, top-tercile employment.  
The share of employment in both sectors in capital city 
regions is around twice the average. And employment 
growth has tended to widen the differentials in    
employment share based on population density.                
The employment share of professional, scientific and 
technical services has, for example, grown by                       
2.1 percentage points (from 7.9% to 10%) between 2008 
and 2017 in capital city regions, but by 1 percentage 
point or less in other region types. Financial services 
employment – another well-paid sector – is also 
concentrated in capital city regions, but in this case, the 
employment growth trajectory has been modestly 
negative.  
For many other service sectors, such as retail, public 
administration and education, the distribution of 
employment by region type is more balanced,    
reflecting in part that these services often involve 
person-to-person contact and employment is therefore 
more likely to be evenly dispersed in line with the 
overall population.  
From Table 3, plausible inferences can be made to 
partially explain some of the job–wage tercile patterns 
observed in Figure 9. The strong skew of capital city 
region employment towards the top tercile is in part 
attributable to the notably higher share of well-paid 
employment in financial services, professional, 
scientific and technical services, and information and 
communication concentrated in this type of region. 
Positive agglomeration processes appear most salient 
in these sectors. There are also advantages for private 
services firms in co-locating with the sources of civic 
and commercial power (legislators, social partners and 
company headquarters) for purposes of influence, 
lobbying and access to state funding. These also tend to 
be concentrated in capital city regions. The fact that the 
capital region positive skew has sharpened is 
attributable in part to the relatively faster employment 
growth of these same sectors in that region type.  
Capital city regions – and other largely urban regions – 
have a lower manufacturing share of employment, and 
this is reflected in relatively low mid-tercile shares in 
Figure 9. These have also declined in both region types 
over the period covered, consistent with the sharper 
falls in manufacturing employment share in cities.          
Mid-tercile employment shares have held up better in 
less densely populated areas, in part due to higher 
shares of manufacturing employment and their more 
modest rate of decline in these regions.  
The counterpart of the strong positive employment 
skew of capital city regions in Figure 9 is the strong 
negative employment skew of largely rural regions, 
albeit one that has moderated significantly in the period 
2002–2017. The first and most important contribution to 
the improvement has been the declining agricultural 
share of employment, which has contributed to 
reducing the bottom tercile share by around                           
5 percentage points. The loss of manufacturing and 
construction employment – mainly mid-tercile – has 
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been only marginal on average in largely rural regions, 
with the result that the declining agricultural share has 
been compensated for mainly by growth in service 
sectors (health; professional, scientific and technical 
services; administrative services; and information and 
communications) which together have boosted 
employment shares in the middle and top terciles.         
The outcome of these shifts is that the employment 
structures in largely rural regions have upgraded 
significantly, while still retaining a skew towards      
lower-paid employment. 
Occupational drivers 
Up until this point, the descriptive analysis has looked 
only at the sectoral dimension of change and has 
ignored the occupational dimension. But there is good 
reason to expect that occupational shifts – both in 
general as well as within sectors – play an important 
role in determining the employment-shift patterns 
observed in the tercile charts and how they are 
differentiated across region types. Wage and skills levels 
tend to correlate more strongly along occupational lines 
than sectoral lines.  
Applying the jobs-based approach at regional level
Table 3: Employment share (2017) and change (2008–2017) by region type and sector, nine Member States
Notes: Emp. = employment; ppt = percentage points. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)    
Capital city Other largely urban Intermediate Largely rural All regions
Emp. 
share 
(%) 
Emp. 
change    
(ppt)
Emp. 
share 
(%)
Emp. 
change    
(ppt)
Emp. 
share 
(%)
Emp. 
change    
(ppt)
Emp. 
share 
(%)
Emp. 
change    
(ppt)
Emp. 
share 
(%)
Emp. 
change    
(ppt)
Agriculture 1.5 -0.3 2.1 0.0 3.1 -0.4 7.8 -2.6 3.0 -0.5
Mining 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
Manufacturing 6.7 -2.4 13.9 -1.9 19.5 -1.6 17.9 -0.3 15.4 -1.7
Utilities 1.2 0.0 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.0 1.7 0.1 1.4 0.1
Construction 5.8 -1.3 6.8 -2.1 7.1 -1.2 7.5 0.1 6.9 -1.4
Retail 12.8 0.0 14.5 -0.5 13.4 -0.4 13.0 -0.5 13.7 -0.4
Transport 5.5 -0.4 5.3 0.0 4.8 -0.1 5.3 0.0 5.2 -0.1
Accommodation and food 5.1 0.5 5.4 0.7 4.5 0.4 3.0 0.4 4.8 0.5
Information and communication 6.5 0.6 2.9 0.1 2.4 0.1 2.0 0.5 3.1 0.2
Financial services 4.8 -0.3 3.0 -0.3 2.6 -0.1 2.6 0.3 3.0 -0.2
Real estate 1.4 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.1
Professional/scientific activities 10.0 2.1 6.0 1.0 5.1 1.0 4.1 0.9 6.0 1.2
Administrative support services 5.4 0.1 4.9 0.7 4.1 0.3 3.2 0.6 4.5 0.5
Public administration 7.4 -1.0 6.4 -0.4 6.9 -0.5 7.5 -0.8 6.8 -0.5
Education 8.0 0.9 8.2 0.8 7.1 0.7 7.1 -0.1 7.7 0.7
Health 9.8 1.1 11.8 1.7 11.6 1.5 11.4 1.6 11.4 1.5
Arts and entertainment 2.6 0.0 1.9 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.4 0.3 1.8 0.2
Other services 2.6 0.1 2.7 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.2 0.1 2.6 0.0
Households as employers 1.7 -0.1 1.3 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 1.1 -0.2
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Based on the specifics of the employment structure in 
capital city regions, some likely sectoral contributors to 
the positive skew observed in capitals have been 
indicated in the previous section. But the skew 
indicated in Figure 9 is so great that rapid increases in 
employment in some relatively small, well-paid service 
sectors are likely to account for only a limited portion      
of it.  
In Table 4, the share of employment in the combined 
ISCO categories 1–3 (Managers, Professionals and 
Associate professionals) is used as a proxy measure of 
higher-skilled white-collar employment. In 2017,         
capital city regions had a significantly higher share of 
this employment than other regions (53% compared          
to 41%). This difference is most pronounced in financial 
services (+24 percentage points) but is also high in 
manufacturing (+14 percentage points) and significant 
in other knowledge-intensive sectors where capital city 
region employment growth has been relatively greater, 
such as professional, scientific and technical services 
(+8 percentage points) and information and 
communication (+8 percentage points). Possible 
explanations include the greater likelihood that private 
company headquarters are located in capital city 
regions, with a correspondingly higher share of senior 
management and professional roles. 
For predominantly state-funded sectors, these 
differentials are lower. The occupational breakdown in 
the public services is more similar in capital city regions 
and non-capital city regions. This lends some support to 
the idea that employment in public services tends to 
have a levelling influence across territories, notably in 
terms of sustaining good-quality employment outside 
the larger urban areas (Jones and Green, 2009). In the 
big cities, especially capital city regions, the dynamics of 
private services employment have been more important 
in boosting well-paid employment.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding analysis 
is that the strong positive employment skew observed 
in Figure 9 in capital city regions has its basis in both the 
distinctive sectoral and occupational division of labour 
in the capitals. On the one hand, capital city regions 
have nearly twice the national share of workers in 
faster-growing, knowledge-intensive service sectors and 
much lower shares of employment in structurally 
declining sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing. On the other hand, they have a greater 
concentration of higher occupational profiles across 
most sectors compared to the other region types.  
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Table 4: Share of white-collar, higher-skilled employment by selected sector, comparing capital city regions 
and non-capital city regions, nine Member States, 2017
Sector Capital city region (%) Non-capital city region (%) Difference (ppt) 
Financial services 83 59 24
Manufacturing 47 33 14
Retail 33 24 9
Information and communication 89 81 8
Professional, scientific and technical activities 86 78 8
Construction 31 25 6
Administrative support services 28 22 6
Public administration 59 54 5
Education 79 77 2
Health 62 60 2
Accommodation and food 20 19 1
Total 53 41 12
Notes: Similar differentials are observed in 2002; data are omitted to simplify presentation and because sectoral aggregation is different as it 
uses the earlier NACE Rev 1.1 categorisation; ppt = percentage points. 
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)   
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Introduction 
Describing the patterns of job polarisation and 
upgrading across European regions is complicated, due 
to the large number of units of analysis involved and 
their significant structural differences. Instead of the        
20 to 30 countries normally analysed in the EJM, there 
are approximately 130 regions in the 9 Member States 
covered by this study. Conducting a visual analysis of 
the absolute change in employment by quintile in each 
region, with further decompositions by sector or other 
variables, is simply not feasible. 
In addition to the proliferation of units of analysis, the 
description of the patterns of job polarisation and 
upgrading by region is also complicated by the large 
structural differences between regions, far larger than 
those that exist between countries. In the EJM, the 
analysis of structural change in national labour markets 
normally uses the initial structure as a reference (for 
instance, see Eurofound, 2017b). In other words, each 
job is ranked and assigned to one of five equal-sized 
categories with an equal share of employment 
(quintiles) in the first year of the period, and then the 
change in the level of employment in each of those 
quintiles is analysed. Doing the exact same exercise 
with regions (looking at change in regional employment 
relative to the initial structure) leads to an excessive 
degree of diversity that is very difficult to interpret. The 
reason for this is that the initial structures of 
employment in European regions are much more 
diverse than the initial structures of employment in 
European countries, and therefore focusing all the 
analysis on change from an initial regional reference is 
not particularly informative. Whereas by country it 
makes sense to abstract from initial differences and 
focus entirely on change, by region it is necessary to 
combine the analysis of change with an assessment of 
the initial (and final) structural differences. 
Therefore, describing the patterns of job polarisation 
and upgrading across European regions requires a more 
synthetic approach, but also one that ensures 
comparability by considering both structure and change 
in regional labour markets. 
One obvious possibility would be to use synthetic 
indices of polarisation and upgrading rather than the 
quantile approach normally used in the EJM. But the 
problem with this is that, despite the copious literature 
on job polarisation and upgrading, there is at present no 
agreement on how to formalise and operationalise the 
concepts of job polarisation and upgrading into indices. 
In particular, there is little agreement on how 
polarisation can be measured with a single index, while 
measuring upgrading is far easier because it implies 
shifts towards higher-paying jobs in the composition of 
employment (which for instance, can be 
operationalised as changes in the weighted average 
percentile of jobs, keeping the percentiles fixed for each 
job at their initial value). Polarisation, however, is more 
complicated, because it refers to a complex non-linear 
pattern of change that is difficult to even define 
analytically. 
Job polarisation involves shifts in the employment 
structure from the middle to the extremes, and most 
experts would agree that these shifts must show some 
symmetry in order to qualify as polarising. Previous 
attempts at devising a single measure to capture the 
concept of job polarisation have involved a variety of 
different and, in some cases inconsistent, approaches. 
For instance, following the method used by Goos and 
Manning (2007), some papers measure job polarisation 
by looking at the signs of the simple and quadratic 
terms of a coefficient linking the wage percentile of a 
job and its change in log employment in a regression 
model. If the quadratic term is negative (and the simple 
term positive), then there is job polarisation. But a 
quadratic term linking two variables in an equation only 
reflects convexity in the regression line: a line showing 
exponential growth is also convex, but nobody would 
say it represents a polarising pattern. Other proposals, 
including some that have been applied to regional 
analysis at country level (for instance, Jones and Green, 
2009) try to construct an index that measures 
polarisation as deviations from the mean in an initial 
percentile distribution. This seems like a sounder 
proposal, but the results of this index often contradict 
what a simple quantile analysis of structural change 
would suggest (for instance, assigning much larger 
values of polarisation to patterns that look like very 
mild ones). The ambiguity and lack of consensus on 
what job polarisation really is and how it could be 
measured synthetically may, paradoxically, be one of 
the reasons it has been such a popular concept in recent 
socioeconomic research, precisely because it allows a 
lot of flexibility in interpretation, perhaps too much. A 
more solid proposal that would remove at least some of 
this ambiguity would be a very good contribution to the 
field but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Regional employment 
polarisation and upgrading: 
Detailed analysis   
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A second alternative is to continue using the quantile 
approach that has been useful for the EJM previously 
but to reduce it to the simplest possible pattern that 
captures the concepts of job polarisation and 
upgrading. The simplest possible expression of the 
quantile approach for our purposes is terciles. 
Classifying jobs (occupation by sector combinations) 
into three groups of approximately equal size, ranked 
from low to high wages, can provide a sufficiently 
synthetic way to analyse structural employment change 
by region. Terciles can capture both polarisation 
(growth of the top and bottom terciles relative to 
middle) and upgrading (growth in the upper terciles 
relative to lower), as well as their mirror concepts of 
middle-biased growth (relative expansion of the middle 
tercile compared to the other two) and downgrading 
(relative expansion in lower terciles). When analysing 
changes in the relative composition of employment, 
terciles also have the advantage of requiring only two 
parameters to represent any pattern: if the three terciles 
must add up to 100%, then a structure of employment 
can be perfectly described just by representing two of 
the terciles, such as the bottom and top ones.                              
For instance, if the terciles are initially equal in share 
(33.3%, 33.3%, 33.3%), and after some years the top   
and bottom terciles expand by 2 percentage points 
(35.3%, 29.3%, 35.3%), just by showing the change in 
the top and bottom terciles (+2 percentage points,           
+2 percentage points), the change in the middle                  
(-4 percentage points) can be inferred because the three 
values must add up to 0. In other words, when analysing 
compositional change, terciles make it possible to 
characterise any pattern of job polarisation and 
upgrading with only two parameters. 
The main disadvantage of terciles is that they are less 
precise than quintiles or deciles and therefore can miss 
some developments at a finer level of granularity. 
However, since the large number of observations 
(regions) requires more parsimony, this can be 
understood as an advantage too: only very clear cases 
of job polarisation and upgrading are observed, while 
developments at a more detailed level are abstracted 
away.  
Grouping the jobs into terciles provides the necessary 
simplification of the analysis. However, how can 
comparability be ensured, given the large initial 
structural differences across European regions, as 
previously discussed? Our solution to this problem is to 
change the reference structure for analysing change 
over time: instead of using the initial structure of each 
region as the yardstick to analyse its change, the overall 
EU structure of employment – as approximated by the 
employment data from nine Member States accounting 
for over three-quarters of EU workers – in each year is 
used as a consistent point of reference for all European 
regions. Change is then analysed in terms of 
convergence towards or divergence from that structure. 
This is a subtle but significant departure from the way 
structural change is normally analysed in the EJM. 
The regional analysis is constructed as follows. First, an 
average normalised ranking is calculated for each job in 
the nine EU countries covered in this study in the first 
year of analysis. For instance, the job of secretary in the 
construction industry occupies a slightly different 
percentile position in each country (it may have a 
percentile position of 37.3 in Spain, 40.7 in France, and 
so on). The weighted average of the nine percentile 
positions for the same job across all countries could, for 
instance, be 39.5. This average percentile position is 
then renormalised according to overall EU employment, 
to allocate all jobs in three equal-sized groups (terciles), 
ranked from lowest to highest average wage. In the 
example, the job of secretary in the construction 
industry would be defined as a mid-paid job, because it 
would fall in the middle tercile of the EU as a whole.  
Then, a simple calculation for each region establishes 
what is the actual share of employment for each of 
those terciles: the distance from the share of the nine 
Member States (which is 33.3% by construction) 
indicates how a given region differs from the average 
employment structure for the nine. For instance, if a 
region’s employment comprises 25% low-paid jobs, 
30% mid-paid jobs and 45% high-paid jobs, its 
employment structure is clearly more upgraded than 
that of the EU (since the same three categories of jobs 
account for an equal share of 33% in the nine Member 
States as a whole). If the exact same exercise is carried 
out at the end of the period of analysis, and the same 
region’s employment turns out to be made up of 35% 
low-paid jobs, 30% mid-paid jobs and 35% high-paid 
jobs, it can be concluded that the region is now closer to 
the average employment structure of the nine Member 
States. In addition, in relative terms, its structure has 
downgraded, because over the period, its share of           
low-paid jobs has expanded by 10% and its share of 
high-paid jobs has decreased by the same amount, 
while the share of mid-paid jobs has remained stable. 
This approach achieves several things simultaneously. 
Firstly, it ensures a high degree of comparability: the 
jobs classified as high-paid, mid-paid or low-paid are 
exactly the same across all regions, according to their 
average wage in all nine countries, facilitating 
comparison of the regions’ different employment 
structures. Secondly, it takes into account the initial 
(and final) large structural differences across        
European regions, because the initial (and final)          
shares of high-paid, mid-paid and low-paid jobs reflect 
how different each region is from the average EU 
employment structure. Thirdly, it allows the 
identification of patterns of job polarisation and 
upgrading over time, since the difference between the 
initial and the final structure reflects structural change 
in a similar way to the standard EJM approach 
(although as previously mentioned, not entirely 
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identical). An additional benefit of this approach is that 
it addresses the issue of convergence and divergence        
in the employment structures of regions towards the   
EU average, a subject of great interest on its own. 
To sum up, in this section the concepts of job 
polarisation and upgrading are explored from both a 
static and a dynamic perspective. 
1. From a static perspective, it analyses whether 
each region is polarised or upgraded in its 
employment structure relative to that of the EU;  
in other words, whether it has more high-paid, and 
low-paid jobs relative to mid-paid jobs, or whether 
it has generally more high-paid jobs than the EU as 
a whole. 
2. From a dynamic perspective, it analyses whether 
in the period covered, the employment structure 
of each region polarised or upgraded relative to 
that of the EU; in other words, whether its share of 
high-paid and low-paid jobs expanded more than 
its share of mid-paid jobs, or whether high-paid 
jobs generally expanded more than in the EU as a 
whole. 
Change in the reference 
employment structure 
The problem with using the employment structure of 
nine selected Member States in each year as the point of 
reference for the analysis is that this structure changed 
in the period covered, and that change is not visible in 
the regional-level analysis. For instance, if a region is 
identical in its employment structure to the EU as a 
whole in the years 2002 and 2017 (the beginning and 
end of the period analysed), then the analysis will show 
no change in the employment structure of that region, 
since all change is expressed relative to the average 
employment structure of the nine Member States. 
This problem is easily solved by starting the analysis 
with a brief description of the overall change in the 
employment structure of the nine Member States, 
shown in Figure 11. The first chart uses the quintile 
representation of absolute change in employment that 
has frequently been used in previous EJM reports. The 
main difference is that, in this case, the figures reflect 
change only in the employment structure of the nine 
countries rather than the EU as a whole. Furthermore, 
the level at which jobs are defined is one-digit level for 
sector and two-digit level for occupation (and this is 
maintained in the rest of this report). Other than that, 
the analysis is identical to the one normally used in           
EJM analyses. 
The results obtained are consistent with previous 
publications despite the different number of countries 
represented and the different granularity in the 
definition of jobs. According to this analysis, over the 
three periods shown (2002–2007, 2008–2010 and              
2011–2017), the employment structure of the nine 
Member States experienced a more or less consistent 
pattern of slightly polarised upgrading: the mid-paid 
and mid-low-paid quintiles declined in relative terms 
(and even in absolute terms during the 2008–2010          
crisis period); the top quintiles expanded significantly 
(or were more resilient in the crisis); and the very 
bottom quintile expanded marginally (or was more 
resilient in the crisis). 
The second chart in Figure 11 represents the same 
structural change but using terciles instead of quintiles. 
This representation is very important because it is 
consistently used as a reference throughout this report. 
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Figure 11: Changes in the employment structure, by job–wage quintile and tercile, nine Member States,           
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It is immediately apparent that using terciles rather 
than quintiles produces a slightly different picture, 
although one that is consistent in broad terms.                             
In the two periods of employment expansion shown 
(2002–2007 and 2011–2017), the use of terciles rather 
than quintiles means that polarisation is not apparent 
anymore. This is because the marginal polarisation 
observed when using quintiles is concentrated in the 
second-lowest quintile, and the higher aggregation 
evens this out. For those periods, the tercile 
representation shows mostly upgrading, concentrated 
in the top tercile with a flat pattern for the two lowest 
terciles. The period of the crisis (2008–2010) does show 
a polarising picture even when using terciles, with a 
sharp decline in mid-paid jobs, a much slighter decline 
in low-paid jobs (lowest tercile) and almost no absolute 
change in the number of high-paid jobs (top tercile). 
The charts in Figure 11 show that, because terciles are 
more aggregated than quintiles, some of the nuance in 
the analysis is lost. The marginal and asymmetric 
polarisation of the two expansionary periods disappears 
from the picture, whereas the sharp and unambiguous 
polarisation of the crisis period is captured well. The 
tercile approach simplifies the analysis so that only 
clear and unambiguous cases of upgrading and 
polarisation will emerge. On the one hand, this is an 
operational advantage, since with so many units of 
observation, it would be impossible to attend to all the 
different possible (and debatable) modalities of job 
polarisation and upgrading that can emerge from a 
quintile approach. On the other hand, this can make any 
conclusions drawn more robust since only clear and 
unambiguous cases of polarisation and upgrading are 
identified. For instance, going back to the aggregate 
quintile picture for the nine Member States as shown in 
Figure 11, emphasising the extent of the polarisation in 
the expansionary periods can be misleading because it 
is rather marginal, whereas upgrading is clear and 
unquestionable. In the crisis period, on the other hand, 
polarisation is clear and unquestionable, whereas any 
upgrading is marginal. Both key patterns are well 
captured in the tercile picture, in a more focused and 
straightforward way. 
In any case, the tercile chart in Figure 11 is significant 
because it represents the change in the employment 
structure of the nine selected Member States that is the 
reference for most of the regional analysis. If a 
particular region does not differ much from the                         
EU reference in its structural employment change, then 
it experienced a similar (slightly polarised upgrading) 
trend. If a particular region appears as having 
downgraded relative to the nine Member States, then it 
expanded its lower terciles more than the EU picture 
shown above, and so on. 
Polarisation and upgrading by 
country 
Although they are well known and have been analysed 
in detail before, a brief description of the broad patterns 
of employment polarisation and upgrading for the nine 
Member States analysed at a regional level provides 
necessary contextual information to understand the 
rest of the analysis. This description of the broad 
country-level developments is also useful to introduce 
in a simple way the type of analysis that is generalised 
later for all regions. 
Figure 12 shows a static and a dynamic view of job 
polarisation and upgrading across the nine countries in 
the period 2002–2017. The horizontal axis represents 
the difference between the share of low-paid jobs 
(lowest tercile) in the country and in the nine Member 
States as a whole (which, by construction, is 
approximately 33.3%). The vertical axis represents the 
difference between the share of high-paid jobs (highest 
tercile) in the country and in the nine Member States as 
a whole (again, approximately 33.3% by construction). 
Thus, a country would have the exact same percentage 
of high-paid and low-paid jobs as the nine Member 
States if it had a value of 0 in both axes (and also of  
mid-paid jobs, since the three must add up to 100).            
The distance from the axes, therefore, represents the 
distance to the average share of high-paid (vertically) 
and low-paid jobs (horizontally) in the nine Member 
States. Each country is represented with a line that 
starts in 2002 and ends in 2017; the end point of the line 
represents 2017 and is indicated by an arrow; the other 
extreme of the line represents 2002 and is indicated by 
the country initials; and the bends in the line reflect the 
values for 2007 and 2012. 
For instance, Figure 12 shows that in 2002, Poland had 
around 12.5% more low-paid jobs than the average of 
the nine selected Member States, and around 5% fewer 
high-paid jobs. Note that only the proportions of high-
paid and low-paid jobs are represented. There is no 
need to represent the proportion of mid-paid jobs; it 
can be inferred, since the three differences must add up 
to 0 (so in this case, Poland had around 7.5% fewer 
nmid-paid jobs than the average of the nine Member 
States in 2002). These results imply that in 2002, Poland 
had a notably downgraded employment structure 
relative to the EU (many more low-paid jobs and fewer 
mid-paid and high-paid jobs). However, the line shows 
how the Polish employment structure changed between 
2002 and 2017 relative to the average employment 
structure of the nine Member States, and it can 
immediately be seen that the change was quite 
remarkable. Fifteen years later (in 2017, represented at 
the end of the line with a dot), the employment 
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structure of Poland had converged entirely with the 
average of the nine Member States. This means that the 
share of high-paid, mid-paid and low-paid jobs in 
Poland in 2017 was almost identical to that of the 
average of the nine Member States, indicated by the fact 
that the dot for Poland in 2017 is almost exactly at 0 on 
both axes. This convergence implies a massive 
upgrading, with a very significant reduction in the share 
of low-paid jobs (from +12.5% relative to the average to 
nearly 0), a significant expansion of high-paid jobs (from 
-5% to nearly 0) and a significant expansion of mid-paid 
jobs (from -7.5% to nearly 0). 
Patterns of structural change 
Whereas vertical and horizontal shifts imply changes in 
the share of high-paid and low-paid jobs, shifts in the 
diagonals of each quadrant represent the four main 
patterns of structural change in the analysis.  
£ Moving towards the top left quadrant implies 
growing high-paid and declining low-paid jobs and 
therefore upgrading.  
£ Moving towards the top right quadrant implies 
growing high-paid and low-paid jobs (and thus 
implicitly declining mid-paid jobs) and therefore 
polarisation.  
£ Moving towards the bottom right quadrant implies 
growing low-paid and declining high-paid jobs and 
thus downgrading.  
£ Finally, moving towards the bottom left quadrant 
means declining high-paid and low-paid jobs (and 
thus implicitly expanding mid-paid jobs) and 
therefore a middle-biased pattern (the opposite to 
polarisation). 
Patterns by country 
Poland, which experienced the most striking case of 
upgrading and structural convergence (see Figure 12), 
has already been described. The main country-level 
patterns observed in the other eight Member States is 
summarised as follows. 
£ As with Poland in 2002 (but not in 2017), Italy and 
Spain were initially in the bottom right quadrant 
and therefore characterised by a downgraded 
employment structure relative to the average of the 
nine Member States. However, whereas Poland 
moved from the downgraded quadrant during this 
period, Italy and Spain remained there, although 
they experienced diverging developments. Italy 
upgraded quite significantly between 2002 and 
2007, moving very close to the average of the nine 
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Figure 12: Change in the employment structures of nine European countries compared to the average of all nine, 
2002–2017 
BE
CZ
DE
ES
FR
IT
PL
SE
UK
-7.5%
-5.0%
-2.5%
2.5%
5.0%
7.5%
10.0%
-10.0% -7.5% -5.0% -2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0%
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-p
a
id
 jo
b
s 
(r
e
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 n
in
e
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s)
Share of low-paid jobs (relative to nine Member States)
More low-paid jobsFewer low-paid jobs
More high-paid jobs
Fewer high-paid jobs 
Upgraded
Middle-biased
Polarised
Downgraded
Note: Four data points for each country correspond to 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. The end point of the line represents 2017 and is indicated by an 
arrow; the other extreme of the line represents 2002 and is indicated by the country initials; and the bends in the line reflect the values for 2007 
and 2012. 
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
34
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
Member States, but afterwards it bent backwards 
and downgraded even more significantly, meaning 
the share of high-paid jobs fell and the share of  
low-paid and mid-paid jobs expanded. Spain, on 
the other hand, moved in a polarising direction, 
whereby the share of both high-paid and low-paid 
jobs expanded relative to the EU average until 2012 
and then moved towards downgrading until 2017. 
£ France started with fewer low-paid jobs than the 
average in 2012 but converged towards the 
structure of the nine Member States until 2017, with 
its relative share of high-paid jobs expanding, but 
more so its share of low-paid jobs. 
£ Belgium and Sweden started in a similarly 
upgraded position relative to the average of the 
nine Member States. But Sweden’s share of high-
paid jobs expanded in the period as did its share of 
low-paid jobs, but to a lesser extent, thus exhibiting 
polarisation in relative terms. Belgium finished very 
close to where it started, though with a marginal 
downgrading trend. 
£ The United Kingdom started relatively high in the 
upgraded quadrant but clearly moved towards 
polarisation, with a significant relative expansion of 
both high-paid and low-paid jobs. 
£ Germany started in an upgraded position compared 
to the average in the nine Member States, but in the 
period shown, it reduced significantly its relative 
share of high-paid jobs, moving towards the 
middle-biased quadrant. 
£ Czechia, which started close to the origin on both 
axes (and was therefore similar to the average 
employment structure of the Member States), 
moved mostly on a horizontal line. This implies a 
reduction in low-paid jobs and an increase in         
mid-paid jobs, thus moving towards the             
middle-biased quadrant. 
These results are very consistent with the findings of the 
EJM over the years and add useful information on the 
static differences between countries in the beginning 
and end of the period, on top of the dynamic 
representation of change in the national structures of 
employment. The main insights from Figure 12 are 
summarised below. 
£ In 2002, the employment structures in Europe were 
diverse: Italy, Poland and Spain had relatively 
downgraded employment structures; Belgium, 
Germany and Sweden, relatively upgraded; the 
United Kingdom, relatively upgraded but also 
polarised; and finally, Czechia and France were 
similar to the EU average but slightly higher in their 
share of mid-paid jobs. 
£ Between 2002 and 2017, the patterns of 
occupational change across Europe were also 
diverse. Some countries upgraded quite 
significantly (especially Poland), some downgraded 
(Italy and Spain), some polarised (the United 
Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, France and 
Sweden), and some experienced a middle-biased 
trend (Czechia and Germany). 
£ As a result of these changes, some of the countries 
changed their position relative to the EU in terms of 
their employment structure. France and Poland 
converged very strongly towards the average of the 
nine Member States. Italy and Spain remained in 
the downgraded category, while Belgium and 
Sweden remained in the upgraded one. The United 
Kingdom moved very close to the purely polarised 
category, while Czechia and Germany moved to the 
mirror middle-biased category. Overall, there was 
as much diversity in the European employment 
structures in 2017 as 15 years earlier. 
Polarisation and upgrading by 
region 
Now the core findings of this analysis can finally be 
introduced: the patterns of employment polarisation 
and upgrading in EU regions between 2002 and 2017 
relative to the EU average. The representation is 
identical to the one shown earlier in Figure 12, except 
that the dots represent regions rather than countries. 
Since there are so many regions in the nine European 
countries covered in the analysis, some simplification is 
required. This is done in two ways. Firstly, instead of 
showing a line representing change for a given region 
(as in Figure 12), the initial (Figure 13) and the final 
(Figure 14) position of the regions in terms of 
polarisation or upgrading relative to the average of the 
nine Member States is indicated. This gives a broad 
picture of how the regional employment structures 
changed between 2002 and 2017 but not of how each 
particular region changed in that period (this is outlined 
on a country-by-country basis in the next section, 
‘Analysis of regional developments by country’). 
Secondly, individual regions are not indicated by their 
name: each region is represented by the code of its 
country (BE for Belgium, and so on); however, capital 
city regions are differentiated by using framed capital 
letters, while the non-capital city regions are 
represented in lowercase.  
Employment structure, 2002 
The relative difference between the employment 
structure of each region and the EU average in 2002 is 
represented in Figure 13.  
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The findings in Figure 13 can be summarised in three 
main insights. 
Firstly, most of the regional values are concentrated in 
the upgraded or downgraded quadrants, with some 
regions in the middle-biased quadrant and just one 
region clearly located in the polarised quadrant                   
(the Belgian region of Limburg). However, this should 
not be interpreted as a nearly complete absence of 
relatively polarised regions. In fact, any region above 
the dashed diagonal line going from the upper left to 
the lower right has experienced some degree of 
polarisation, although combined with an upgraded or 
downgraded pattern that is dominant. For instance, it 
can be seen in Figure 13 that, in 2002, the Polish capital 
city region (Mazowieckie) had around 10% more low-
paid jobs than the average in the nine Member States 
and around the same percentage of high-paid jobs as 
the nine. This implies (since, again, the deviations from 
the EU average must add up to 0 for any given region) 
that Mazowieckie also had around 10% fewer mid-paid 
jobs than the average in the nine. A pattern of 10% more 
low-paid jobs, 10% fewer mid-paid jobs and around the 
same share of high-paid jobs as the average can be 
interpreted as a downgraded and polarised 
employment structure. Similarly, several regions display 
some degree of polarisation, but this tends to be 
simultaneous with an even more significant pattern of 
either upgrading or downgrading. Therefore, most of 
the diversity among European regions in terms of their 
employment structures in 2002 is associated with either 
upgrading or downgrading patterns. And while there are 
many clear cases of polarisation, it is rarely symmetrical 
and tends to be dominated by either upgrading or 
downgrading. Interestingly, the rarely discussed pattern 
of a middle-biased employment structure (one in which 
jobs in the middle have a larger share of employment) 
was much more common and clear (symmetrical) in 
2002 than the frequently discussed pattern of 
polarisation. 
Secondly, as expected, regions cluster around the 
country values presented earlier in Figure 12. However, 
importantly, there is a very significant amount of 
overlapping between the regional values of different 
countries, which means that the regional breakdown 
shown in Figure 13 is very relevant. If all the regions of a 
given country were around the country average values, 
and there was little overlapping between them, then it 
could be concluded that the regional breakdown brings 
little added value with respect to the country analysis. 
But the regions of most countries are quite widely 
spread in Figure 13, and the degree of overlapping 
between them is quite remarkable. The bottom right 
quadrant of relatively downgraded employment 
structures is dominated by Italian, Polish and Spanish 
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Figure 13: Static relative polarisation and upgrading in regions compared to average in nine Member States, 
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regions, as expected, but there are also several regions 
from other countries such as Czechia, France and the 
United Kingdom. It is very interesting to see that there 
are many French regions in the bottom left quadrant of 
middle-biased employment structures, together with 
several Czech, German, Polish and even some Swedish 
regions. Most of the Belgian regions are in the upgraded 
quadrant, with the exception of the mildly but 
symmetrically polarised region of Limburg. Lastly, 
mixed in the upper left quadrant of upgraded 
employment structures, are the remaining German, 
Swedish and UK regions. 
Finally, the most striking regional pattern identified in 
Figure 13 perhaps is the sharp divide between the 
capital city regions and the rest of the regions in all 
European countries. Without exception, the capital city 
regions tend to be located towards the upgrading 
quadrant compared to the rest of the country, although 
on their own they may have relatively polarised or even 
downgraded employment structures. This is the case of 
Mazowieckie, by far the least upgraded capital city 
region but still decidedly more upgraded than all the 
other Polish regions. Comunidad de Madrid and Lazio 
(the Italian capital city region) also have relatively 
downgraded structures compared to other European 
regions, but they are highly upgraded compared to 
other regions in their respective countries. Although 
Brussels is one of the most upgraded capital city regions 
in Europe, it is overshadowed by three other Belgian 
regions with even more upgraded structures, which is 
relatively rare. London is also more upgraded than most 
other UK regions, but it displays a relatively high degree 
of polarisation too. The French, German and Swedish 
capital city regions are at the far side of the upgraded 
quadrant, again quite distant from the rest of their 
regions. However, perhaps the most striking case is 
Prague, which has one of the most upgraded 
employment structures of all the regions represented in 
Figure 13, contrasting with middle-biased or 
downgraded structures in most other Czech regions. 
Employment structure, 2017 
How much did these patterns change over the following 
15 years? Figure 14 shows the same regions 15 years 
later, using the same representation. In this case, the 
values represent the difference between the share of 
high-paid and low-paid jobs in each region and the 
overall employment structure in the nine Member 
States in 2017. 
Figure 14: Static relative polarisation and upgrading in regions compared to average in nine Member States, 
2017
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As Figures 13 and 14 show, there were many changes 
between 2002 and 2017. These can be summarised in 
three key points. 
Firstly, although the upgraded–downgraded diagonal 
axis is still the dominating one, there are many more 
cases of clearly and symmetrically polarised regional 
employment structures as well as more cases of clearly 
and symmetrically middle-biased employment 
structures than in 2002. In other words, it seems that 
jobs in the middle of the employment structure are 
becoming more significant in the diversity of regional 
labour markets in Europe. 
Secondly, there is clearly more overlapping between the 
regional employment structures of the different 
countries than in 2002, suggesting that differences by 
country are becoming less relevant and differences by 
region more relevant over time. In other words, regions 
within the same country are becoming more different in 
their employment structures, whereas European 
countries themselves are either maintaining their 
differences or becoming more alike. This is the result of 
very different trends in terms of regional developments 
across countries. Most of the Polish regions experienced 
an impressive upgrading process, meaning that they are 
no longer dominant in the downgraded quadrant (as 
they were 15 years earlier). Italy and Spain, in contrast, 
did not see much improvement at all: in fact, many 
regions moved even further towards the downgraded 
quadrant. The French regions appear in all quadrants 
but are generally very close to the European average. 
Many Czech and German regions moved towards the 
middle-biased quadrant (which was dominated by 
France 15 years earlier), while many UK regions moved 
towards the polarised quadrant (indeed, UK regions are 
the most consistently polarised ones). Finally, the 
Belgian and Swedish regions are generally spread 
around the upgraded quadrant, as they were 15 years 
earlier. 
Thirdly, the position of capital city regions also changed 
in interesting ways. Again, the most impressive shift is 
observed in the Polish capital city region, Mazowieckie, 
which moved towards a rather polarised but upgraded 
structure from a polarised and downgraded structure  
15 years earlier. Lazio is quite striking too but for the 
opposite reasons: from a position very close to the 
average of the nine Member States, its relative share of 
low-paid jobs expanded and it moved clearly towards 
the downgraded quadrant. In contrast, Madrid’s share 
of high-paid jobs expanded mostly and thus its 
employment structure upgraded, but the relative share 
of low-paid jobs also expanded and therefore the region 
experienced some polarisation. London and Brussels 
also experienced a significant shift towards the 
polarised quadrant, whereas the capital city regions of 
Czechia, France, Germany and Sweden remained very 
high in the upgraded quadrant and very distant from 
the other regions. 
Employment change, 2002–2017 
The changes in the relative position of the different 
regions can be better identified in Figure 15, which 
simply represents the difference between the 2017 and 
the 2002 values for the share of high-paid and low-paid 
jobs. On its own, Figure 15 provides a limited picture 
because it shows only change and abstracts from the 
initial differences, which as previously indicated are 
highly significant and must be taken into account. 
However, since initial and final positions have already 
been discussed in detail, it is also useful to focus on 
change to close this analysis. 
In terms of change (as shown in Figure 15), polarisation 
and downgrading are, perhaps surprisingly, the most 
common patterns. The polarised quadrant (which in 
this case must be understood as reflecting the nature of 
change between 2002 and 2017, not the employment 
structure of each region compared to the EU at a given 
point in time) is highly populated in this case (with 
mostly French and UK regions, as well as some Belgian, 
Spanish and Swedish regions). It includes four of the 
capital city regions (Brussels, London, Madrid and 
Stockholm). In all these regions, the relative shares of 
both high-paid and low-paid jobs expanded, and thus 
they experienced some degree of job polarisation. The 
downgraded quadrant is also highly populated when 
the focus is exclusively on change; it contains four 
capitals (Berlin, Paris, Rome and, to a lesser extent, 
Prague) as well as many regions of Italy and Spain but 
also of Belgium, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. The purely upgraded quadrant contains 
Polish regions predominantly, reflecting the impressive 
occupational upgrading experienced by Poland 
between 2002 and 2017. The middle-biased quadrant is 
mostly populated with Czech regions, as well as some 
German and other country regions. 
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
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The main findings of this analysis can be summarised in 
three key points.  
Firstly, there is a very significant and growing diversity 
in the employment structures of the different European 
regions. Employment structures and their change over 
time are clearly differentiated by regions as much as, or 
even more than, by country.  
Secondly, an axis that goes from downgraded to 
upgraded employment structures (relative to the EU 
average) can characterise most of the static differences 
between European regions, but a secondary axis of 
polarised to middle-biased employment structures is 
gaining importance. From a dynamic perspective (in 
terms of change), the most important patterns observed 
in the period analysed are polarisation and 
downgrading (although with many exceptions, 
including most Polish regions).  
Thirdly, capital city regions differ systematically from 
the other regions of the same countries and generally in 
very similar ways. With few (but significant) exceptions, 
capitals tend to have much more occupationally 
upgraded labour markets. 
Analysis of regional 
developments by country 
The previous section provided an overview of regional 
developments in the nine Member States analysed for 
this study without identifying any specific region except 
for the capital region of each country. In this section, 
regional developments in terms of polarisation and 
upgrading for each country are presented separately, 
identifying all regions by name. Although the regional 
results are presented and discussed by country, the 
same reference for the definition of the three terciles of 
jobs (high-paid, mid-paid and low-paid) is used as the 
reference employment structure against which the 
regional values are defined.  
General developments by Member State 
To analyse regional developments at the country level, 
two different types of representation are used. Firstly, 
the regions of each country are represented in terms of 
polarisation and upgrading relative to the average 
employment structure in the nine Member States 
analysed, in 2002 and 2017 (see Figure 16, which 
illustrates developments in Spain). Essentially, this first 
representation is a close-up view of Figures 13 and 14 
for the regions of each country in turn, with the 
difference that the values for 2002 and 2017 have been 
Figure 15: Dynamic relative polarisation and upgrading in regions compared to average in nine Member States, 
2002–2017
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included in a single chart (with a line linking them for 
each region) and that the regions are identified 
individually. The vertical and horizontal axes still 
represent the average share of high-paid and low-paid 
jobs in the nine Member States (which is 33.3% by 
construction), and the position of each region is 
identical to the one discussed earlier in Figures 13 and 
14. Each region is represented by a line starting in 2002 
and ending in 2017. 
Secondly, and as an additional perspective to better 
understand the regional developments of each country, 
a simple representation of absolute change in the 
terciles is added for each region of the same country. 
The terciles are the same as in previous charts, but in 
this case, employment change is presented in 
thousands (of workers) in each region rather than as 
change in relative shares. This additional perspective is 
important because the same relative change can have 
very different implications depending on the absolute 
developments that are behind it. A region can upgrade 
its employment structure because of a sharp absolute 
decline in low-paid and mid-paid jobs – arising from 
large emigration, for instance. Obviously, that is very 
different from a region where the employment structure 
upgrades because of fast economic growth and the 
creation of many high-paid jobs. Yet, in relative terms, 
both patterns can look very similar, as an increase in the 
relative share of high-paid jobs (see Figure 16). It is 
important, therefore, to complement the relative 
picture (presented in Figure 16 for Spain) with the 
absolute developments (presented in Figure 17 for 
Spain). 
Spain 
Figure 16, therefore, represents the patterns of regional 
job polarisation and upgrading in Spain between 2002 
and 2017 relative to the nine Member States. As already 
indicated (although now it is far clearer), only Madrid is 
outside the downgraded quadrant throughout the 
period. In other words, all Spanish regions except 
Madrid have relatively more low-paid jobs than the 
average of the nine Member States analysed and, to a 
lesser extent, fewer high-paid jobs (implicitly, also, 
slightly more mid-paid jobs). Between 2002 and 2017, 
Madrid’s employment structure polarised and 
upgraded, moving towards the upper right quadrant.         
A number of regions in the north saw upgrading 
developments (with the expansion of high-paid jobs  
and declining shares of low-paid jobs), for instance     
País Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja and Galicia. By contrast, 
many of the Mediterranean and southern regions 
(Andalucía, Extremadura, Murcia and Baleares) 
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 16: Spain: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
Galicia
Asturias
Cantabria
País Vasco
Navarra
La Rioja
Aragón
Madrid
Castilla 
y Léon 
Castilla-La Mancha
Extremadura
Cataluña
Valencia
Baleares
Andalucía
Murcia
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
-5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
h
ig
h
-p
a
id
 jo
b
s 
(r
e
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 n
in
e
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
S
ta
te
s)
Share of low-paid jobs (relative to nine Member States)
Fewer low-paid jobs More low-paid jobs 
More high-paid jobs 
Fewer high-paid jobs 
Upgraded Polarised
DowngradedMiddle-biased
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
40
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
experienced significant expansions in their shares of 
low-paid jobs, moving further down the downgraded 
quadrant.  
If represented as absolute change, as shown in          
Figure 17, an important additional dimension to these 
occupational developments is revealed. The three 
regions where most of the absolute employment 
expansion concentrated were Cataluña, Madrid and 
Andalucía, and each had a different pattern of 
occupational change. Cataluña and Madrid mostly 
created high-paid and low-paid jobs, with no change in 
the absolute number of mid-paid jobs in Cataluña and a 
significant absolute decline in Madrid. Andalucía, on the 
other hand, saw a large absolute expansion of low-paid 
jobs only, with mid-paid jobs declining slightly and  
high-paid jobs expanding to a small extent. Compared 
to these three regions, the number of jobs created or 
destroyed in absolute terms in the other regions is 
comparatively small. In most cases, however, absolute 
employment growth tended to be concentrated in the 
lower tercile, with few exceptions.  
Belgium 
As indicated earlier, most Belgian regions are spread 
around the upgraded quadrant (top left) of Figure 18, 
which means almost all Belgian regions have a higher 
share of high-paid jobs and a lower share of low-paid 
jobs than the average of the nine Member States. 
Patterns in the employment structure over the period 
2002–2017 relative to the nine are very diverse across 
regions. On the one hand, the capital city region of 
Brussels and the large economic poles of Antwerp and 
Namur are polarised, although the share of high-paid 
jobs increased much more in Brussels. On the other 
hand, a rather downgrading pattern emerged in half of 
the regions: Hainaut, Liège, Luxembourg, Flemish 
Brabant and West Flanders. Meanwhile East Flanders 
and Limburg showed a middle-biased trend                       
(in the latter, due to a strong reduction in the of share of 
low-paid jobs) and Walloon Brabant upgraded slightly. 
Figure 17: Spain: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the average in 
nine Member States, 2002–2017
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Brussels, Antwerp and, to a lesser extent, East Flanders 
accounted for most of the expansion in absolute 
employment levels in the country (Figure 19). While the 
former two regions demonstrated an upgrading and 
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 18: Belgium: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
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Figure 19: Belgium: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to average in 
nine Member States, 2002–2017
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polarising pattern (with large job creation in the top 
tercile, especially, but also in the bottom), the latter 
region is a case of middle-biased growth (with much 
employment expansion in the middle). While 
employment creation in the other regions was of a 
lower absolute magnitude, all except Limburg 
registered employment expansion in the low and 
middle terciles, while employment in the top tercile 
declined in three of these nine regions.  
Czechia 
Czech regions are spread around the middle-biased 
quadrant (Figure 20), which means they are 
characterised by having a larger share of mid-paid jobs 
than the average in the nine Member States. The capital 
city region of Prague is an exception as it is clearly in the 
upgraded quadrant. The most common trend over the 
period was one of middle-biased employment shifts, 
since the shares of high-paid and low-paid jobs in most 
regions fell compared to the average in the nine 
selected Member States, although the reduction in     
low-paid jobs was generally more important (except        
in Moravskoslezsko). The only exceptions to this  
middle-biased pattern are Střední Čechy, where a mild 
upgrading pattern emerged, and Prague, with a modest 
downgrading pattern (while remaining strongly 
upgraded).  
The middle-biased pattern is clearly reflected in         
Figure 21, depicting absolute changes in employment 
by job terciles. The net employment creation is 
relatively scattered across the regions, with a key 
feature being the disproportionate employment 
expansion in the middle tercile in almost all regions, 
even when job reductions occur in the bottom or top job 
terciles. The only exception is the capital city region of 
Prague, where the job expansion is similar across all job 
terciles.  
Figure 20: Czechia: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
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France 
As shown in Figure 22, most French regions are 
characterised by upgrading and polarising dynamics, 
although they are generally close to the EU average. 
Only three regions, Île de France, Rhône-Alpes and     
Midi-Pyrénées, belong to the upgraded quadrant.         
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 21: Czechia: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the average 
in nine Member States, 2002–2017
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Figure 22: France: Change in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
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The capital city region, Île de France, experienced a     
very significant expansion in the share of low-paid jobs 
between 2002 and 2017, although it remains above       
the average of the nine Member States in its share of 
high-paid jobs.  
Turning to changes in absolute terms, illustrated in 
Figure 23, one can see that there was a significant 
expansion of employment between 2002 and 2017, 
largely driven by the growth of low-paid jobs in Île de 
France (387,000) and Provence-Alpes-Côte D’Azur 
(231,000). The region with the highest absolute 
expansion and at the same time the biggest increase in 
high-paid jobs was Rhône-Alpes, which also had the 
highest, and an almost unique, increase in mid-paid 
jobs. 
Germany 
German regions are spread around the upgraded and 
middle-biased quadrants (Figure 24). This means they 
are mainly characterised by having a lower share of  
low-paid jobs than the average in the nine Member 
States, while the shares of high-paid and mid-paid jobs 
are mixed. The capital city region of Berlin has a much 
larger share of high-paid jobs, but other regions have a 
lower share. Between 2002 and 2017, almost all regions 
experienced a downgrading pattern compared to the 
average in the nine Member States – that is, a growing 
share of low-paid jobs and, typically more strongly, a 
declining share of high-paid jobs. Baden-Württemberg, 
Bayern and Saarland were the only regions that escaped 
this trend and experienced a middle-biased pattern, 
characterised by declining shares of both low-paid and 
high-paid jobs.  
Figure 23: France: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to average in 
nine Member States, 2002–2017
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Nordrhein-Westfalen, Bayern, Baden-Württemberg and 
Niedersachsen are the four regions in which much of the 
net employment creation was concentrated (Figure 25). 
All of them saw strong job creation in the middle tercile, 
much more modest job creation in the bottom tercile 
and even less in the top tercile; jobs in the top tercile 
were actually destroyed in Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
Niedersachsen. Employment creation in the other 
regions was of a lower absolute magnitude, but in most 
cases, the job creation in the middle tercile stands out. 
There was job destruction in the top tercile across many 
regions, which is consistent with the downgrading 
pattern described above, where the reduction in the 
share of high-paid jobs was relatively more important.  
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 24: Germany: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
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Italy 
As for Italian regions, as already indicated, a clear 
pattern of downgrading emerges between 2002 and 
2017 (Figure 26). Compared to the average of the nine 
Member States, all regions but Lombardia are 
characterised by a higher share of low-paid jobs and a 
lower share of high-paid jobs. The shape of these 
dynamics nonetheless differs across regions. Puglia, 
Calabria, Sicilia and Campania (four major southern 
regions) experienced a significant increase in the share 
of low-paid jobs, which shifted them further towards the 
bottom right of the downgraded quadrant, meaning 
also that the share of high-paid jobs decreased.         
Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Toscana, while 
downgrading, did not move too much in terms of 
polarisation. Changes in the employment structure in 
Lazio, the Italian capital city region, involved a relevant 
expansion of low-paid jobs together with an expansion 
of high-paid ones, albeit to a lesser extent. As with the 
rest of the country, Lazio experienced a significant 
downgrading relative to the EU employment structure, 
with its relative share of low-paid jobs expanding quite 
significantly and its    share of high-paid jobs 
diminishing slightly relative to the EU average. 
Figure 25: Germany: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the 
average in nine Member States, 2002–2017
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Looking at the absolute change, between 2002 and 2017 
Italian regions experienced different patterns within the 
overall downgrading pattern (Figure 27). Employment 
expansion was mainly concentrated in Lombardia and 
Lazio. In Lombardia, this process was characterised by 
middle-biased growth, with a gain of more than 200,000 
mid-paid jobs. Lazio is characterised by a significant 
expansion of low-paid jobs, probably related to the 
expansion of tourism-related activities. These are 
followed by Emilia-Romagna and Veneto, two 
traditionally manufacturing regions, where changes         
in absolute terms involved almost only mid-paid jobs.  
At the opposite end, in southern regions such as Sicilia, 
Puglia and Calabria, a net destruction of high-paid jobs 
is the most obvious characteristic.  
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 26: Italy: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member States, 
2002–2017
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Poland 
In Poland, all the regions with the exception of Śląskie 
were in the downgraded quadrant in 2002 (Figure 28), 
meaning that the share of low-paid jobs was higher than 
the average of the nine Member States and the share of 
high-paid jobs lower. The situation changed 
significantly over the following 15 years, with most 
regions improving their relative position compared to 
the average and moving out of the downgraded 
quadrant. This is the case of the capital region 
Mazowieckie, Dolnośląskie, Pomorskie and, to a lesser 
extent, Małopolskie, where a clear process of upgrading 
took place. This upgrading took the form of notably 
higher shares of well-paid employment in the two most 
densely populated, urbanised regions: Mazowieckie and 
Śląskie (Upper Silesia). These were also the only two 
Polish regions to record average annual employment 
growth rates exceeding 2%. In the remaining regions, 
upgrading was more likely to take the form of a relative 
reduction of low-paid employment compared to the 
average, in many cases linked to declines in the 
agricultural sector. 
On the other hand, three other regions – Opolskie, 
Lubuskie and Zachodniopomorskie – recorded        
middle-biased developments, having a lower share of 
both high-paid and low-paid jobs relative to the  
average in 2017. Śląskie was the only region with a 
middle-biased employment structure at the beginning 
of the period, but it then upgraded considerably. As for 
the remainder of the regions, which were still in the 
downgraded quadrant in 2017, their relative situation 
also improved, with a reduction of low-paid jobs and        
of the negative gap in terms of high-paid jobs (with       
the exception of Świętokrzyskie, where the share of         
high-paid jobs remained constant).  
Figure 27: Italy: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the average in 
nine Member States, 2002–2017
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In absolute terms, all regions in Poland recorded overall 
employment expansion in 2002–2017 (Figure 29), with 
the notable exception of Lubelskie, where job 
destruction was concentrated in the lowest tercile, 
mainly due to a marked decline of employment in 
agriculture. Similarly, significant job destruction of 
more than 100,000 jobs occurred in the lowest tercile  
for Łódzkie, Małopolskie and Podkarpackie. Overall,          
a decline in low-paid jobs was recorded in all but       
three regions.  
The capital city region, Mazowieckie, experienced the 
highest employment expansion, which was highly 
skewed towards high-paid and mid-paid jobs. A total 
gain of more than 300,000 jobs was also observed in 
Wielkopolskie, Śląskie and Dolnośląskie but with 
different patterns: strong middle-biased growth in 
Wielkopolskie, upgrading in terms of the top tercile in 
Śląskie, and an equal expansion of mid-paid and         
high-paid jobs in Dolnośląskie. 
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 28: Poland: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to average in nine Member States, 
2002–2017
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Sweden 
Swedish regions cluster in the upgrading quadrant, with 
all having a higher share of high-paid jobs and a lower 
share of low-paid jobs in 2017 compared to the average 
of the nine Member States (Figure 30). Norra 
Mellansverige and Småland med öarna, two less 
densely populated regions, shifted from having a 
slightly lower share of high-paid jobs in 2002  
(compared to the average) to a slightly higher share in 
2017. The capital city region of Stockholm is highly 
distinctive in having a much more upgraded 
employment profile vis-à-vis the remaining Swedish 
regions, with higher shares of high-paid jobs and lower 
shares of low-paid jobs. As Figure 30 indicates, 
employment in many Swedish regions polarised 
significantly compared to the nine Member States. 
There was a relative growth of low-paid jobs across the 
board, which was most conspicuous in Stockholm and 
the northernmost regions (Övre Norrland and Mellersta 
Norrland); however, this was accompanied by relative 
growth in high-paid jobs as well. 
Figure 29: Poland: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to average in 
nine Member States, 2002–2017
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This relative polarisation is evident in Figure 31, where 
absolute change in employment between 2002 and 
2017 was weakest in the middle tercile across all 
Swedish regions. The capital region of Stockholm 
accounted for the largest job gains, which totalled a 
quarter of a million net new jobs. Alongside other more 
populous regions – Vast Sverige, Sydsverige and Östra 
Mellansverige (the hinterland surrounding the capital) – 
net employment gains were skewed towards high-paid 
jobs.  
Regional employment polarisation and upgrading: Detailed analysis
Figure 30: Sweden: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine Member 
States, 2002–2017
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United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, most regions are located in the 
polarised or upgraded quadrants, with a somewhat 
higher share of high-paid jobs compared to the nine 
Member States (Figure 32). London is distinctive in 
having both a lower share of low-paid jobs and a much 
higher share of high-paid jobs. It also appears to 
exercise a strong ‘gravitational’ effect on surrounding 
regions, drawing the South East and, to a lesser extent, 
the East of England into the upper left, upgraded 
quadrant. This can be inferred, for example, from the 
comparatively high share of white-collar, high-skilled 
employment in these satellite regions surrounding the 
capital (see Annex 2).  
Figure 31: Sweden: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the average 
in nine Member States, 2002–2017
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Other UK regions tend to have higher shares of low-paid 
jobs than the capital city region and to cluster in the 
polarised quadrant. The direction of travel of most UK 
regions in the period 2002–2017 was one of polarising 
employment growth, with expansion of low-paid and 
high-paid jobs and a declining relative importance of 
mid-paid jobs. The upgrading vector was strongest in 
the London hinterland regions as well as other English 
regions (South West, East Midlands and North West), 
while the expansion of low-paid jobs was most notable 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
The importance of the capital city region is also 
underlined by its disproportionate contribution to 
absolute employment growth over the period covered 
(Figure 33). London alone added one million net new 
jobs between 2002 and 2017, the largest share being 
high-paid jobs but with a significant share of low-paid 
jobs and growth heavily polarised. Similar patterns 
were observed in the capital hinterland regions          
(South East and East of England), which were also 
among the regions contributing most to absolute 
employment growth. Together, these three regions 
contributed nearly half of overall national employment 
growth during the period. With the exception of 
Northern Ireland, where weak employment growth was 
skewed towards low-paid jobs, employment in all UK 
regions tended to polarise compared to the EU 
reference employment structure. In most cases,              
this polarisation was skewed upward, while the          
post-industrial regions of the North West and the         
West Midlands showed a modest downward skew.  
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Figure 32: United Kingdom: Changes in the regional employment structure compared to the average in nine 
Member States, 2002–2017
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Figure 33: United Kingdom: Absolute change in jobs (thousands), by tercile according to region, compared to the 
average in nine Member States, 2002–2017
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An interactive data visualisation of the data in this chapter is available at http://eurofound.link/regionalshifts
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Conclusions 
Employment patterns at national level 
The European Jobs Monitor (EJM) has, for more than a 
decade now, analysed the transformation of 
employment structures across European countries. 
Despite confounding factors such as short-term cyclical 
fluctuations and breaks in the sectoral and 
occupational classifications, some striking regularities 
have emerged. The dominant pattern of recent 
occupational change in Europe, as consistently 
reflected in the overall EU figures, is one of upgrading 
with some polarisation, meaning most net employment 
growth in well-paid jobs, along with somewhat greater 
employment growth in low-paid jobs than in mid-paid 
jobs.  
But behind this dominant pattern, there has been 
significant variation in the patterns at national level. 
Clear and consistent cases of upgrading have typically 
been observed in northern Europe, while patterns of 
polarisation are apparent mostly in the large 
continental European economies and the United 
Kingdom. A pattern of middle-biased occupational 
change – where growth is greatest in mid-paid jobs – is 
clear in some southern European economies before the 
economic crisis of 2008–2010. Meanwhile, there have 
been some striking cases of occupational downgrading 
– with employment growth skewed towards lower-paid 
jobs – as in Italy after the crisis.  
This diversity was consistently observed in periods of 
economic growth (1995–2007 and 2012 onwards), 
whereas the economic crisis of 2008–2010 (extending to 
2012 in some countries) seemed to generalise a pattern 
of job polarisation. The factors behind this diversity are 
complex and manifold: whereas the more or less 
pervasive and resilient growth of high-paid jobs seems 
to be linked to technological change and general 
economic progress, the relatively anaemic growth of 
mid-paid jobs tends to be associated with secular 
trends of deindustrialisation and the computerisation  
of routine cognitive tasks. On the other hand, the much 
more diverse trends in the evolution of low-paid 
employment are more likely to be affected by 
institutional factors such as labour market 
(de)regulation, minimum wages and industrial     
relations models. 
Findings at regional level 
All these findings apply to the changing employment 
structures at country level. The present report has, for 
the first time on a comparative European scale, applied 
a similar approach to the changing employment 
structures of regions rather than countries. This shift in 
the unit of analysis is justified by the mounting evidence 
of growing within-country inequalities in Europe. This is 
associated with a growing regional diversification in 
economic opportunities, which is already having 
disturbing sociopolitical ramifications. The implicit 
questions this report has tried to answer are these: are 
the employment structures of European regions 
growing apart, and is occupational change by region 
significantly different from the national patterns 
described above? 
£ The findings show that there is indeed more 
diversity in the employment structures of regions 
than countries, from both a static perspective (as 
they stood in 2002 and 2017) and a dynamic 
perspective (as they changed over 2002–2017). The 
employment structures of different European 
regions (characterised by their degree of 
occupational upgrading and polarisation) tend to 
gravitate around their country averages,                        
but with a very significant amount of overlap 
between regions of different countries. Moreover, 
while this overlap tends to increase over time (with 
some regions, particularly in eastern Europe, 
converging towards the average European 
employment structure), the overall diversification 
of regional employment structures in Europe is 
growing rather than shrinking. This reflects 
different underlying factors that could be discussed 
only superficially in this report. Regions specialise 
more than countries for obvious reasons of scale, so 
it is not surprising that their employment structures 
(which reflect patterns of economic specialisation) 
are more diverse than those of the countries to 
which they belong. In addition, some underlying 
trends such as the growing agglomeration of 
economic activity in big cities tend to exacerbate 
within-country regional diversity in employment 
structures. In sum, regions within countries are 
becoming more occupationally different, but in 
similar ways. 
£ A second important finding is that the broad trends 
identified in the country-level analysis can also be 
observed in regional employment shifts but with 
some important qualifications. From a static 
perspective, the main axis differentiating European 
regions is one of upgraded versus downgraded 
employment structures. In other words, regions 
tend to differ mostly in the concentration of 
employment in the upper or lower occupational 
layers. Regions in northern and continental 
countries tend to be more upgraded than in 
southern and eastern Member States, and capital 
4 Conclusions and policy pointers  
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city regions tend to be more upgraded than the rest 
of the country. There are also some cases of 
polarised and middle-biased employment 
structures. However, from a dynamic perspective, 
the picture is rather different, because the axis of 
polarisation–middle-biased occupational change is 
becoming more important over time. In other 
words, the diversity of employment structures is 
becoming wider and qualitatively different: rather 
than the high-paid jobs concentrating in some 
regions and the low-paid jobs in others, there is a 
growing diversity between some regions having a 
concentration of the high-paid jobs, others having a 
concentration of the low-paid, while a third group 
has a more polarised pattern, and a fourth exhibits 
a more middle-biased pattern. 
Comparing national and regional patterns 
How do these findings compare with the previous 
findings of the EJM country-level occupational trends? 
At country level, upgrading and polarisation have been 
the dominant patterns of occupational change in recent 
periods (with a small number of exceptions). However, 
at regional level the most frequent patterns of 
employment change are polarisation (in several capital 
city regions and northern continental regions) and 
downgrading (also in several capital city regions, as well 
as in southern European regions). However, as 
previously mentioned, there was even more diversity at 
regional level than at country level, and there are also 
many cases of upgrading (especially in many eastern 
European regions that have experienced rapid catch-up 
growth) as well as middle-biased growth (notably in 
several eastern European regions that expanded their 
manufacturing base and in some German regions).  
A note of caution must be added here on the patterns of 
employment change observed across regions. To make 
it possible to compare regions so initially different in 
their employment structures, the EU employment 
structure, based on data from nine selected Member 
States, was used as a yardstick. That is to say, the 
patterns of upgrading, polarisation and so on, when 
applied to regions, refer to polarisation and upgrading 
in a particular region compared to the EU overall 
pattern of occupational change. As noted already, the 
overall EU pattern was one of upgrading with some 
degree of polarisation, and thus the regional results 
presented tend to significantly underestimate the 
degree of upgrading as well as the degree of 
polarisation to a certain extent. In other words, it is 
important to qualify the previous summary of the main 
patterns of occupational change across European 
regions: there were undoubtedly more cases of 
occupational upgrading than observed and probably a 
few more cases of polarisation as well. But the 
importance of this qualification should not be 
overstated. If occupational upgrading was a more or 
less pervasive pattern across European regions, its 
relevance for comparative analysis is relatively limited. 
How do these findings compare to those of previous 
studies of employment change by region, which are 
available for some European countries, as summarised 
in the literature review? Although many of the findings 
of this report corroborate and generalise some of the 
previous findings of national studies (for example, the 
growing chasm between capital city regions and the 
other regions within countries, and the more or less 
widespread polarisation in many UK regions), this 
report has arguably found more diversity in patterns of 
regional employment change than many of the previous 
studies. This is similar to the EJM itself, which has often 
found more diversity in the patterns of employment 
change than other similar studies, which tend to 
emphasise polarisation as a more or less pervasive 
trend. In many of the regional analyses of employment 
change reviewed, job polarisation was identified as the 
overarching trend. In this report, job polarisation was 
indeed observed in many regions but certainly not in all 
of them: other important patterns of change were 
upgrading, downgrading and even middle-biased 
occupational trends, the opposite of job polarisation. 
The latter pattern was observed predominantly in 
regions where manufacturing employment was most 
resilient or even growing, while polarisation tends to be 
linked to deindustrialisation. This diversity in itself 
suggests a multiplicity of factors behind structural 
change in European labour markets and invites 
scepticism regarding any deterministic explanation of 
polarisation (or any other pattern) being the 
inescapable consequence of technological change                  
(or any other factor). 
Capital cities versus other regions 
One important and common finding of previous studies 
that received qualified support in this report is the 
apparent link between polarisation and population 
density. Larger cities tend to have a higher share of 
high-paid jobs but also more low-paid jobs than                     
mid-paid jobs. The service sectors, which account for              
as much as 85–90% of employment in some highly 
urbanised regions, have high concentrations of                     
well-paid services employment at the top of the                   
wage distribution. They also have a concentration of 
low-paid, less-skilled and often precarious employment 
in sectors such as retail, accommodation and food 
services, and personal care – in many cases 
employment that is dependent on the spending of their 
higher-earning co-citizens. Over the period 2002–2017, 
several capital city regions have tended to expand their 
share of low-paid employment, while remaining 
distinctively ‘upgraded’ in employment structure 
compared to other regions.  
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This growth of capital city regions appears to come 
partly at the expense of other regions, including other 
urban regions, in the same country. The growth in the 
national employment shares of Brussels and London, 
for example, mirrors a decline in the shares of other 
largely urban regions in both countries. Economic 
dynamism appears to be waning in some second cities 
and other regional urban centres just as it accelerates in 
capital city regions. Moreover, in many Member States, 
retrenchment in the public sector – on which regional 
labour markets have traditionally been more reliant – 
has sharpened this divide. These developments can 
feed perceptions that capital city regions are benefiting 
from globalisation and technological change, the very 
same forces that are perceived to be undermining the 
social and economic fabric outside the capitals.  
Unbalanced regional growth may not be the only, or the 
main, force driving these movements. However, it does 
appear to be an important contributor and – as this 
report suggests – it is likely to have roots in the 
emerging geographical division of labour within 
advanced economies and the unequal distribution of 
the benefits of the shift towards services.  
Policy pointers 
The EU has been successful to date in its objective of 
reducing economic disparities between Member States. 
A combination of catch-up growth and cohesion policy 
has contributed to faster growth in GDP per head in 
central and eastern European Member States over the 
last 15 years, just as it assisted earlier accession 
countries, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to 
converge economically with the founding Member 
States of the European Community. However, in recent 
years, the gap in the economic fortunes between 
regions within many Member States has been growing 
and that interregional inequality has contributed to the 
widely documented increase in social inequality. The 
economic cleavages that have opened up between 
capital city regions and other regions in the same 
country have found expression in the ballot box as well 
as in popular protests. Disenchantment with 
established political parties – and indeed with the 
broader civic establishment including the media – has 
fed the rapid emergence of populist alternatives adept 
at drawing electoral advantage from disillusion.  
Given this context, what lessons or insights can this 
report provide to policymakers?  
£ The first point to make is that where there are 
divergences in intra-country regional economic 
performance, these remain in the first instance a 
national responsibility and a concern for national 
actors.  
£ The report draws attention to the important role of 
public investment, notably in the form of public 
services employment, in supporting more 
regionally balanced growth. The literature on 
employment polarisation has tended to emphasise 
technological vectors of change in labour demand 
and to disregard, among other things, the 
important role of the state as a direct or indirect 
employer, accounting for more than a quarter of 
employment in some Member States. But jobs in 
education, health and the public administration 
tend by their nature to be geographically dispersed 
rather than concentrated and enjoy above-average 
pay. They are an important prop to aggregate job 
quality in regions suffering the impacts of industrial 
change. The corollary is that such regions suffer 
disproportionately in times of public spending 
retrenchment. 
£ A related point is that public policy matters. The 
existence of a broad variety of employment-shift 
patterns – at national and regional levels – gives 
support to the idea that different labour market 
policy mixes may mediate the effects of other 
drivers of change such as technology, globalisation 
or demographic shifts.  
£ The report also highlights that industrial change 
need not be a synonym for decline. Around two 
million net new manufacturing jobs have been 
created in the EU since the economic recovery. 
There has been something of an industrial 
renaissance in central Europe going back further in 
time, including in two countries covered in this 
report, Czechia and Poland. Manufacturing 
employment itself has tended increasingly to locate 
outside large urban areas. It too has been an 
important source of relatively well-paid 
employment, notably for those with non-tertiary 
educational qualifications. This suggests that 
investment in manufacturing may have beneficial, 
territorially equalising effects and underlines the 
importance of linking regional and industrial policy.  
£ Regional mobility has been seen as one antidote to 
unbalanced regional growth, whereby individuals 
are encouraged to transfer from declining regions 
to  higher-growth regions. This can be an important 
safety valve and may be economically efficient. But 
it can also run the risk of leaving unfavoured 
regions even further behind. The need for 
integration is just as great for regions as for 
individuals, and this need is more acute for those 
regions beset by industrial decline or depopulation.  
Conclusions and policy pointers
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£ Given the increasingly digital – and in many cases, 
location-independent – nature of much work, 
universal high-quality broadband availability is one 
obvious example of a policy that may contribute to 
dispersing labour activity. However, as the report 
highlights, good-quality employment – often work 
that could, in principle, be carried out remotely or 
virtually – has, in practice, tended to cluster more 
and not less in large, urban and often capital city 
regions. So, connectivity, while helpful, may be just 
one small part of the answer to the problem of 
regionally unbalanced growth.  
£ EU regional policy should continue to assist 
unfavoured regions not to fall further behind 
regional powerhouses. Infrastructural and human 
capital investments (for example, through the 
European Social Fund and European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund) provide the connective tissue 
strengthening linkages between different regions 
and region types. Such policies mitigate the risks of 
overconcentration of economic activity in some 
areas and territorial disconnection in others. They 
can also contribute to ensuring that decisions to 
move from one region to another for work remain 
primarily a matter of choice, rather than 
circumstance.  
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Note: NUTS level 1 regions were analysed for Germany and the United Kingdom; NUTS level 2 regions were analysed for the remaining       
Member States.  
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)    
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Annex 2: Employment shifts at 
national level, 2011–2018  
Labour market context 
Employment in the EU has grown continuously for over 
five years, meaning that there were just over 230 million 
people in employment in the EU in the second quarter 
of 2018,9 an increase of some 15 million workers since 
the post-crisis trough in 2013.  
There are more people in employment in the EU now 
than ever before, reflecting improved economic 
circumstances as well as the longer-term trends of 
increased labour market participation, notably of 
female and older workers. The recent boost to 
employment levels is reflected in higher levels of labour 
market participation, higher employment rates and 
declining unemployment rates.  
Demographic factors, however, no longer offer the 
boost to employment levels that they once did. The 
working-age population has been contracting since 
2010 and is forecast to shrink by some 6–7 million 
overall between 2010 and 2020, compared to an 
increase of approximately 10 million in the preceding 
decade, 2000–2010. The declining working-age 
population is a particular concern in the central and 
eastern European countries, where the effects of low 
birth rates are compounded by emigration.                    
Year-on-year declines were greater than 1% in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia and Romania and more than 2% in 
Lithuania (Eurostat, 2019).  
National labour markets within the EU have recovered 
from the economic crisis at very different paces, but        
the huge divergences that arose in the immediate            
post-crisis period are shrinking. Unemployment is at 
low enough levels in some countries (such as Austria, 
Czechia and Germany) that labour shortages rather than 
unemployment is the principal labour market policy 
concern. Unemployment remains very high in the 
countries worst affected by the crisis (Greece and Spain) 
but has improved by nearly 10 percentage points 
relative to its most recent peaks. 
In this annex, the manifestations of these top-level 
changes in terms of the employment structure are 
described. The jobs-based approach is then used to add 
further detail on how shifts in employment (by country, 
sector, gender, working time, contractual status and       
so on) are shared across the wage, or job quality, 
distribution. The main focus is the period                             
Q2 2011–Q2 2018, with the analysis based on the most 
recent EU-LFS data available at the time of writing.  
Broad occupational and sectoral change 
Table A2 provides a broad outline of how employment 
in the EU has changed in terms of occupation and 
sector. The data in this table are at a much more 
aggregated level (four occupational groups and five 
sector categories) than the jobs-based analysis earlier in 
the report but serve well as a first approximation.  
The main vectors of change in employment continue to 
be the shift towards services – which now account for 
73% of EU employment – and occupational upgrading.  
Annexes
9 Note that official estimates of EU employment using national accounts data are generally higher by 2–3% than those from the EU-LFS used in this report. 
The main reason for the difference is that the EU-LFS is a household survey and identifies resident population in employment (national concept), whereas 
national accounts estimate those working in resident production units (domestic concept) using a variety of sources (including the EU-LFS) and are 
adjusted for consistency. The differences relate mainly to cross-border workers.  
Table A2: Change in employment composition (percentage points), by broad sector and occupation, EU, 
2011–2018 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)    
Agriculture/ 
Extractive
Manufacturing/ 
Utilities Construction
Primarily 
private services
Primarily public 
services
Total 
occupation
White-collar high-skilled 0.00 0.19 0.02 1.60 0.58 2.40
White-collar low-skilled -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.25 -0.11 -0.51
Blue-collar high-skilled -0.80 -0.39 -0.40 -0.02 -0.03 -1.65
Blue-collar low-skilled -0.14 -0.06 -0.22 0.24 -0.06 -0.24
Total sector -0.95 -0.35 -0.64 1.57 0.37 0.00
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The most significant positive occupational shift has 
been in white-collar high-skilled employment 
(especially professionals and associate professionals, 
with an increase in the share of overall employment of 
2.41 percentage points). There have been relative 
declines in each of the other occupational categories, 
the sharpest being in blue-collar high-skilled jobs. This 
category includes much skilled agricultural employment 
as well as traditional, mainly male, blue-collar jobs in 
manufacturing and construction.  
Employment growth has been heavily concentrated in 
service sectors. There have been declines of growing 
magnitude in the manufacturing, construction and 
agriculture/extractive sectors respectively. The 
manufacturing and agriculture shares of employment 
have been structurally declining over a long period. The 
decline in construction reflects the very delayed 
recovery of employment in this typically cyclical sector 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession; employment 
levels, if not shares, have recovered more quickly in 
manufacturing than in construction. 
Within services, the shift has been primarily to private 
service sectors, though the predominantly public 
service sectors (health, education and public 
administration) account also for a notable share of 
employment growth in the higher-level occupations. 
There has been a decline in the share of white-collar 
low-skilled employment (mainly clerical and secretarial) 
in both public and private services. And blue-collar 
occupations have contributed only modestly to growth 
in services employment.  
Finally, there is evidence across the sectors of 
occupational upgrading; white-collar high-skilled 
employment has fared relatively better than blue-collar 
employment in each of the five broad sectors. In part, 
this reflects changing patterns of labour demand, which 
have been skewed towards services and higher-skills 
profiles, but also reflects changes on the supply side.  
The workforce continues to change across a number of 
other dimensions as well, notably: 
£ a skills upgrading of the workforce as older workers 
retire and are replaced by younger cohorts with 
higher average levels of qualification 
£ an increasing share of older workers due to 
declining levels of youth participation in the labour 
market and later retirement 
£ an increasing incidence of part-time work 
£ a declining gender employment gap 
Employment change in Member States 
The crisis and post-crisis period has been experienced 
very differently across Member State labour markets, 
though with some degree of reconvergence as the 
recovery has become more generalised in recent years. 
Two Member States, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
have contributed disproportionately to overall net 
employment growth (of 2.8 million and 3 million, 
respectively) between 2011 and 2018. Only two other 
Member States, France and Poland, have increased 
employment by at least 1 million in the same period. 
Figure A1: Employment rates (%), EU, Q2 2008–Q2 2018
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Thirteen Member States had surpassed the Europe 2020 
target of a 75% employment rate by mid-2018, while 
another four (Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, and Malta) were 
within 1 percentage point of doing so.  
The most recent period of employment growth since 
2013 has seen some sustained recovery in most of the 
Member States whose labour markets suffered most 
during the crisis period. As Figure A1 shows, 
employment rates have risen substantially from the 
minima, even if for some countries, notably Greece and 
Spain, these are just the first steps towards the 
normalisation of labour markets.  
Recent employment shifts in the EU 
This section uses the jobs-based approach to describe 
employment developments by job–wage quintile, 
primarily during the period Q2 2011–Q2 2018. In order to 
put in context more recent developments, however, it is 
useful to observe how shifts in the EU employment 
structure have been distributed based on earlier EJM 
analyses covering data back to the late 1990s.  
The distribution of employment change has been 
relatively consistent between quintiles over the three 
charts covering 20 years (Figure A2). One key 
characteristic has been the relative outperformance of 
the top quintile. Well-paid jobs have added employment 
even during the peak crisis period (2008–2010) and 
contribute disproportionately in all periods to overall 
employment growth. A secondary recurring pattern 
across the three periods is the relative weakness of 
employment growth in the mid-low-paid quintile, 
though the resulting pattern of employment 
polarisation was clearest during the recessionary period 
and has been less obvious during periods of 
employment expansion. In summary, the dominant shift 
has been one of employment upgrading.  
Annexes
Figure A2: Employment change (% per annum) by job–wage quintile, EU, 1998–2018
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Notes: Different EU country aggregates and periodisations are used due to data availability, as follows: for 1998–2007, 23 Member States             
(no data for Cyprus, Malta, Poland or Romania); for 2008–2010, 27 Member States (no data for Croatia); for 2011–2018, 27 Member States        
(data for Luxembourg omitted).  
For all periods from 2008 onwards, figures are based on data from the second quarter of each year. The most recent chart, 2011–2018, is based 
on an adaptation of the jobs-based approach (see footnote no. 6 in Chapter 2), using a tailor-made EU-LFS data extraction carried out in 
January 2019. For this reason, it may differ slightly from previously reported EJM figures, due to data revisions in the underlying EU-LFS data.  
Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)   
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Drivers of employment change 
Until recently, the debate about shifts in the 
employment structure in developed economies was 
largely focused on the two main patterns of change – 
upgrading and polarisation – observed in Figure A2. 
Each pattern has its own supporting narrative –            
‘skill-biased technological change’ (SBTC) in the case     
of upgrading and ‘routine-biased technological change’ 
(RBTC) in the case of polarisation.  
Upgrading shifts should lead to a linear improvement     
in employment structure, with the greatest   
employment growth in high-paid (or high-skilled) jobs 
and the weakest growth in low-paid (or low-skilled) 
jobs, with intermediate growth rates in the middle.     
With polarisation, the main difference is that the relative 
positions of the middle and bottom of the job 
distribution are swapped: employment growth is 
weakest in the middle and relatively stronger at both 
ends of the job–wage distribution, leading to a 
‘shrinking’ or ‘hollowed’ middle.  
In both accounts, the principal driver of employment 
change is technology, and its principal effect is to 
increase the demand for skilled labour in developed 
economies at the expense of less-skilled labour. Higher 
skill levels endow their possessors with the capacities to 
utilise and master new technologies. This should 
enhance their individual productivity. But while 
technology tends to act as a complement to those with 
higher skills, it is more likely to substitute those with 
lower-level skills whose job tasks are more easily 
replaceable by machines.  
The main explanation of the differences in the two 
accounts (SBTC and RBTC) relates to where in the wage 
distribution – at the bottom or in the middle – those 
jobs that are most susceptible to technological 
displacement lie. Exponents of RBTC claim that the 
most vulnerable jobs are routine jobs with a high share 
of tasks than can easily be codified (for example, routine 
clerical and manufacturing or production jobs).          
These happen to predominate in the middle of the wage 
distribution in developed economies (Autor et al, 2006). 
Less routine jobs – such as personal services jobs at the 
bottom of the wage distribution (for example, 
hairdressers or restaurant workers) and                
knowledge-intensive professional services jobs at the 
top (for example, lawyers or medical doctors) – are less 
easy to automate and therefore less vulnerable to 
replacement. 
However, the world of work and employment is 
impacted by factors other than new technology. 
Previous EJM reports have drawn attention to                 
factors contributing to the shifts observed in  
developed-economy employment structures                                   
(see Eurofound, 2017b). These include: the role of the 
state as an employer; institutional vectors such as 
labour market regulation, taxation and social welfare 
policy; worker representation; macroeconomic 
considerations including regional specialisation; 
inequality; the business cycle; and, importantly, labour 
supply factors such as migration, feminisation and 
educational upgrading. Each of these factors is likely to 
have a bearing on the changing shape of employment in 
advanced market economies and – at the least –                   
to mediate the changes that originate in technological 
progress. As previously argued, these drivers or 
contextual factors vary significantly between countries 
and across time, even among a subset of relatively 
homogeneous, developed western European Member 
States (Eurofound, 2015). For these reasons, even if 
aggregate EU employment displays some consistency in 
its shifts over time, it is not unreasonable to expect 
significant variation between countries. As the next 
section indicates, this was found to be the case for the 
period 2011–2018, as well as being documented in 
earlier EJM analyses going back to the mid-1990s. 
Variety of patterns across Member States 
The employment recovery is now well established,              
with 15 million net new jobs created across the EU        
since 2011. Recent net new employment has been 
shared more broadly across the wage distribution, 
though with a customary skew towards higher-paid 
jobs. Employment growth has tended to spread down 
the wage distribution during the recovery, consistent 
with a consumption-led recovery raising demand in 
particular for lower-level, non-tradeable services.           
But, structurally, labour demand remains skewed to 
higher-paid and higher-skilled jobs.  
There is clearly no dominant or pervasive pattern of 
employment shift over the period covered, as might be 
expected given the divergent labour market 
performances of Member States over much of the same 
period (Figure A3). The aggregate EU pattern is one of 
upgrading with some polarisation.  
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Figure A3: Employment change by job–wage quintile, in thousands, Member States, Q2 2011–Q2 2018
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Those more populous Member States with significant 
positive employment growth in recent years each 
demonstrate clear upgrading patterns – Germany, 
Poland and the UK. Over half of top-quintile 
employment growth in the EU since 2011 occurred in 
these three Member States – they also account for 
around half of total net employment growth. Other 
unambiguously upgrading countries included Austria, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Portugal and Sweden. 
Employment polarisation is apparent in Denmark, 
France and Romania as well as in some of the countries 
where labour markets were most affected by the crisis – 
Estonia, Greece and Spain. It is interesting, however, 
that more recent employment growth in Greece and 
Spain has also tended to occur in mid-paid or                  
mid–low-paid jobs, leading to distinctive                        
‘growth-in-the-middle’ employment shifts since 2016 
(Figure A4). A small number of Member States display 
downgrading employment shifts, notably Hungary and 
Italy.  
In many countries, employment shifts do not conform 
to any obvious pattern, are irregular or are some hybrid 
of the four patterns already indicated. This is in part due 
to the short time frame covered. Structural changes 
generally take longer than seven years to manifest 
themselves. But a second general conclusion based on 
Figure A4, supported by previous jobs-based approach 
analysis carried out over longer time frames (Oesch, 
2013; Eurofound, 2015), is that there has been a variety 
of employment-shift patterns in different countries, 
while the dominant aggregate pattern has been one of 
upgrading.  
Growing and declining jobs 
The quintile charts compress a large amount of data in 
order to convey the main employment-shift patterns 
graphically. They do not, however, identify the 
individual jobs (again, as defined in our application of 
the jobs-based approach) that contribute to the overall 
pattern. In practice, a small number of large-employing 
jobs account for a very large share of employment, and 
shifts in headcount in these jobs contribute most to the 
observed patterns of change in the quintile charts. 
Tables A4, A5 and A6 list in sequence the top 12 jobs         
in terms of employment in the EU as well as those  
large-employing jobs (having more than 600,000 people 
employed in the EU in 2016, n=57) with the fastest rate 
of growth or contraction in 2011–2018.  
The top 12 jobs (Table A3) account for over a third of all 
employment in the EU (34%), with the two biggest jobs, 
sales workers in the retail sector and teaching 
professionals in the education sector, together 
accounting for more than 1 in 10 jobs in the EU. 
Employment has grown modestly in these two 
predominantly female jobs, the former being in the 
lowest job–wage quintile and the latter being in the 
highest. Of the other largest-employing jobs, the biggest 
contractions in headcount were in skilled agricultural 
workers and construction sector labourers, while the 
biggest gains were among health sector professionals 
and associate professionals as well as personal services 
workers in the accommodation and restaurants sector.  
Figure A4: Employment shifts by job–wage quintile, in thousands, Greece and Spain, 2011–2018
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Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)    
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The fastest employment growth was recorded mainly in 
higher-paid professional or associate professional 
grades (Table A4) in a variety of sectors, such as 
information and communication, health, education, 
retail and the broad professional services category 
(professional, scientific and technical activities). 
However, two low-paid service jobs also feature: food 
preparation assistants in the hospitality sector and 
cleaners and helpers in the health sector.  
Annexes
Table A3: Top 12 jobs by employment, including job–wage percentile, EU, 2018 
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
Occupation Sector
Employment  
(millions)
Employment 
change 
2011–2018 
(%)
Wage 
percentile
Sales workers G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 13.5 0.2 15
Teaching professionals P - Education 10.0 4.5 82
Building and related trades workers, etc F - Construction 6.6 -6.3 40
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.1 -13.5 25
Health professionals Q - Human health and social work activities 5.5 11.7 90
Personal service workers I - Accommodation and food service activities 5.4 14.8 9
Personal care workers Q - Human health and social work activities 5.2 2.9 21
Drivers and mobile plant operators H - Transportation and storage 5.1 8.5 55
Health associate professionals Q - Human health and social work activities 4.9 10.1 59
Metal, machinery and related trades workers C - Manufacturing 4.9 -2.2 57
Stationary plant and machine operators C - Manufacturing 4.3 1.6 44
Science and engineering associate professionals C - Manufacturing 3.3 11.7 75
Table A4: Top 12 fastest-growing large-employing jobs, including job–wage percentile, EU, 2011–2018 
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
Occupation Sector
Employment  
(millions)
Employment 
change 
2011–2018 
(%)
Wage 
percentile
Business and administration professionals G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 1.0 65.4 87
Legal, social, cultural, etc. professionals P - Education 1.1 50.2 50
ICT professionals J - Information and communication 2.3 47.1 94
Business and administration professionals M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 2.0 40.9 87
Business and administration professionals C - Manufacturing 1.0 37.6 93
Personal service workers I - Accommodation and food service activities 1.3 35.8 2
Legal, social and cultural professionals Q - Human health and social work activities 1.2 32.2 67
Cleaners and helpers Q - Human health and social work activities 1.4 28.3 4
Legal, social, cultural, etc. professionals Q - Human health and social work activities 1.2 27.1 36
Business and administration professionals K - Financial and insurance activities 1.1 25.9 97
General and keyboard clerks O - Public administration and defence 1.4 24.2 49
Labourers in mining, construction, etc. G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 1.6 21.1 11
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The jobs that are contracting fastest are dispersed 
across the wage distribution and include construction 
labourers, clerical jobs in two sectors as well as one of 
the large-employing jobs, agricultural labourers         
(Table A5). 
As Figure A5 illustrates, a very large share of net new 
employment since 2011 has been in service sectors, 
which now account for nearly three out of four jobs in 
the EU. Private services have accounted for the      
majority of this growth, but services that are 
predominantly state-funded (education, health,         
public administration, and so on) have also made a 
strong contribution to growth in the top quintiles, 
where public sector jobs are well represented.         
Private services employment growth has also been 
strong in the top quintile but shows some modest 
evidence of polarisation overall, as nearly all net 
employment growth in the lowest two quintiles is in 
lower-level service jobs, such as personal service 
workers or food preparation assistants in 
accommodation and food service activities                         
(see Table A5).  
Table A5: Top 12 fastest-declining large-employing jobs, including job–wage percentile, EU, 2011–2018
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)    
Occupation Sector
Employment  
(millions)
Employment 
change 
2011–2018 
(%)
Wage 
percentile
Cleaners and helpers T - Activities of households as employers 1.4 -23.0 0
Labourers in mining, construction, etc. F - Construction 1.0 -21.1 28
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.1 -13.5 25
Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.3 -12.7 4
Hospitality, retail and other services managers I - Accommodation and food service activities 1.1 -11.7 63
Hospitality, retail and other services managers G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 1.2 -7.9 84
Building and related trades workers F - Construction 6.6 -6.3 40
Business and administration associate professionals C - Manufacturing 1.6 -3.3 77
Numerical and material recording clerks G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 1.5 -3.3 38
Business and administration associate professionals G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, etc. 2.3 -2.9 69
Metal, machinery and related trades workers C - Manufacturing 4.9 -2.2 57
Food processing, wood working, etc. workers C - Manufacturing 3.1 -1.8 27
Figure A5: Developments by broad sector – the services transition, in thousands, EU, 2011–2018 
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Employment losses by broad sector have been 
concentrated in the primary sector 
(agriculture/extractive industries) and construction. In 
agriculture, these losses have been highly concentrated 
in a small number of Member States with comparatively 
large but fast-declining agricultural workforces, for 
example Croatia, Greece, Poland, Portugal and 
Romania. The jobs involved are low-paid and in the first 
and second job-wage quintiles.  
The construction sector headcount suffered the 
steepest relative decline during the global financial 
crisis and has been much slower to recover than 
manufacturing. Net employment growth resumed only 
in 2016, and employment levels remain below those of 
2011 and far below those of 2008. This net destruction 
of employment affected mainly low-paid and mid-low-
paid jobs. 
Manufacturing, which suffered the steepest employment 
losses during the recession, has staged a stronger 
recovery, with net employment growth since 2013 
amounting to 2 million new jobs. Interestingly, net new 
employment has been skewed towards better-paid jobs, 
with a recomposition of employment towards higher-
skilled, professional roles and away from more traditional, 
blue-collar production jobs. Employment has grown in 
professional engineering and management roles.  
The key trends can be summarised in the following 
points. 
£ Net employment growth since 2011 in the EU has 
tended to be upgrading and skewed towards         
well-paid jobs, generally requiring higher-level 
qualifications. In the five years after the                   
post-recession resumption of employment growth in 
2013, the EU created nearly 15 million net new jobs. 
£ There continues to be a variety of patterns of 
employment shift across Member States. During       
Q2 2011–Q2 2018, some countries exhibited one of 
the two main patterns identified in the literature – 
upgrading and polarisation. For example, Sweden 
was clearly upgrading while Belgium was clearly 
polarising. Some countries, such as Hungary and 
Italy, exhibited downgrading shifts, where relative 
employment growth was strongest in low-paid jobs.  
£ Service sectors have contributed to all net 
employment growth recorded since 2011; the 
balance of the remaining broad sectors has been 
slightly negative. Private service sectors have          
been the main beneficiary, but predominantly 
state-funded sectors (mainly education and health) 
have made an increasing contribution in more 
recent years to top-quintile employment growth, 
consistent with less-constrained public finances. 
Annexes
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Annex 3: Mobility and migration 
from a regional perspective 
In this section, the jobs-based regional analysis is 
reframed from the perspective of worker mobility, in 
two dimensions. Firstly, the extent of regional 
commuter flows is estimated (that is, the incidence of 
workers who reside in one region but work in another, 
generally neighbouring, region), and these flows are 
characterised in terms of job–wage terciles. Secondly, 
the section describes how non-native employment –            
as proxied by country of birth – is distributed by region 
type. This confirms a higher incidence of non-native 
employment in urban areas, which contributes to the 
polarisation of employment in capital city regions. 
Region of work 
In previous EJM analyses, the jobs-based approach has 
been applied at national and aggregate EU levels only. 
The main data source, the EU-LFS, is a household 
survey, and the respondents are resident in the 
reporting Member State; but they are not necessarily 
working in the same Member State. In practice, this is a 
minor problem for the analysis at national level, where 
the share of cross-border workers is tiny (never more 
than 2% of the national population and usually much 
less), and unlikely to affect national estimates in any 
meaningful way. To be consistent with the methodology 
of previous EJM analyses, the main analysis in this 
report has been based on the region of residence of     
EU-LFS respondents (as captured by the survey variable 
REGION). 
An argument can be made for focusing instead on the 
region of work (the region where respondents’ principal 
paid job is carried out), regardless of where respondents 
live. Where there are high levels of intra-country 
regional commuting, a residence-based approach could 
give misleading or biased results. This potential concern 
extends also to cross-border workers commuting 
between border regions and neighbouring countries. 
Here, we investigate how relevant this difference is for 
the analysis, based on the REGIONW (region of work) 
variable in the EU-LFS, which identifies the regions in 
which respondents work as opposed to where they 
reside.10  
Just over 6% of workers in the nine Member States 
analysed – around 11 million – indicated that they were 
not working in the region in which they were resident in 
2017 (Table A6). The large majority of these resided in 
another region in the same Member State (5.1%).           
The proportion explicitly indicating that they worked          
in another country is very small (0.3%), but this is likely 
to be an underestimate. The distribution of the ‘not 
indicated’ respondents, which is heavily weighted in 
border regions in the reporting countries, suggests that 
a large share of these workers were also working in 
neighbouring Member States. The share of regional 
commuting was especially high in Belgium (over 20%) 
and relatively low in Italy, Poland and Spain (less       
than 3%). 
Table A6: Share of workers who work in the same region as where they reside, a different region or another 
country, nine Member States, 2017
Country Same region (%) Different region (%) Other country (%) Not indicated (%) 
Belgium 77.8 19.5 0 2.7
Czechia 93.4 5.4 1 0.2
France 93.4 4.8 1.2 0.7
Germany 92.8 5.6 0.1 1.5
Italy 96.9 2.6 0.0 0.6
Poland 96.2 2.5 0.5 0.8
Spain 97.6 2.0 0.1 0.3
Sweden 93.7 5.4 0.0 0.9
United Kingdom 91.8 7.5 0.0 0.7
Total 93.7 5.1 0.3 0.9
Note: Regions at NUTS 2 level except for Germany and the United Kingdom, where it is NUTS 1 level. 
Source: EU-LFS    
10 REGIONW data are available only more recently in some of the nine Member States covered. For Sweden, data is from 2005; for Poland, from 2004.  
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As Table A7 illustrates, capital cities in particular absorb 
commuting workers from surrounding regions. The 
table lists the top three regions by country in terms of 
the national share of non-resident workers (those 
working in the region but not resident there). The 
highest national shares were reported in the capital      
city regions in all nine Member States except Italy and 
Germany – though Berlin and Lazio did appear among 
the top three regions in each case. The highest shares 
were recorded in less populous Member States with 
‘dominating’ capital city regions (those accounting for 
more than 20% of national GDP): Prague and 
Stockholm. But the larger capital city regions of                 
Île de France, London and Madrid accounted for over 
one-third of all regional commuters in their respective 
countries.  
In each, the share of the country’s non-resident workers 
is much higher than the capital’s share of national 
employment – by a factor of nearly four in the case of 
Brussels and Prague. The converse is true in the case of 
second cities in many of the countries; the regions 
containing Antwerp, Barcelona, Gothenburg and Lyon 
each absorb a significantly lower share of regional 
commuters than their share of national employment 
would suggest. The gravitational draw of regional 
commuting flows appears to be highly capital-specific, 
rather than more broadly metropolitan, in these 
countries.  
Annexes
Table A7: Share of country’s total employment and of non-resident workers in top three regions, 2017
Top three regions by country
Share of national 
employment  
(%) 
Share of country’s                   
non-resident workers 
(%) 
BE10 Brussels 10 36
BE24 Flemish Brabant 9 15
BE21 Antwerp 19 11
CZ01 Prague 13 55
CZ02 Střední Čechy 11 21
CZ06 Jihovýchod 16 8
FR10 Île de France 21 38
FR82/83 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 8 7
FR71 Rhône-Alpes 11 5
DE60 Hamburg 2 15
DE30 Berlin 4 12
DE70 Hessen 8 11
ITC4 Lombardia 19 24
ITH5 Emilia-Romagna 9 12
ITI4 Lazio 10 12
PL12 Mazowieckie 15 27
PL22 Śląskie 12 14
PL21 Małopolskie 9 9
ES30 Communidad de Madrid 16 39
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 4 10
ES51 Cataluña 18 8
SE11 Stockholm 25 43
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 15 16
SE23 Västsverige 21 11
UKI London 14 39
UKJ South East (England) 13 16
UKH East of England 9 10
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)  
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In Germany and Italy, it was the regions around the 
second cities – Hamburg and Milan – that recorded the 
highest share of non-resident workers. The polycentric 
urban settlement of Germany in particular but also Italy 
to a lesser extent leads to relatively low shares of 
interregional commuters in the top three regions – 
commuting flows are much more dispersed across 
regions and less concentrated in individual population 
centres.  
A final point from Table A7 is that capital city regions 
can exert a further pull in terms of regional commuting 
shares on neighbouring regions. This is the case in the 
United Kingdom, where the regions surrounding Greater 
London – and from which many Greater London-bound 
workers leave to work – themselves absorb a high share 
of national cross-region commuters. Similar patterns 
are observed in Střední Čechy, the ‘doughnut’ region 
surrounding Prague, and Flemish Brabant, part of the 
Brussels commuting zone, as well as Castilla-La Mancha 
near Madrid. These patterns suggest that work-related 
commuting stretches the effective capital city economic 
boundaries beyond its NUTS-defined limits in these 
countries in such a way that surrounding regions 
themselves are incorporated in a greater capital region 
commuting zone – with outflows to the capital region 
itself but also inflows from the capital region proper as 
well as from other neighbouring regions. 
From 2002 to 2017, the pull of the capital city regions in 
terms of commuting flows has increased in relative 
terms in all cases except Brussels – where it nonetheless 
remains very high. The strongest increase has been 
recorded in Prague (Table A8). 
The growing importance of capital city regions in the 
national employment share presented in this report is 
boosted by commuting flows from workers resident 
outside the capital. In all of the nine capital city regions, 
the net commuting flow (non-residents working in the 
capital minus those resident in the capital working 
elsewhere) is positive, especially in Brussels but also 
strongly in Berlin, London and Prague. In total, these 
commuting flows add 1.7 million net headcount to the 
capital city regions. 
This raises two questions. The first relates to the 
characteristics of these commuting workers, for 
example in terms of occupation and sector. Do they 
differ from those of the resident working population? 
The second question, which follows on from the first,            
is whether and to what extent changing the frame of 
reference from region of residence to region of work 
might alter the descriptive findings of the jobs-based 
approach regarding employment-shift patterns at 
regional level – upgrading, polarisation, and so on. 
Clearly, they impact on the quantitative employment 
shifts as already indicated, notably in capital cities such 
as Brussels, London and Prague, but will they also 
change the aggregate qualitative patterns? 
One hypothesis is that commuting workers could be 
categorised in two distinct groups, broadly speaking 
those choosing to live outside cities for quality of life 
reasons (generally those with better-paid jobs) and 
those obliged to live outside cities for cost of living 
reasons, especially high housing costs (those with 
lower-paying jobs). What we infer from the EU-LFS data 
is that the first hypothesis is better supported by the 
data than the second. The key difference between 
resident and commuting workers is that a higher share 
of commuting workers tends to be in higher 
occupational groups. The share of high-skilled          
white-collar workers among those commuting to work 
is 13 percentage points higher than among workers 
resident in the same region. Commuting workers are 
less likely to be blue-collar workers or lower-skilled 
white-collar workers. A possible explanation is that 
distance imposes costs and that, as a consequence, 
relatively well-paid workers have more obvious 
incentives to commute interregionally. For those on 
lower pay, the rewards are less likely to justify the 
additional expense. These differences apply across all 
Table A8: Share of non-resident workers in capital city regions and change, 2002–2017, nine Member States
NUTS code Region 2002 (%) 2017 (%) Change (ppt)
BE10 Brussels 55.47 46.9 -8.5
CZ01 Prague 14.5 19.5 5.0
DE30 Berlin 11.5 14.0 2.5
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 2.9 4.9 2.0
FR10 Île de France 7.3 8.3 1.0
ITI4 Lazio 2.9 3.1 0.2
PL12 Mazowieckie 2.4 4.3 1.9
SE11 Stockholm 7.6 9.0 1.4
UKI London 17.8 18.2 0.4
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)  
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types of region of work (mostly urban, intermediate and 
mostly rural) and are not especially prominent in capital 
city regions. Indeed, the biggest differential is observed 
for those commuting to largely urban – but not capital 
city – regions (14 percentage points, 54% versus 40%) 
while it is somewhat lower for  those commuting to 
work in capital city regions (10 percentage points,         
62% versus 52%). Moreover, among the nine capital city 
regions covered, there was considerable variation, with 
commuters working in Brussels, London, Paris and 
Rome having a higher occupational profile than resident 
workers, but little difference in Berlin, Mazowieckie, 
Prague or Stockholm and, exceptionally, a higher 
occupational profile of resident workers in Madrid. 
Overall, this implies that regions that absorb a lot of 
commuting workers are, in reality, more upgraded in 
their employment structures than would be the case if 
they were characterised solely on the basis of resident 
workers. Across all of the 130 regions covered in this 
report, these differences are relatively marginal. Broken 
down by region type, the main difference is that the 
already high share of top-tercile employment in capital 
city regions is increased further by 1.2 percentage 
points (45.5% versus 44.3%). The principal pattern –      
the contrast of largely rural areas with a skew towards 
low-paid employment and capital city regions with a 
skew towards high-paid employment – remains 
unaffected.  
However, for specific regions, especially those capitals 
that absorb a high share of relatively high-skilled,           
high-paid commuters, the differences can be dramatic. 
In the Brussels region, where nearly half of workers 
commute in from other regions, each job–wage tercile 
grows in absolute terms when region of work is 
compared to region of residence. By far the majority of 
this additional headcount is in jobs in the top tercile, 
followed by those in the middle tercile, with a more 
modest positive contribution in the low-paid tercile 
(Figure A6). The skew towards well-paid employment 
steadily increased from 2002 to 2017. Interestingly, the 
contribution of commuting to boost employment in the 
middle tercile has tended to decline since 2002.  
In the case of London, a similar pattern of employment 
growth skewed towards higher-paid jobs is evident. This 
skew increased over time and commuting flows tended 
to accentuate the skew. Unlike Brussels, however, 
commuting flows raise the level of employment in the 
low and middle terciles only modestly.  
In summary, assessing employment shifts based on 
region of work rather than region of residence does 
make a difference but mainly for larger metropolitan or 
capital city regions, especially those with significant 
commuting inflows. These regions benefit numerically 
from the daily movement of workers from neighbouring 
regions. As interregional commuters tend to have a 
higher-than-average occupational profile, these inflows 
tend to exacerbate the already existing employment 
skew towards high-paid jobs in these large urban areas, 
and this skew appears to have become stronger over 
time.  
Annexes
Figure A6: Distribution of employment, in thousands, by national job–wage tercile, Brussels and London,         
2002–2017
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Non-native employment 
Non-native employment accounts for one in eight 
workers in the EU, and this share has grown over time. 
The EU has consistently had a significantly positive net 
migration balance since the 1980s (Darvas, 2017), while 
intra-EU mobility has also increased, notably after the 
expansion of the EU from 15 Member States to 28 during 
the period 2004–2011. As non-native workers tend to 
have disadvantages in the labour market – due to a lack 
of personal networks, lack of relevant language skills, 
non-recognition of qualifications, discrimination and 
other reasons – they are more likely to be overqualified 
than native workers for their given jobs (OECD and 
European Union, 2015). This translates into a higher 
share of non-natives on the lower rungs of the 
occupational ladder. At the same time, international 
mobility can benefit highly qualified workers by offering 
them superior work possibilities outside their country of 
birth. Both types of non-native worker tend to be 
concentrated in largely urban areas, especially capital 
city regions, where employment growth has been most 
resilient and where co-national networks are most likely 
to exist. In this section, we explore the extent to which 
non-native workers contribute to employment growth 
across the job–wage distribution and by region type. 
It is important to underline that methodological 
considerations abound in relation to measuring the 
non-native working population. The identification of 
who counts as a mobile or migrant worker is itself     
non-trivial. Statistically, estimates can vary widely 
based on inadequate coverage in population sampling 
frames, high non-response rates and, increasingly, 
difficulties in capturing phenomena such as short-stay 
or circular migration. Box A1 describes the basis on 
which EU-LFS data is used to estimate the non-native 
employment share.  
There are two questions in the EU-LFS that capture the native status of workers. Each measures different things 
and therefore generates different estimates. One relies on country of birth (countryb), the other on citizenship 
(national). For the descriptive analysis in this section, we use country of birth as a proxy for workers who are 
internationally mobile (EU-born but working in another Member State) or migrant (non-EU-born and working in 
an EU Member State). This conforms to the international standard definition of immigrant (Diez Guardia and 
Pichelmann, 2006), but it does tend to generate higher estimates for the migrant population than the question 
about citizenship. The main reason for not using a citizenship-based proxy of mobile or migrant workers is that 
citizenship is affected by naturalisation processes that absorb proportions of the immigrant population in ways 
that vary markedly between Member States.  
Another note of caution is required regarding indicated estimates of the proportion of non-native workers in the 
EU workforce, due notably to partial data on the country of birth question from Germany, where all non-native 
workers were coded as ‘non-response’ until 2016. Our working assumption is that all workers in this category 
were non-native workers, as the indicative shares are consistent with those from other sources used to generate 
estimates of the German non-native population share. 
Box A1: Measurement difficulties
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The regional distribution of non-native employment is 
heavily skewed towards urban regions and in particular 
capital city regions, as Figure A7 confirms. Around one 
in four workers (24%) in capital city regions in the nine 
Member States analysed was born outside the Member 
State concerned in 2017. This compares to around 4% in 
largely rural regions. Other largely urban and 
intermediate regions lie in the middle, with between 
12% and 14% of jobs held by non-native workers.         
Cities then, especially larger cities and capitals, tend to 
be the first port of call for mobile and migrant workers. 
It is here that they can join existing networks of                 
co-nationals, which facilitate integration and where 
employment opportunities are likely to be most 
plentiful and wages higher. They are also the key nodes 
of high-skilled services work where labour markets are 
increasingly transnational and transfers of specialised 
workforce, including intercorporate transfers, more 
common. As already indicated (see Chapter 2), the  
share of capital cities in employment in sectors such        
as financial services, professional, technical and 
administrative activities, and information and 
communication is around twice that in non-capital       
city regions.  
Capital city regions are distinctive not only in the 
quantity of the migrant and mobile working 
populations, but also in how this has shifted over time 
and in how it is distributed across the job–wage 
spectrum. The non-native workforce in capital city 
regions is more likely to be working in either low-paid or 
high-paid jobs (bottom and top tercile) than in mid-paid 
jobs. In each of the other region types, there is a strong 
skew of non-native employment towards low-paid jobs. 
This differentiation has become more acute since 2004. 
The first thing to observe is that most regions and 
region types have seen a rise in the share of non-native 
employment. The share of non-native workers in the 
lowest-paid jobs has, however, risen faster than in           
mid-paid and high-paid jobs across all region types, but 
notably so in capital city and largely urban regions.           
At the same time, capital city regions have also 
experienced a stronger non-native growth in               
higher-paid jobs than the other region types. 
Consequently, non-native employment in capital city 
regions was more polarised in 2017 than in 2004, while 
in each of the other region types it was more skewed 
towards the bottom tercile and dominated by low-paid 
employment.  
Annexes
Figure A7: Share of non-native workers (%), by job–wage tercile and region type, nine Member States,                  
2004 and 2017
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Individual capital city regions differ markedly in terms 
of their share of non-native employment, mainly along 
an east–west axis, with much higher shares observed in 
long-standing Member States (Figure A8). There is also a 
strong differentiation in terms of their wage 
distribution. In the two capital city regions with the 
highest shares of non-native employment, Brussels – 
where more than half of resident workers are                          
non-native – and London, non-natives are most likely to 
be in the top tercile of employment. It is interesting to 
note on the eve of Brexit that London alone accounts for 
nearly half of the top-tercile employment of all nine 
capital city regions considered together (860,000 of        
1.82 million), evidence of its long-established status as 
one of a small number of ‘world cities’ and one of the 
main financial services centres worldwide. The 
probability of non-natives working in well-paid jobs 
(compared to mid-paid or low-paid) is also somewhat 
higher in the Berlin, Prague and Stockholm regions 
while in Madrid, Rome, and, to a lesser extent, Paris,     
the opposite is the case, with a high share of non-native 
employment in the low-paid tercile.  
Figure A8: Share of non-native employment (%) in capital city regions, by job–wage tercile, 2017
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Annex 4: Literature review – 
Regional applications of the  
jobs-based approach  
Germany 
Dauth (2014) analyses employment polarisation at the 
local level in western Germany between 1980 and 2010 
using registry data of all German employees subject to 
social security, provided by the German Federal 
Employment Agency and the BIBB/IAB Qualification and 
Career Survey for the task content. The results show a 
significant level of heterogeneity, with about half of all 
functional local labour markets (204 in total, defined              
on the basis of commuting patterns) displaying the            
U-shaped wage–employment profile characteristic of 
employment polarisation, while the other cases are 
either not polarised or even negatively polarised. The 
study then explores the factors behind these regional 
differences, first introducing a new measure of the 
magnitude of job polarisation, which allows a 
quantitative comparison across labour markets. Rather 
than relying on the parameter of the quadratic term to 
demonstrate a U-shaped relationship (Goos and 
Manning, 2007), which is sensitive to the influence of 
single observations at the extremes of the distribution, 
Dauth (2014) considers the t-ratio of the quadratic term 
a better measure of polarisation, since it accounts for 
how well the U-shape fits the data.11 The author finds 
that employment polarisation occurs almost exclusively 
in urban areas with a stronger concentration of routine 
tasks (in particular cognitive tasks, which are easily 
replaced by computers and are most prevalent in cities). 
It also occurs to a lesser extent in urban areas where  
the industry structure is characterised by modern and 
skill-intensive export-oriented manufacturing            
(rather than import-competing industries where     
mostly routine manual tasks are performed). 
Senftleben-Konig and Wielandt (2014) analyse the 
polarisation of employment and wages in Germany 
between 1979 and 2006. This is the first study that tests 
the implications of the model proposed by Autor and 
Dorn (2013) for the German labour market.12 Data on 
local employment and wages were obtained from the 
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies 
Regional File, provided by the Institute of Employment 
Research of the Federal Employment Agency, while task 
intensity is derived from BIBB/IAB. The authors exploit 
spatial variation in the exposure to technological 
progress, due to initial differences in the share of 
routine intensive employment, in order to directly link 
labour market outcomes to levels of computer 
adoption. In line with findings for the United States, the 
local labour markets in Germany that polarised the 
most were those particularly exposed to 
computerisation because of a higher share of routine 
jobs. These markets also experienced an employment 
shift from mid-skilled routine occupations to lower-
skilled personal services (although the effect is gender 
specific and only true for female employees, while men 
relocate towards construction). However, and contrary 
to what Autor and Dorn (2013) find, the reallocation to 
service occupations is accompanied by significant wage 
losses, suggesting that technological change 
contributes to a dispersion of the wage structure. This 
key difference highlights the importance of demand 
forces when investigating the impact of technological 
change on the wage structure and suggests no evidence 
of increasing demand for personal services in Germany.  
Blien and Dauth (2016) also look at structural changes in 
local labour markets in Germany from 1978 to 2010. 
Local labour markets consist of 204 regions defined on 
the basis of commuter flows. They use data from the 
German Federal Employment Agency, which originate 
from the compulsory notifications made by employers 
to the social security system, and the BIBB/IAB 
Qualification and Career Survey for the task 
composition of each occupation. The main findings 
reveal only weak employment polarisation for the 
overall period, but clear polarisation for the decade of 
the 2000s. The regression analysis shows a positive 
association between employment growth at the 
occupational level (within labour market regions) and 
the upper two quartiles of the occupation–wage 
distribution, indicating that they grew faster than 
average. There is no evidence of a significant 
association with the lower two quartiles. A negative 
correlation with routine intensity is found instead, in 
line with previous literature, which suggests a decline in 
the demand for routine labour. However, this result is 
no longer significant when controlled at the 
occupational qualification level. Surprisingly, the results 
also reveal that a higher population density is 
negatively related to employment growth at the 
occupational level. This goes against the theory and 
evidence that agglomerated areas show the highest 
employment growth.  
Reinhold (2016) investigates the link between job 
polarisation and wage inequality in Germany using 
regional variation to identify this link. Analysing data 
from social security records from 1975 to 2010, the 
Annexes
11 Inclusion of a quadratic term (squared value of an existing independent variable) in a regression framework helps to establish whether the relationship 
between the said independent variable and an outcome variable is non-linear. As employment polarisation is an example of a non-linear relationship 
between wage and employment growth for a given set of jobs or occupations, many studies use such an approach. One potential problem of such an 
approach is that it identifies non-linearity or convexity rather than polarisation per se.  
12 Autor and Dorn (2013) investigate the polarisation of employment and wages in the United States and the growth of low-skilled service jobs between 1980 
and 2005 in local labour markets (approximated by commuting zones). The study found that the rising employment and wages in low-skilled service 
occupations accounted for polarisation and the growth of the lower tail of the employment and earnings distributions. 
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study finds that while technology-driven employment 
polarisation drives up wage inequality, it only 
marginally moves the wage structure itself. Indeed, 
structural wage shifts in regions exhibiting employment 
polarisation, relative to regions not exhibiting 
polarisation, are small and limited to wages in the upper 
part of the distribution. This suggests that lower-tail 
wage inequality can most likely be explained by other 
changes not related to technology, such as institutions. 
Furthermore, when skills are taken into consideration, 
employment shifts are not correlated to wage growth. 
The rise in inequality at the top is directly associated 
with rising skills requirements within occupations. 
Regional diversity in workforce composition, and not 
job polarisation itself, explains differentials in wage 
inequality. 
Italy 
Aimone et al (forthcoming) apply the jobs-based 
approach developed by Eurofound to the Italian labour 
market. Using EU-LFS data for the period 1998–2017, 
the authors look at employment change by job–wage 
quintile both at national and (macro) regional levels, 
given the great diversity in the Italian productive 
structure across regions. The analysis of employment 
dynamics at territorial level confirms an economic 
divide between central and northern Italy, on the one 
hand, and southern Italy, on the other. In particular, by 
looking at different subperiods, the authors show that 
southern Italy experienced a more intense decline in 
employment during the recession, and that the recovery 
in the years 2014–2017 was weaker and attributable to 
growing employment in low-skilled jobs. The sectoral 
composition seems to be one of the main factors 
explaining these trends: southern Italy is characterised 
by a relatively high share of employment in agriculture, 
public services, and less-technological services and 
industry. 
Netherlands 
Terzidis et al (2017) confirm that the Dutch labour 
market polarised at provincial level between 1999 and 
2012, but with a considerable spatial heterogeneity 
among local labour markets. Firstly, the degree of 
urbanisation plays an important role, with regions that 
are initially more urbanised being more likely to have a 
polarised employment structure. Secondly, by testing 
the relationship between tasks and structural 
employment changes at the occupational level, the 
authors find a negative association between the level of 
routineness (abstract task intensity) in the occupation 
and changes in employment share. The data used for 
the analysis are from the Dutch LFS, merged with 
administrative data on income and work location. 
Spain 
Consoli and Sánchez-Barrioluengo (2016) analyse 
regional polarisation in 50 Spanish provinces for the 
period 1981–2011, using data from the decennial 
population census and the Spanish Structure of Salary 
Survey. The analysis finds that: 
£ job polarisation is the main employment trend 
among Spanish regions over the period considered 
£ the decrease in routine jobs is particularly driven by 
the diffusion of technology 
£ the expansion of low-skilled service jobs is stronger 
in those regions with a higher initial level of routine 
occupations (for example, clerks and machine 
operators) 
These results are not specific to large metropolitan 
areas. The study also shows that the presence of               
high-skilled workers produces a local job creation effect 
with spillovers into non-tradeable service occupations 
(which are highly dependent on physical proximity to 
their customers), although this is small in magnitude. 
Results are robust to various controls and instrumental 
variables that account for long-term industry 
specialisation. 
United Kingdom 
Kaplanis (2007) examines the spatial patterns of 
employment polarisation in UK regions between 1991 
and 2001 and confirms its regional pervasiveness. The 
data used for the analysis are from the New Earnings 
Survey,13 which samples employees aged between                       
16 and 64; a robustness check using UK LFS data is             
also performed. The empirical work in this study 
extends the analysis of Goos and Manning (2007) to  
look at changes in the employment structure at the 
local level (the 11 standard statistical regions of Britain 
– the NUTS 1 regions excluding Northern Ireland),                
using pay as a proxy for job quality (10 equally sized job 
quality categories are created based on median 
occupational wages). The analysis primarily considers 
headcounts, but robustness checks using hours worked 
are also performed. Results show that the pattern of 
employment polarisation found at country level is also 
visible at regional level (with the exception of East 
Anglia). Among all the regions, this pattern is strongest 
in London, followed by the West Midlands and the South 
East, and weakest in Wales and the North of England.14  
13 One disadvantage of this survey is that it does not cover employees whose weekly pay is below the lower threshold for paying National Insurance 
contributions, which means there is an underrepresentation of low-paid workers. This means many part-time employees are excluded. 
14 While in the 1990s London appeared to experience stronger employment polarisation than the rest of Britain, this was not the case in earlier decades. 
When extending the period of analysis to earlier data between 1975 and 1990, evidence suggests that the London labour market operated differently 
during the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1990s. Indeed, while employment polarisation appears to emerge at the national level, the phenomenon is 
weaker for London. 
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When performing the same analysis for metropolitan 
compared to non-metropolitan areas, results do not 
support the existence of an ‘urban’ effect, suggesting 
that London is a special case on its own. When exploring 
differences in the composition and growth of 
employment between London and the rest of Britain, 
results show that in the capital there was stronger 
employment polarisation among women, which was 
not recorded in the rest of the country. Furthermore, 
when looking specifically at the full-time workers 
subgroup, employment polarisation (both in terms of 
headcounts and, even more so, hours worked) is 
observed at national level and, even more so, in 
London. This somehow challenges, even if only 
indirectly, the evidence that polarisation is due to 
increased employment of part-time workers in low-paid 
jobs. 
Jones and Green (2009) examine the regional 
distribution of employment in the United Kingdom 
between 1997 and 2007 using a job quality approach 
proposed by Goos and Manning (2007). The analysis is 
undertaken using UK LFS data, both for employment 
and hourly wages at the occupational level, with regions 
defined by place of work. The main findings reveal 
evidence of regional differences in the quality of 
employment, which have also grown over time. While 
increasing polarisation since 1997 is recorded for most 
UK regions, with net new job creation being skewed 
towards higher-skilled occupations, London and the 
South East (which already have the highest initial 
proportion of high-quality jobs) have outperformed 
other regions in this respect. Northern Ireland is the 
notable exception, with an increase in the proportion of 
the lowest-quality rather than the highest-quality jobs. 
A more detailed examination of regional employment 
trends by industry reveals that the majority of new jobs 
that were created in London and the South East were in 
areas such as finance, real estate and business-related 
activities. Yet, regional differences are actually driven by 
the occupation structure within sectors, in terms of a 
high-quality or low-quality bias, rather than an 
employment bias towards more productive sectors. 
Finally, the study presents evidence that the public 
sector (which is quite evenly spread across regions) 
played an important role in providing high-quality jobs, 
especially outside London and the South East, hence 
contributing to a reduction of regional disparities.  
Lee et al (2015) investigate the geography of urban 
inequality in Great Britain. More specifically, the authors 
examine patterns of wage inequality and employment 
polarisation in 60 British cities,15 defined on the basis of 
‘travel to work areas’. The primary source of data is the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2008, 2009 and 
2010) and the Business Register and Employment 
Survey for statistics on industry composition at city 
level. While previous studies investigated inequality at 
regional level in Great Britain, this is not the case for the 
urban level. The authors use several measures of wage 
inequality (the Gini coefficient, the 90/10 ratio, the 90/50 
ratio and the 50/10 ratio) as well as the measure of 
employment polarisation developed by Jones and 
Green (2009), which captures the extent to which jobs 
are considered low-wage and high-wage occupations 
relative to those at the median wage level.16 The results 
suggest that the most unequal and polarised cities, 
apart from London which holds the negative record, 
tend to be in the Greater South East of England               
(the areas surrounding London), while the most equal 
tend to be the ex-industrial cities in the North of 
England or the Midlands.  
When assessing the determinants of urban inequalities, 
the authors find that:  
£ the higher the concentration of high-skilled and 
better-paid workers, the higher the wage inequality 
and employment polarisation 
£ the greater the population size, the more unequal 
the city (however, once controlling for the median 
wages, the coefficient loses significance and halves 
in magnitude, suggesting that it is the higher wages 
in large cities that makes them more unequal) but 
not necessarily the more polarised in the 
occupational structure  
£ the proportion of the workforce employed by the 
public sector is negatively associated with wage 
inequality, while no significant relationship is found 
for employment polarisation 
Annexes
15 The study covers cities in England, the Scottish cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen, and the Welsh cities of Cardiff and Swansea.  
16 With respect to the measures of skill bias and employment polarisation, Jones and Green (2009) introduce two new indexes to 1) quantify the extent to 
which employment is skewed towards the top end of the skills distribution (‘job quality bias’ – the sum of the distances of normalised job rank from 
median job rank); 2) measure the degree to which employment is clustered at the top and bottom ends of the distribution (based on the ‘distance 
squared’ of normalised job rank from the median). 
88
European Jobs Monitor 2019: Shifts in the employment structure at regional level
Annex 5: Determinants of 
regional employment shifts 
Data and empirical strategy 
This section presents the key findings from an 
econometric analysis that aims to investigate the 
determinants of changes between 2002 and 2017 in the 
regional employment structures across the nine 
European countries studied in this report. Using an 
original dataset based on EU-LFS microdata and 
developed for this EJM analysis, regional employment 
structures are described using the jobs-based approach 
(Wright and Dwyer, 2003; Fernández-Macías, 2012), 
where each job is ranked and assigned to equal               
EU-based employment-weighted terciles at the 
beginning and end of the period. Jobs are classified as 
low-paid, mid-paid and high-paid according to whether 
they are assigned to the first, second or third tercile, 
respectively. Using these EU-based job–wage terciles, 
employment is assigned for each region according to 
the share belonging to each of the three groups of jobs.  
Change in employment by tercile is then analysed over 
time. Identifying the baseline structure at the European 
level makes it possible to cover a long time span,           
2002–2017, minimising as far as possible the effects of 
classification changes that occurred during the period, 
which would have led to a different classification of jobs 
and therefore employment in each tercile.  
In all regressions, following the relevant literature        
(see Annex 4), structural employment changes are 
considered as an outcome of different socioeconomic 
forces, often interacting with each other. In particular, 
the contribution of demand and supply factors is 
analysed as well as institutional and innovation factors 
in shaping changes, exploiting the high level of 
heterogeneity across European regions. There are 
controls not only for the contemporaneous effects of 
our explanatory variables but also for differences in the 
regional initial conditions, given the strong path 
dependence of socioeconomic developments. Because 
of data availability at regional level (NUTS 2 level for all 
countries analysed, except Germany and the United 
Kingdom, for which data are at the NUTS 1 level), the 
number of actual observations, 125, is lower than the 
full sample, 130 regions.  
Estimates are calculated using ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) according to the following equation:  
where Tji, the outcome of interest, is the absolute 
employment change in tercile j in region i between 2002 
and 2017. More specifically, absolute changes in each 
tercile are defined as the change in the share of 
employment with respect to the first year.  
In line with the literature (among others,                             
Esping-Anderson, 1999; Gregory et al, 2001; Schettkat 
and Yocarini, 2006; Madariaga, 2018), Dit serves as a 
partial proxy for the demand side of the economy. In 
particular, demographic characteristics are used as a 
proxy for internal demand, measured as relative change 
in the share of individuals over 60 years old in the 
population, where the age structure captures the 
variation in the demand for services and care. This 
captures the need for sector-specific local production 
(both private and public, depending on the level of 
liberalisation of these sectors). The supply side of the 
economy is represented by Sit, which again includes a 
set of regionally defined variables such as changes in 
the share of non-native workers in the population to 
capture variation in the lowest tail of the labour supply 
(Oesch and Rodríguez-Menés, 2011). From an 
interpretative point of view, migrants are thought to 
have a structurally weak position in the labour market, 
regardless of their potential or actual contribution to 
labour productivity or production. Similarly, changes in 
the share of migrants can been seen as a boost to the 
‘reserve army of labour’ (the share of unemployed                   
and underemployed in the regional labour market).              
In the regression, the relative change in the share of 
non-native workers during the subperiod 2002–2007 is 
used as a proxy of migrant worker flows. This shortened 
period rather than the full time span is used, as 
intuitively it could take time for non-natives to integrate 
and participate in the labour market. The second 
variable is the change in the share of women out of the 
total population, to capture female labour supply, a 
driver of the ‘care economy’ (Dwyer, 2013). A third 
variable relates to high-skilled labour supply, measured 
by the change in the share of third-level graduates in the 
population (Cirillo, 2018). 
Not only demand and supply but also technology plays 
a role in determining changes in the employment 
structure. However, technology as such does not have 
an unambiguous effect on employment: the 
employment impact mostly depends on the innovation 
strategy adopted. According to Pianta (2001), it is 
important to distinguish between product and process 
(cost reduction) innovation, where the former should 
have a positive impact on employment and its quality, 
while the opposite occurs under the latter. In the model, 
innovation strategies are measured using the      
European Commission’s Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard, where research and development 
expenditure in the business sector (expressed as a 
percentage of regional GDP) and the share of exports of 
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medium and high-tech manufacturing 17 in total exports 
captures product innovation, while the share of SMEs 
introducing marketing and organisational innovation 18 
captures process innovation.  
Additionally, according to the relevant literature                     
(see, among others, Wright and Dwyer, 2003; Oesch and 
Rodríguez-Menés, 2011; Oesch, 2015; Murphy and 
Oesch, 2017), structural changes cannot be explained 
without looking into the social relations of work and the 
institutional settings mediating them. For this reason, a 
variable based on the wage-setting system, Iit, is 
included to proxy labour market institutions, as well           
as the absolute change in the share of involuntary              
part-time workers (among all part-time workers) as          
a measure of the balance of power between employers 
and workers: the higher the indicator, the lower 
workers’ bargaining power (Wright, 2000). Finally,                
controls for sectoral composition of the employment 
structure. The inclusion of initial conditions is pivotal in 
capturing structural changes that are historical 
outcomes (Nolan and Slater, 2010), and therefore 
subject to strong path dependence. In order to account 
for this, the share of employment in 2002 is used, 
aggregating all sectors (at the NACE two-digit level) in            
a revised version of the Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984) 
built using an ad hoc extraction from the EU-LFS       
(seven broad sectoral categories). As indicated in the 
descriptive sections, employment in one or another 
tercile is often characterised by a high share of workers 
within specific sectors: for example, regions with a           
high share of low-paid jobs (compared to the average          
of the nine Member States analysed) tend to have          
more jobs in the primary sector as well as the                        
low-knowledge-intensive service sector. At the opposite 
end of the job distribution, higher shares of 
employment are observed in the high-tech industrial 
sector as well as health and knowledge-intensive 
services. Finally, the middle of the job distribution has a 
concentration of low-tech manufacturing and 
construction employment.  
This last set of regressors is the only one that differs 
across the tercile-based regressions. The non-inclusion 
of all categories in each specification has been done in 
order to better characterise each tercile in the most 
parsimonious way.  
Results 
Overall, the estimation models seem to explain much of 
the variation across regions and show a high goodness 
of fit. Looking into the statistical significance of the 
socioeconomic determinants yields some significant 
findings (see Table A9).  
£ As far as labour supply is concerned and with all the 
controls included in the models, changes in the 
share of the female population do not significantly 
affect the employment structure, while the more 
skilled the population, the lower the increase in the 
share of low-paid jobs and the higher the absolute 
change in high-paid jobs.  
£ A higher presence of non-native employment over 
time does not seem to directly affect low-paid jobs 
as the literature sometimes predicts, while it 
significantly decreases the share of mid-paid jobs. 
The lack of an effect in the share of non-native 
workers on the change in the share of low-paid jobs 
is the result of the controls for labour market 
institutions and imbalances of labour market 
power. Without these variables, the effect is more in 
line with expectations based on the literature. 
£ The level of involuntary part-time employment has 
a positive effect on the share of low-paid jobs and a 
negative effect on the share of mid-paid 
employment. This is coherent with an 
interpretation of the employment effects of the 
balance of power between employers and workers: 
the higher a firm’s power, the higher the possibility 
of competing on labour costs while specialising in 
labour-intensive sectors that mainly characterise 
jobs in the lowest tercile.  
£ The more centralised the wage-setting system is, 
the lower the increase in high-paid jobs, while the 
opposite occurs for mid-paid jobs. Coefficients are 
statistically significant, suggesting that centralised 
bargaining power tends to be associated with a 
more even distribution of employment across the 
job–wage terciles (or with growth in mid-paid jobs, 
the opposite  to job polarisation).  
Annexes
17 These include: chemicals and chemical products; machinery and equipment; office machinery and computers; electrical machinery and apparatus; radio, 
television and communication equipment; medical, precision and optical instruments; motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; and other transport 
equipment. 
18 As defined in the EC scoreboard, ‘many firms, in particular in the service sectors, innovate through non-technological forms of innovation. Organisational 
innovation is an example of this. This indicator tries to capture the extent to which SMEs innovate through non-technological innovation.’ 
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£ Innovation strategies appear to have a significant 
impact as structural determinants of employment 
shift. In particular, the higher the indicator of 
process innovation in the region, the more growth 
in low-paid jobs and the lower the growth in the 
second and third tercile. This is not surprising, as 
process innovation is often linked to deskilling and 
increased precariousness of work according to the 
classical analysis by Braverman (1974). On the other 
hand, the proxies for product innovation, research 
and development expenditure and exports of    
high-tech manufacturing have a positive effect on 
the increase of the share of well-paid jobs. This 
suggests that if firms in the region specialise in the 
production of goods and services with a higher 
technological content, they tend to hire workers in 
better-paid occupations. The same applies in the 
case of research and development activity. In 
addition, the same variables play a negative role in 
the increase of low-paid jobs, which together with 
the previous results are indicative of an upgrading 
of the employment structure.  
£ Finally, as could be expected, the initial sectoral 
composition of employment has strong effects on 
structural change as measured by the change in 
employment shares by tercile. In particular, regions  
that were initially characterised by a high share of 
employment in the primary sector are those that 
experienced the highest decrease in the share of            
low-paid jobs. The higher the initial share of 
employment in knowledge-intensive services in 
2002, the higher the increase in high-paid jobs, a 
pattern that could be interpreted as the cumulative 
and expansionary effect of high-tech innovations. 
Less intuitive is the role played by the share of            
low-tech industries in employment changes in   
mid-paid jobs. According to the literature, jobs in 
those sectors should be those that tend to be more 
easily displaced over time, making the employment 
structure more polarised. The lack of such evidence 
in the case of this study may suggest that other 
factors included as controls in the model – for 
example, institutional and political factors –            
can offset this effect. 
Table A9: Determinants of shifts in regional employment in the nine Member States analysed, 2002–2017
Low-paid jobs Mid-paid jobs High-paid jobs
% change in share of female population -0.338 0.339 0.243
% change in share of tertiary education -0.0318* 0.00985 0.0255***
% over 60 years old, 2002 -0.00111 0.00265** -0.000357
% change in non-native workers, 2002–2007 0.00611 -0.0205*** 0.00448
Exports medium and high-tech manufacturing -0.0424 0.0274 -0.0297
Marketing or organisational innovation 0.118** -0.114*** -0.0844***
R&D expenditure business sector -0.00239 -0.105*** 0.0777***
Involuntary part-time workers, 2017 0.0944*** -0.0900*** 0.0113
Wage-setting coordination, 2014 0.000392 0.0102*** -0.0152***
Primary sector -0.320***
Construction 0.105
Low-knowledge-intensive services 0.0170
Low-tech industries 0.390***
Public administration 0.0404
Education -0.362
High-tech industries 0.0773
Knowledge-intensive services 0.183**
Health 0.360***
Constant 0.00378 -0.0283 -0.0157
Observations 125 125 125
R-squared 0.638 0.529 0.539
Note: Note: *p = 01; ** p = 05; ***p = 001. 
Source: EU-LFS, SES (authors’ calculations)  
91
Annex 6: An application of the 
Krugman Dissimilarity Index  
The Krugman Dissimilarity Index (Krugman, 1991, p. 75f, 
1993, p. 250f) is a simple transformation of the 
coefficient of regional specialisation, a measure for the 
dissimilarity of the industrial structure of two regions, 
which has a long history in regional studies. 
The Krugman Index for region A compared with B is 
calculated as follows: 
where employment in industry i in region A is XirA, 
employment in the same industry in region B is XirB, 
total employment in all industries in region A is XrA and 
total employment in all industries in region B is XrB. 
In this case, by construction the Krugman Index will 
always lie between the values of 0 (indicating that the 
two distributions are the same, hence the regions have 
identical industrial structures) and 2 (where the two 
distributions have nothing in common, reflecting strong 
sectoral specialisation). Because the index is higher the 
more dissimilar the two distributions are, the measure 
is sometimes said to be an ‘index of dissimilarity’.  
In the case of more than one pair of regions and 
employment as a variable of interest, the Krugman 
Dissimilarity Index is expressed as follows: 
where i indicates the industry and j the region. This 
means to compute the differences between the share of 
employment in a given industry (i) and region (j) and the 
share of employment in a given industry in all regions 
(or reference area). The absolute value of these 
differences is the total sum for all industries (n). In this 
case, the minimum value of the index is 0, while the 
maximum is 2 x (n-1)/n.  
Like the coefficient of regional specialisation, the 
Krugman Index should be seen only as a measure of 
relative specialisation; no absolute degree of 
specialisation can be assessed with this measure. The 
reference area can obviously vary, and the EU average, 
rather than the country average, can be used as a 
benchmark such that the industrial structure of regions 
is compared to the industrial structure of Europe rather 
than the country in which the regions are located. In his 
analysis at the regional level, Hallet (2000) highlights 
that the Krugman Index has a tendency to 
underrepresent the degree of specialisation of large 
countries.  
The Krugman Dissimilarity Index is a useful synthetic 
indicator to capture all deviations from the average 
industrial structure in terms of employment shares.           
It can be seen as a measure of relative specialisation, 
vis-à-vis the national average in this case. The evolution 
of the Krugman Index over time can suggest patterns of 
increasing relative specialisation (when the index 
increases because the industrial structure in the region 
is becoming less similar to the national average) or, 
otherwise, despecialisation. Figure A9 shows the values 
of the Krugman Index (rescaled to 0–100) separately for 
each country and computed for each region in 2002 
(green line) and in 2017 (purple line).  
The main results can be summarised in the following 
points. 
£ Within each country, the index varies considerably 
across regions. In particular, the highest variability 
(standard deviation) is recorded in Czechia, with 
very similar values both at the beginning and at the 
end of the period considered; however, this is all 
driven by the economic specialisation in the capital. 
There was also a significant level of variation in the 
values of the index in Poland in 2002, but this 
rapidly declined due to shrinking employment in 
agriculture in some peripheral eastern regions. In 
2017, the variability in the value of the index was 
also high in Germany and Spain, though somewhat 
slightly declining in the latter. 
£ Prague is by far the region with the highest values 
on the index, and therefore the most dissimilar 
industrial structure compared to the average in 
Czechia, both at the beginning and at the end of the 
period considered. It is followed by the southern 
Italian region of Calabria.  
£ The capital city regions are among the most 
dissimilar in every country. However, while in 
Belgium, Czechia, France, Germany, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, they all rank first in terms of 
the highest Krugman Index value (second in the 
case of France), this is not so clearly the case for 
countries like Italy, Poland and Spain.19   
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19 There may be a data artefact consideration here since the NUTS regions are demarcated in most of the countries so as to effectively isolate the capital city 
population, but in others they encompass significant hinterland territory outside the capital (especially Lazio for Rome, Italy, and Mazowieckie for 
Warsaw, Poland). 
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Figure A9: Krugman Dissimilarity Index, nine Member States, 2002 and 2017
0
10
20
30
40
50
Belgium
2002
2017Brussels
Namur
Luxembourg
Liège
Hainaut
Walloon Brabant West Flanders
Flemish Brabant
East Flanders
Limburg
Antwerp
2002
2017
Lorraine
0
10
20
30
40
50
France
 Île de France
Bretagne
Provence-Alpes
Limousin
Poitou-Charentes
Basse-Normandie
Champagne-Ardenne
Languedoc-Roussillon Picardie
Auvergne Haute-Normandie
Rhône-Alpes Centre
Midi-Pyrénées Bourgogne
Aquitaine
Nord–Pas-de-Calais
Pays de la Loire Franche-Comté
Alsace
2002
2017Prague
Severovýchod
0
10
20
30
40
50
Czechia
Moravskoslezsko
Střední Morava
Jihovýchod Severozápad
Jihozápad
Střední Čechy
2002
2017Baden-Württemberg
0
10
20
30
40
50
Germany
Hessen
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Thüringen
Sachsen
Rheinland-Pfalz
Bremen
Bayern
Schleswig-Holstein Berlin
Sachsen-Anhalt Brandenburg
Saarland Hamburg
Niedersachsen
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
2002
2017Łódzkie
Lubuskie
Pomorskie Mazowieckie
Małopolskie
Zachodniopomorsk
Wielkopolskie
Dolnośląskie
Podlaskie
0
10
20
30
40
50
Poland
Warmińsko-Mazurs
Kujawsko-Pomorsk
Opolskie
Świętokrzyskie
Podkarpackie
Lubelskie
Śląskie
2002
2017Piemonte
BasilicataVeneto
Lazio Liguria
Marche Lombardia
Umbria Abruzzo
Sardegna Sicilia
0
10
20
30
40
50
Italy
Toscana
Bolzano/Trento
Emilia-Romagna
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Calabria
Puglia
Campania
Molise
2002
2017Galicia
Canarias Principado de Asturias
Extremadura
Castilla-La Mancha
0
10
20
30
40
50
Spain
Región de Murcia
Andalucía
Illes Balears
Cataluña
Comunidad Valenciana
Castilla y León
Comunidad de Madrid
Aragón
La Rioja
Comunidad Foral 
de Navarra
Cantabria
País Vasco
2002
2017North East (England)
London
East of England
Northern Ireland
South East (England)
0
10
20
30
40
50
United Kingdom
Scotland
Wales
South West (England) West Midlands
 (England)
East Midlands 
(England)
Yorkshire and 
the Humber
North West (England)
2002
2017Stockholm
Västsverige
Sydsverige
0
10
20
30
40
50
Sweden
Östra MellansverigeÖvre Norrland
Mellersta Norrland
Norra Mellansverige
Småland med 
öarna
EF/19/036
Getting in touch with the EU 
 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres.  You can find the address of 
the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union.  You can contact this service: 
–  by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls) 
–  at the following standard number: +32 22999696 
–  by email via: http://europa.eu/contact 
Finding information about the EU 
 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on  the Europa website 
at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from the EU Bookshop at:  
http://publications.europa.eu/eubookshop. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained  by contacting 
Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official  language versions, 
go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
Open data from the EU 
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp) provides access to datasets from the EU. Data can be 
downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
Accumulating evidence indicates that large 
metropolitan centres are faring much better than 
other regions within the Member States of the EU. 
Such interregional inequality contributes to 
disenchantment with existing political systems, 
which in turn can weaken the social bonds that 
ground democratic systems. 
This is the context for the 2019 edition of the 
European Jobs Monitor, which analyses shifts in 
the employment structure – meaning change in the 
distribution of employment across occupations 
and sectors – of the EU regions. The analysis covers 
130 regions of 9 Member States, which together 
account for nearly 4 out of 5 EU workers. The study 
finds that, while Member States are becoming 
more similar in their employment structures, 
regions within the same country are becoming 
more disparate. It also finds that cities have a 
disproportionately high share of well-paid,              
high-skilled services employment alongside 
growth in low-paid employment. The findings 
support continued EU regional policy assistance of 
regions in danger of being left behind. 
    
   
 
The European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a 
tripartite European Union Agency established in 
1975. Its role is to provide knowledge in the area 
of social, employment and work-related policies 
according to Regulation (EU) 2019/127.
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